Anthony Cordesman’s preliminary assessment of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict
In case of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict it has been found that the terrain essayed an important role in resolving the conflict. Apart from the terrains comprising of the rocky ground with dense vegetation, the small cities and the villages along the border were used in an optimum manner by the Hezbollah forces. The Hezbollah army made use of the ambush and the IED against the attack perpetrated by the IDF tanks. According to Cordesman, the Hezbollah forces were sharp far-sighted and made use of the upper floors of the buildings of the buildings to plan their move against the IDF forces who were proceeding underneath in the narrow streets (Cordesman and Sullivan 2006, 48-52). The defensive position and the strategy of the Hezbollah forces came as a surprise to the IDF at the outset of the war. The Hezbollah forces were engaged in the construction of sophisticated and large bunkers along with the firing positions since the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. The effort of the Hezbollah forces demonstrated that they have the ability to maintain control, effective communications and command for the two or more squad operations that was achieved with competence (Cordesman 2006, 67-74). These methods of communications have been effective during the warfare. The information on rocket was kept secret as the maps and the intelligence were kept out of the reach of the commanders until the latter phase of the war despite the awareness of the officers in the field. I agree with the findings of Cordesman regarding the ability of war to demonstrate the Hezbollah forces did the powerful security of the country as.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and William D. Sullivan. Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Vol. 29, no. 4. CSIS, 2007.
Cordesman, Anthony H. Preliminary" lessons" of the Israeli-Hezbollah war. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006