The Department of Defense (DOD) in the United States has since time immemorial been relying on numerous contractors to provide the United States Military with numerous goods and services which include among others operational support, food, vehicles, uniforms and even military weapons. Acquisition in the Department of Defense in the United States usually takes place through contract obligations which occur or happen when the concerned agencies actually enter into not only contracts but also employ personnel and even commit themselves to spend money (Chiow & Metzger, 2012). The Federal government in the US thus tracks money which has been obligated on the federal contracts using a database which is known as the “Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation” or the FPDS. It is therefore important for all and sundry to note that indeed, there is no public database which tracks the Department of Defense contract outlays as the “FPDS track obligations”
It is the responsibility of the Department of Defense or DoD in the United States to ensure that a balance is found which is capable of recognizing the relevant industrial costs as well as the contractor risks. In addition to that, it must also be able to ascertain any potential high prices for the weapons and systems that have to be acquired so as to prevent any potential harm to its industrial base. It is prudent to note that the people who are responsible for the DoD acquisition are the Secretaries of the numerous Military Departments as well as the “Directors of the Defense Agencies” (Schmith, 2011). It is therefore their responsibility to ensure that they effectively apply existing policies so that they can not only prevent but also detect and remediate and investigate any form of counterfeiting that may occur in the supply chain of the DoD.
In acquiring goods and services, the Department of Defense in the United States is usually required to come up with viable qualification requirements which are in line or consistent with the 10 U.S.C 2319. This is quite important since it helps in the identification of trusted suppliers, contractors, and even the subcontractors that are well trusted. It is important to note that the “trusted supplier programs” must actually comply with the laid down industry standards and they must also be subjected to audit by the relevant officials in the DoD. That apart, it is prudent to note that the US law at no time provides a safe haven from the obligation of suppliers to replace or even repair of the counterfeit or even suspect electronic parts. This can happen even if the contractors in the acquisition process have relied on the trusted suppliers of the DoD, the OEMs, and even their authorized dealers (Watson et al, 2017).
Based on an article on the web by SBIR titled Acquisition Basics regarding how the US Department of Defense makes its purchases (2017), it is ascertained that the acquisition term usually implies more than just the purchasing of a particular service or product. This is because it usually involves the designing. Testing, construction, deployment, and even the sustainment and disposal of such products.
Bangert, D., Davies, N., & Watson, R. (2017). Managing Defence Acquisition Cost Growth. The RUSI Journal, 162(1), 60-67.
Chiow, J. M., & Metzger, R. S. (2012). Legislating supply chain assurance: An examination of section 818 of the FY 2012 NDAA. The Procurement Lawyer, 47(4), 1-30. Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1027765068?accountid=8289
Schmith, M. D. (2011). The congress and DOD management process: Space acquisition, a critique and evaluation (Order No. 3499387). Available from ABI/INFORM Collection. (936121998). Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/936121998?accountid=8289
SIBR (2017). Acqusition Basics. Retrieved on 25th September 2017 from https://www.sbir.gov/tutorials/acquisition-basics/tutorial-