The Republic of Philippines

Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 1 Introduction Litigation is afundamental right of anation where adisagreement occurs with some available treaty or where there is aconflict with other states. However, the states prohibit the rights to prosecute by including an arbitration provision in numerous treaties and agreements that they have signed into. Arbitration is aform of alternate conflict settlement that is used outside of court to increase the chances of resolving the dispute while reducing the expense and time of proceeding to court. Disagreements between separate states have affected all sides negatively since the Arbitration Clause has been inserted into several treaties, which countries have not properly read or have little understanding of 1. Unlike the International Court of Justice, arbitration between states has existed for several decades, and the tradition of ancient Greece contains countless instances of arbitration. It was also used “in China, amongst Arabian communities, in the early Middle East, in maritime customary international law in mediaeval Europe, and in Papal practise. ” The fundamental premise of arbitration is the notion that aconflict between states may be more effectively settled if a third independent authority is vested with the jurisdiction to render afinal judgement on the dispute after hearing all sides and attempting to come to an agreement agreeable in between both parties involved in the arbitration. This guiding principle remains valid today. At a period when there were no conflict resolution options and the only available way of resolving conflicts was warfare, the fruitful and respectful arbitration between the United States and the United Kingdom “served as a reminder of the feasibility of arbitration 2.”Arbitration is therefore authorised by Article 33 of the United Nations (“UN ”)Charter that mentions arbitration as one of the conflicts resolving mechanisms, along with negotiation, compromise, conciliation, judicial settlement, and various other means to resolve the same. This is why arbitration is among the most successful approaches for resolving disputes or disagreements amongst states 3.The subject of the South China Sea Arbitration between the 1Anthea Roberts, "State-To-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: AHybrid Theory Of Interdependent Rights And Shared", Heinonline (Webpage, 2014) .2C. J.Trevino, "State-To-State Investment Treaty Arbitration And The Interplay With Investor-State Arbitration Under The Same Treaty" (2013) 5(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement . 3Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration (Juris Publishing, Inc, 2014). Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 2 Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China is one of the hotly debated topics in the media and among nations. In this essay, athorough review of the above case is rendered after objectively analysing the evidence, court rulings, and arbitration awards in this matter. Following that, the available actions that may be used to settle the case in accordance with the arbitration judgement made in this litigation would be discussed in the following segment . Understanding the dispute The South China Sea Arbitration dispute, also known as the Philippines v. China case (PCA case number 2013 –19), was a case filed by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China. This arbitration dispute was brought under the UNCLOS, i.e., the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's Annex VII 4,in relation to the defendant's arguments on the nine-dotted line and other questions in the South China Sea 5.China announced in 2013 that it will not participate in any arbitration proceedings, and in 2014, it released a white paper to further explain its stance. The arbitral tribunal accepted the Philippines' 15 applications after determining that they had jurisdiction over the matter. Finally, in 2016, adecision was made in favour of the Philippines 6.This case is explored in the following sections, and acritical review focused on the facts and rulings is performed. Factual Background Six countries are involved in the South China Sea dispute: China (including Taiwan, which has similar allegations to China), Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The key points of contention are territorial claims and the categorisation of territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) created by the territories. China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam also have territorial claims. Since the majority of the contested territory is underwater at high tides, determining the correct number of islands and rocks is impossible. Just afew hundred of the recognised islands are feasible. Vietnam claimed 30 of the contested islands and rocks, the Philippines 9, Malaysia 6, Brunei 4United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 5AMTI, "Arbitration On The South China Sea: Rulings From The Hague", Amti.Csis.Org (Webpage, 2016) .6Permanent Court of Arbitration, "Permanent Court Of Arbitration", (Webpage, 2016) . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 3 1, and China 7. China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are involved in aconflict about the demarcation of sea territory and EEZ in the region around the Spratly Islands 7.Prior to the 1960s, the controversy was centred on the freedom to fish. Since the 1960s, the subject of the conflict has been fishery rights and control over the available oil and natural gas. In recent years, the ownership of oil and natural gas deposits has been a significant source of concern. The territorial claim conflict is the more important of the two kinds of conflicts. The UNCLOS states that if possession of territory is determined, the territorial sea, maritime region, and EEC will be determined in accordance with the clauses of the UNCLOS 8. The arguments raised by the parties in the South China Sea conflict include territorial claims of exploration and conquest, as well as claims based on the expansion of sovereign authority under interpretations of UNCLOS clauses. China considers the South China Sea to be an independent Chinese sea, claiming almost the whole region. It bases its factual assertions on the exploration and conquest of the territory. The Ruling party established China's claims in 1947 by limiting them to aregion bounded by nine intersecting marks that encompassed the majority of the South China Sea. Prior to the reintegration, Vietnam acknowledged Chinese control over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. From 1975, Vietnam has been claiming both the Islands for their exploration and occupation on the basis of historical arguments. Vietnam also formed a200-nautical-mile zone and termed it as an Exclusive Economic Zone in 1977. Other ASEAN members who are participating in the dispute make competing statements that are restricted to certain areas of the Spratly archipelago and depend on International Law, like the expansion of the territorial waters, but instead of empirical evidence. The Philippines holds the largest territory of the Spratlys – Kalayaan – among the member states. Kalayaan was formally recognised as part of the Philippines' national territory by apresidential decree issued in 1978 9.The Philippines have formed a200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Malaysia expanded its coastline in 1979, incorporating the Spratly Islands into its domain. In 1988, Brunei established a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone to the south of the Spratly Islands, which included Louisa Reef. Indonesia, which is not aSpratly 7Sreenivasa Rao Pemmaraju, "The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): Assessment Of The Award On Jurisdiction And Admissibility" (2016) 15(2) Chinese Journal of International Law . 8Lucy Reed and Kenneth Wong, "Marine Entitlements In The South China Sea: The Arbitration Between The Philippines And China" (2016) 110(4) The American Journal of International Law . 9Bernard HOxman, "The South China Sea Arbitration Award", Heinonline (Webpage, 2016) . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 4 actor, and was unbalanced in the South China Sea controversy before 1993, has been an allegedly expanding Chinese rights to the natural gas fields in the waters that are now exploited by the Indonesian government 10. Conflicts arose from legal and economic factors. There are two laws and standards upon which parties depend as to legitimate heritage. The first is the law of "continuous and efficient occupational activities." The second is the UNCLOS. Prior to the reassessment of the UNCLOS by both claimant countries, the “effective occupation ”statute remained in force, resulting in armed tensions that arises in between the China, Vietnam, and also the Philippines as they attempted to successfully capture the contested islands in order to facilitate diplomatic reorganisation 11.With the rectification of the UNCLOS, certain plaintiffs may have manipulated it to arbitrarily expand their territorial authority and validate their charges in the South China Sea 12.The estimated vast deposits of oil and natural gas, and also the fishery right, are the economic causes of the conflict. Key Issue and Arguments of the Parties The primary argument posed by the Philippines in this situation is that the Chinese nine-point contention is invalid since it goes against UNCLOS as far as the territorial seas and the EEZ are concerned (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2017). This is because most of the aspects of the South China Sea such as most of Spratly can neither support life and thus, as described by UNCLOS, they could not get acontinental shelf 13. On the other side, China declined even to take part in the arbitration by stating that amajority of Philippine treaties had to use reciprocal agreements to resolve boundary conflicts. In addition, the Philippines are suspected of violating the 2002 voluntary declaration on the conduct of the South China Sea parties, which also included abilateral resolution of conflicts, 10Emma Kingdon, "A Case For Arbitration: The Philippines' Solution For The South China Sea Dispute", Heinonline (Webpage, 2015) .11Sophia Kopela, "Historic Titles And Historic Rights In The Law Of The Sea In The Light Of The South China Sea Arbitration" (2017) 48(2) Ocean Development & International Law . 12Ted McDorman, "The South China Sea Arbitration", Asil.Org (Webpage, 2016) . 13Michaela Del Callar, "ITLOS Completes Five-Man Tribunal That Will Hear PHL Case Vs. China", GMA News Online (Webpage, 2013) . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 5 between China and ASEAN 14.In 2014, China released apolicy paper that said that itwas not arbitrated because of jurisdiction and not exploitation of rights 15. Taiwan often expressed its position apart from China and the Philippines, even though it did not participate in the arbitration, or Taiwan's advice was not requested. In these hearings, Vietnam even took astand and placed out three grounds on which the country backed the Philippines' arguments. Vietnam also requested the tribunal to note the allegations made on islands such as Paracels 9-strand claims from China 16.Malaysia and Indonesia also took those positions. Law As previously mentioned, the Philippines lodged the case under the UNCLOS, which governs the protection of the territories of the world's oceans. This treaty was established in 1994, and the Philippines and China, along with the European Union and 165 other nations, accepted it. According to this convention, the country has jurisdiction over the sea up to 12 nautical miles from the nation's shore, as well as power over commercial operations in the seas on the territorial waters up to 200 nautical miles as from the nation's coast 17.This involves control over the development of artificial islands, as well as oil drilling, refining, and fishing. This treaty also contains specific guidelines for identifying certain areas, as well as how disputes can be settled in the event of aconflict, by recommending what can be done where the zones of two separate countries intersect 18. The Philippines had already reported to the Tribunal that it possessed the required authority under UNCLOS Articles 297 and 298. It also claimed that the country had the opportunity to resolve the conflict peacefully and that China had arelated duty not to prolong or exacerbates 14Greg Torode, "Philippines South China Sea Legal Case Against China Gathers Pace", U.S. (Webpage, 2013) .15Reuters Staff, "China Says U.S. Trying To Influence Philippines' Sea Case", U.S. (Webpage, 2015) .16Diep Ngoc Pham and John Boudreau, "South China Sea Tensions Flare As Vietnam Files Stance To Court - Bloomberg", Web.Archive.Org (Webpage, 2014) .17Katie Hunt, "Philippines Vs. China: Court To Rule On Territorial Fight", CNN (Webpage, 2014) .18Permanent Court of Arbitration, "ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PEOPLE ’SREPUBLIC OF CHINA", (Webpage, 2015) . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 6 the dispute before asettlement was found. China's behaviour, on the other hand, not only prolonged but also escalated the conflict 19. The Philippines have referred to the ICJ's ruling in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.) 20,Interim Measures of Protection, Order of 5December 1939, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199. (5 December 1939). According to this, the Court had understood the widely acknowledged concept that the parties to alawsuit must keep from doing something that would result in the aggravation of conflicts. The Philippines have noted that this specific theory had been expressed in relation to the judgement relating to the temporary steps and that it was often cited in those matters 21.The Philippines have relied on the situation of the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran ), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980. Paragraph 5of the Declaration also followed this on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the UN General Assembly's Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 22. Holding China argued that the nine-dash line covered the water within these zones and that there was historical proof to support this argument. However, the court rejected these claims, claiming that the potential implementation of the Treaty eliminated many of the China's customary rights formerly enjoyed by the nation. The Tribunal also observed that even though the island had been used by Chinese navigators and anglers, there was no evidence indicating that Beijing had exercised sole authority over the water supply 23. The tribunal determined that the obligation to preclude from extending or escalating a disagreement whilst the settlement proceedings were ongoing was implicit in the fundamental position of good faith in the international legal ties that occurred between the nations. The tribunal also noted that there was no need to go past the scope of the UNCLOS to identify the 19He Yafei, "The Truth Behind The Philippines' Case On The South China Sea", Huffpost (Webpage, 2017) .201940 P.C.I.J 21Tara Davenport, "Legal Implications Of The 'South China Sea Award' For Maritime Southeast Asia" (2018) 34 Australian Year Book of International Law . 22Permanent Court of Arbitration, "ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PEOPLE ’SREPUBLIC OF CHINA", (Webpage, 2015) .23Nikolaos Lavranos and Ruth AKok, Hague Yearbook Of International Law (BRILL, 2014). Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 7 basis of the law that applied to the actions of the parties throughout the course of litigation relating to conflict resolution under Section XV of the UNCLOS 24. The tribunal ultimately granted almost all of the demands raised by the Philippines in this dispute, and they have issued a series of significant decisions that would redefine the discourse around the South China Sea conflicts in the coming years. First and foremost was the reliability of the claims about the South China Sea in accordance to the conventional rights of China as seen in the nine diagrams. The Court characterised it and then struck it. The tribunal held that when China signed and ratified the UNCLOS and thereby complied with the EEZ formation and the coastal waters frameworks in favour of all coastal states, it discarded and surrendered any historic rights claims regarding the waters outside the territorial sea 25. Second, all the characteristics of the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands region have been extensively characterised by the Court. The rocks and the islands established the contested territorial integrity. However, the sea covering these areas may be assigned to adjacent coastal states in accordance with the UNCLOS 26. The Tribunal also ruled that China's participation in oil and gas mining, Filipino fishing, and the construction of artificial islands to disincarnate Chinese fishermen in the Philippines' EEZ all breached the territorial claims of the Philippines over the EEZ and the coastal waters. It also decided to breach China's obligation to safeguard and protect the aquatic ecosystem by setting up its 7islands, along with China's failure to ban the use of fishermen in sustainable fishing practises 27. The tribunal also ruled that the construction of these artificial islands violated China's commitments to refrain from taking acts that caused irremediable and lasting damage to the marine ecosystem, and that it behaved in away that was detrimental to the interests of the Philippines. Because of these factors, China behaved in away that violated international law by escalating the conflict. According to the UNCLOS, the arbitration award in this situation 24Jay Batongbacal, "Philippines Vs. China In The South China Sea: Beijing At AGeopolitical Crossroads", The National Interest (Webpage, 2016) .25Ibid 19 26Ibid 19 27Ibid 19 Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 8 was both conclusive and binding, and it was published by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 28. Analysis This was regarded as awatershed moment in recent times, and the Philippines were declared to have won by alandslide. About the fact that this was ahistoric judgement, the People's Republic of China declined to recognise itafter itwas released. They released adeclaration in which they dismissed the verdict as null and agreed to disregard it, i.e., they claimed that they would not accept the order of the arbitral tribunal 29. This award has not only major consequences, but also caused shock waves in South Eastern Asia and the rest of Asia-Pacific. This award also placed an end to the claims made by China against unreasonable marine jurisdictions built on ancient rights in the Southern China Sea. For the Philippines' demands for their continental shelf and EEZ beyond the disputed enclaves, the South China Sea was clear of common international use or the sole privilege of costal state ownership outside of the rocks or island and continental fees 30. It is normal that the tiny littoral states in the South China Sea profit from the legal enforcement of the EEZ, as well as the continental shelf entitlements that range from the mainland coasts. And, if China now persists in enforcing the same, itwill be unconstitutional under international law, leaving the coastal states liable to file acivil or similar suit to protect their sovereignty and interests 31. Steps Ahead To cope with rising conflicts in the South China Sea, Southeast Asian claimant states have pursued avariety of dispute-resolution mechanisms. They've just had modest progress up to this stage. For one thing, they have depended on ASEAN to take aunified Southeast Asian stance on sovereignty conflicts and to focus on multilateral engagement with China. Next, they tend to enlist the help of international powers to establish adiplomatic counterbalance to 28Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, China's Global Engagement (Brookings Institution Press, 2017). 29Tom Philips and Oliver Holmes, "Beijing Rejects Tribunal's Ruling In South China Sea Case", The Guardian (Webpage, 2016) .30Ibid 20 31Ibid 19 Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 9 China's assertiveness. Third, they have taken the diplomatic path, attempting to resolve the dispute by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As addressed in other sections of this essay, the Philippines started arbitral proceedings against China under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 32.This segment goes through some of the approaches that may be used to address the current standoff between these sides, as well as whether or not they have been effective in finding realistic alternatives to the conflicts. The ASEAN way Southeast Asian claimant countries, led by Vietnam and the Philippines, have switched to ASEAN for regional support. Members, however, are split in articulating acommon stance vis- à-vis China over tensions in the South China Sea. ASEAN representatives have been struggling to find universal approval on the South China Sea conflicts due to differing national priorities and foreign ties with China and the United States. Vietnam and the Philippines have become the most involved of the four claimant states in latest years, while Malaysia and Brunei have indeed been comparatively peaceful 33. The former two have alarger interest in the South China Sea, which may explain why they have adopted amore forceful stance in asserting their arguments. Both countries are similar to China and have asserted the majority of the maritime territories in the South China Sea. Their hard stance against China is unmatched by other ASEAN members, as shown by their inability to achieve ajoint communiqu éat the 45th Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Cambodia 34.This last one has been accused of having priority over ASEAN's regional priorities on its bilateral relations with China. As a result, it raised concerns regarding ASEAN's capacity to direct regional integration and resolve dynamic security-related disputes in the future. In addition to Cambodia, non-claimants for the additional territorial features of the South China Sea are Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Singapore, and Indonesia. Known for having good connections with China, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos and do not want to harm its 32UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 33Suisheng Zhao, "China And The South China Sea Arbitration: Geopolitics Versus International Law" (2017) 27(109) Journal of Contemporary China . 34S. Yee, "The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines V. China): Potential Jurisdictional Obstacles Or Objections" (2014) 13(4) Chinese Journal of International Law . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 10 bilateral ties by openly endorsing the initiatives of claimants in the South China Sea. For example, countries such as Singapore and Indonesia promote friendly settlement of disputes, since regional uncertainty will impact navigational rights. Both are coastal states adjoining Malacca Straits, which link the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean and rely heavily on maritime trade and seagoing. But they too are not prepared to accept the claim of any specific group 35.Singapore and Indonesia both do not engage in wars and have close ties with China. Singapore thus distanced itself after, according to Article 287 and UNCLOS Annex VII; the Philippines launched arbitration against China. Although the existence and settlement of conflicts are not one voice for ASEAN, China does not have great faith in multilateral solutions. It has always stressed that bilateral agreements include the parties involved specifically in the conflicts. With the resolution of the majority of boundary issues bilaterally with its neighbours, it claims the problem is complicated by including further parties. In general, China is available for multilateral collaboration on certain non-traditional international issues with ASEAN, driven by its enforcement of the Good Neighborhood Policy. But this cannot be inferred that China is prepared and able to take multilateralism as a predominant part of foreign policy, becoming more instrumental than necessary 36.The Chinese government, more specifically, regards the recovery of land as essential to the existence of the Chinese regime. It is appalling that all ASEAN Member States would join in pressing for compromises in claimant states like Vietnam and the Philippines. In addition, the multilateral mechanism will call upon major powers such as the United States, India and Japan to mediate and manage it. This implication cannot be drawn, however, that ASEAN is absent in the controversies over the South China Sea. Under Brunei's presidency in 2013, ASEAN pursued a stance of neutrality and tried to make it obvious that only claimant states would resolve territorial conflicts. They also played arole in facilitating dialogue between applicant states, working together on a DOC, observing COC execution, and limiting unilateral acts that may jeopardise the region's security climate. 35Ian Storey, "Intra-ASEAN Dynamics And The South China Sea Dispute: Implications For The Doc/Coc Process And Zopffc Proposal, By Ian Storey", (Webpage, 2011) .36Sonika Gupta, "Chinese Strategies For Resolution Of The Taiwan And South China Sea Disputes" (2005) 42(3-4) International Studies . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 11 Strategic Involvement of Great Powers The US has long been the foundation of Southeast Asia's security and prosperity. As China's influence in the region grows, many Southeast Asian countries, particularly the claimant parties, have sought to embrace astrengthened US influence in the country. Claimants may have seen expanded foreign intervention as solid reinforcement for their sovereignty arguments 37.Among the four Southeast Asian claimant nations, Vietnam and the Philippines were the most vocal in their opposition to China's allegations. The presence of foreign forces, on the other hand, runs counter to China's policy of settling conflicts bilaterally. External powers, especially the United States, are firmly opposed to intervening in bilateral sovereignty conflicts. It seems China's "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia, including its strong presence in the South China Sea, is emboldening other claimants to question China. Although Vietnam, like the Philippines, is aconstructive applicant, the latter has maybe the poorest defence capabilities in Southeast Asia and cannot compete with increasing military strength. The United States is the Philippines' traditional supporter and the world's only superpower, and its return to Asia and forward military activity in the area has inevitably been seen as an important counterpoint to China. In recent years, the Philippines has secured military support and supplies from Washington, as well as launched military modernization programmes with US assistance. During joint military drills with the US during the Scarborough Shoal confrontation, it attempted to gain confirmation from the US that their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty would extend to its claims in the South China Sea. 38 The US, on the other hand, has remained ambiguous about whether its military obligations will stretch to protecting the South China Sea in acircumstance in which the Philippines is being invaded by its rivals. Besides the United States, the Philippines and Vietnam, with some other nations including Japan and India, have undertaken robust diplomatic efforts to secure recognition for their assertions on the South China Sea 39. 37Stefan Talmon, "The South China Sea Arbitration: IsThere ACase To Answer?" [2014] Bonn Research Papers on Public International Law . 38The Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951 39Asia Times, "Philippines, Vietnam Take China Hedges", Atimes.Com (Webpage, 2013) . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 12 International Law interference Smaller countries, it may be argued, are more dependent on foreign law and its compliance, owing to their failure to protect them militarily or economically 40.Big forces, on the other hand, have aplethora of tools at their disposal to protect their rights. Their growing economic and political power gives them an advantage over smaller and poorer groups. Furthermore, international law can be seen as a“tool of political persuasion for smaller countries ”.In terms of the South China Sea conflicts, neither of the claimants might compete with China economically or militarily. As aresult, it's understandable that lesser parties want to take their conflicts to the ICJ or the ITLOS. Sovereignty issues cannot be resolved by third-party dispute resolution alone without the agreement of both concerned parties, as per international customary law 41.China strongly condemns the intervention by athird party in the South China Sea conflicts, like forwarding the matter to the International Court of Justice. As aresult, submitting the conflicts to the ICJ without China's permission is futile. Furthermore, China has exerted its right to opt-out of the agreement to use the UNCLOS conflict settlement process by submitting aformal declaration under UNCLOS Article 298 to the UN secretary-general, UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, on August 25, 2006. By doing so, China effectively disqualified itself from binding adjudication or arbitration by both the ICJ and International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on maritime border delimitations, ancient bays and names, and conflicts involving military operations. Furthermore, the UNCLOS makes no provision for determining jurisdiction claims over maritime features, instead of establishing requirements for determining maritime zones that range from pre-determined land territories. Nonetheless, as Robert Beckman has argued, China may be included in the scheme of compulsory bidding conflict resolution in Section 2 Part XV of the UNCLOS where the controversies include the understanding or implementation of UNLCOS provisions. This suggests that China's absence from the UNCLOS compulsory binding conflict resolution scheme is limited to specific cases, such as conflicts over the historic claim and maritime 40Jorri Duursma, Self-Determination, Statehood, And International Relations Of Micro-States (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 41Robert C. Beckman and Leonardo Bernard, "Disputed Areas In The South China Sea: Prospects For Arbitration Or Advisory Opinion" [2016] The South China Sea . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 13 border delimitation 42.In consequence, despite the China's rejection of the recommendations made by Philippines' to request arbitration from the ITLOS, the Philippines have not decided to give up on filing the complaint with the ITLOS. Even if the ITLOS agrees that it will take up the case and make a definitive decision in favour of the Philippines, China can opt to disregard the court's judgement. Without Chinese intervention or compliance, itis difficult to expect a "peaceful and permanent solution" to the conflicts, while it could assist the Philippines in gaining the "moral high ground 43.” Most profoundly, as Beckman acknowledged, “the transfer of disputes on legal concerns cannot settle the fundamental sovereignty conflicts, ”even if UNCLOS judgments of arbitral or advisory opinion could lead to a peaceful settlement of the core problems by trying to clarify whether such claims or concrete actions of the claimants are compliant with UNCLOS and international law 44.In this respect, ITLOS might be willing to have advisory advice on the legitimacy of China's nine-dash line and its operations in the South China Sea, but it essentially lacks authority to determine supremacy or border limits in order to resolve conflicts. Furthermore, the Philippines' decision could have "poor ramifications" for ASEAN- China ties 45.It is cautioned that unless the judicial mechanism is properly handled, it might transform into a"political mess" in the area (Tay, 2013). Management issues The preceding review shows that existing methods and means of resolving conflicts have shown few results. The potential for an overall outcome in the immediate term seems to be similarly bleak at this stage. For the time being, it is important to seek methods for properly managing conflicts so that they do not intensify into afull-fledged confrontation at times of increasing tensions 46.As aresult, it is advised that applicants maintain strict self-control and collaborate on aCOC. In the meantime, they should strictly adhere to the DOC's terms and conditions and help follow the protocols they agreed to in November 2011. Furthermore, they can create mutual partnership structures to re-establish consensus, express shared values, and restore faith. 42Ibid 33 43Ibid 19 44Robert C. Beckman and Leonardo Bernard, "Disputed Areas In The South China Sea: Prospects For Arbitration Or Advisory Opinion" [2016] The South China Sea . 45Ibid 29 46Stefan Talmon, "The South China Sea Arbitration: IsThere ACase To Answer?" [2014] Bonn Research Papers on Public International Law . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 14 Declaration of the Code of Conduct and Adoption of aCode of Conduct The DOC contains a series of agreements reached in 2002 between China and ASEAN members. Its primary goal is to encourage applicant parties to maintain discipline and establish mutual respect and belief among themselves. It also said that the parties must "work, based on agreement, toward the sentence comprehension" of aCode of Conduct to further foster security and harmony in the South China Sea. As aresult, applicant states are dedicated to working ever further to convert the original DOC into aCOC. Unlike the DOC, which lacks procedural effectiveness and strict compliance, the COC is expected to be endowed with legal authority and act more efficiently to prevent more deterioration of tensions and pave the groundwork for multilateral cooperation. The DOC somehow doesn't deal with jurisdiction issues, nor does it penalise signatory parties for some kind of violation. With the establishment of the DOC in 2002, applicant countries have largely decided to abstain from taking armed measures and have ceased new occupations. Previous to their recognition in 1974 and 1988, China and after the normalisation of relations, the Paracel and Johnson Islands had just two encounters 47.China was discovered militarising Mischief Reef in 1995, prompting strong condemnation from the Philippines. Even so, progress toward COC adoption has been slow. The complexity is initially due to disagreements among the parties involved over the scope of the COC. Member states within ASEAN have voiced disagreements as to whether the drafted COC could apply to resolve conflicts mechanisms. In January 2012, the Philippines suggested converting the South China Sea into aZone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation (ZoPFFC) and circulated a draught COC to ASEAN countries. The plan envisions the prospect of mutual cooperative efforts. Joint Cooperation Given the challenges that disputing states face in reaching an agreement on maritime borders, diplomatic negotiations may be alengthy operation. Until there is adiplomatic agreement, competition for energy sources in the South China Sea would make it much more unpredictable. Furthermore, in response to the greater demand and falling foreign supply, coastal states have sought to invest in hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea. There are also long-term and short-term exploration opportunities to doubt when ashared energy 47Stefan Talmon, South China Sea Arbitration (Hart, 2014). Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 15 resource is being explored. Countries may also pose questions and collaborate on common non-traditional protection challenges like navigation risks, natural calamities, piracy and smuggling, maritime pollution, and so on. This is consistent with the intent of the DOC, which notes that “the Parties involved can discuss or conduct cooperative actions awaiting a substantive and lasting resolution of the disagreements. ”The UNCLOS also includes clauses in Articles 74 and 83 to allow parties to border conflicts to reach an agreement on interim arrangements during the transitional phase before the full boundary of the maritime region. Since the South China Sea is classified as a semi-enclosed sea, maritime nations need to cooperate with one another. Joint collaboration in the South China Sea has both fruitful and ineffective rulings. The most current successful event is the approval of Production Sharing Agreements in a contested region between Malaysia and Brunei. Another example is the JMSU's presence in acontested region of the Spratly Islands. This would be the first multilateral treaty between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 48.If this had been avictory, it would have been awatershed moment in the history of such collaborative efforts. Tragically, the treaty collapsed, and it was signed in March 2005, only to be suspended in 2008. Conclusion A lasting and long-term solution to the South China Sea conflicts is unlikely in the near future. The complexities of the disagreements, particularly those involving sovereignty and conflicting claims, has been analysed in this portion. Thus far and, the methods to conflict resolution have been reasonably good. The framework under which conflicts have escalated in the South China Sea is necessary to recognise. On the other side, amajor conflict between China and the US could create Southeast Asia's political fault lines, making the ASEAN less able to deal with the crisis. Following that, Southeast Asian claimant countries disagree on the degree to which American involvement is expected in the area. Besides that, the Southeast Asian countries are motivated by diverse national concerns, and some are embroiled in various maritime border conflicts with one another (Bateman, Ho, & Chan, 2009). 48Stefan Talmon, "The South China Sea Arbitration And The Finality Of ‘Final ’Awards" (2017) 8Journal of International Dispute Settlement . Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 16 It is in China's strategic interests to implement aconstructive approach to resolve its maritime border conflicts in the South China Sea. As demonstrated above, this may have been accomplished although the jurisdiction conflicts well over Paracels, Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal remain unresolved. Alternatively, bilateral agreements would be prioritised for delineating maritime borders. This, though, would necessitate diplomatic endurance for several years or decades. Chinese politicians must be bold enough to make significant compromises, such as acknowledging other claimant states' territorial rights in their EEZs and on their territorial waters. The path forward is impossible to be adefinitive agreement reached in one fell swoop, but rather by settling the phase of the difference by step over aprolonged period. Treaties ratified elsewhere in the world, as well as boundary rulings made by the International Court of Justice, the Law of the Sea Tribunal in Hamburg, or separate Arbitral Tribunals, which provide valuable precedents along the way. The two key challenges for China to complete at the outset are a) establishing a structured all-Chinese maritime negotiating team, comprising Taiwan representatives; and b) clarifying the significance of the U-shaped axis. There are still some drawbacks to legal remedies. China strongly opposes the participation of external parties. Moreover, UNCLOS does not provide for sovereignty conflict settlement arrangements and cannot create maritime areas where there is no consensus on the sovereignty. Although foreign arbitration or adjudication concerning the understanding or enforcement of UNLCOS clauses contribute to the clarification of their allegations by press parties, they will essentially not cope with the conflicts over sovereignty. While the dilemma remains and the applicants did not go over the barrier, adispute mediation process must be developed that emphasises the avoidance of incidents and the build-up of trust. Joint collaboration can meanwhile be an interim step for the abolition of tensions, for meeting energy demand and for tackling popular regional challenges. However, both efforts should properly strengthen the rights of all directly affected parties and should emphasise ASEAN's key position and joint commitment in promoting the process. Decisions of acourt or tribunal with authority under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, like the arbitral awards in the South China Sea situation, are conclusive and valid. The UNCLOS provides for the definitive and final existence of these rulings, which is reinforced by the compulsory authority incorporated into the conflict resolution framework. As a Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China Page 17 consequence, parties to acase are required to follow these rulings. Failure to comply implies that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is broken, that UNCLOS conflict resolution bodies are ignored, that the fragile negotiations implied in the Treaty are upset, and that international treaties are disrespected. Non-compliance often leaves the legal relationships of the parties involved dysfunctional and poses barriers for the parties to shift toward cooperative and legitimate uses of the seas. China's refusal to conform with the Arbitral Tribunal's judgments in the South China Sea conflict results in acontinuing infringement of the Philippines' territorial rights and authority in the latter's EEZ. The legitimacy would most certainly suffer when China is seen as an emerging force with little regard for or tolerance for foreign law. Furthermore, several other countries are concerned about the South China Sea conflict. If one party's conduct violates the awards or foreign law in general, the other group or big nations can take action to contest the action. That would ultimately be detrimental to China and the Philippines, as well as regional unity, prosperity, and defence. In either event, it should not refute the importance of the South China Sea arbitration that China has not completely complied with the arbitral awards and would maybe not. As the awards reinforce the Philippines' and other ASEAN claimants' positions, they can affect their negotiating strategies and directions. The room for negotiation in their EEZ would shrink, but their incentives to cooperate in fishing, environmental conservation, maritime defence, and marine science research in the recently identified parallel areas will possibly increase. Overall, the arbitration should provide aprocedural basis for prospective mediation and resolution of the underlying maritime border and jurisdiction conflicts, as well as lead to regional stability, defence, and progress. Way ahead: The Republic of Philippines v. 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