Terrorist Modus Operandi: The Mumbai Attack 26/11

Event Map

Discuss about the Terrorist Modus Operandi The Mumbai Attack: 26/11.

The event of 26^th November 2008 Mumbai attack has been selected in order to discuss the attack and the justice carried out. This report describes the 26/11 Mumbai attack that took place in India in the year 2008. The attack was launched on 26^th November and continued till 29^th November resulting in loss of many lives of police force and civilians. The problems with navy force and the lack of training to Mumbai police were the reasons that this attack happened with such a severe impact. The government of India took the steps to provide required aid to police by affiliating them with the advanced technology and weapons (Times of India, 2017).

In the context developed above, this report has been prepared to discuss the 26/11 attack and perpetrators of the attack. Further, the discussion extends to the targeting tactics used by the perpetrators in conducting the attack. The impact of this attack on the country has also been analysed.

It has been nine long years when the Mumbai attack took place in Hotel Taj and since then but the image of that event in the mind of people still persists. The Mumbai attack is popularly known as 26/11 attack that took place on 26^th November 2008, Wednesday at midnight. The terrorists came in India through the water ways by hijacking the boat and the one with whom they came was also the Indian. It was Kasab’s first operation as per his confession.

There were two terrorists who blasted themselves at Jewish community center situated at Nariman house at Colaba, Mumbai. There were around 8 planned attacks that happened in India in Mumbai city in which total 171 people lost their lives and around 250 people were badly wounded. The identification of terrorist was made and 2 attackers, Nasir alias Abu Umar, who belongs to Faisalabad (Pakistan) and another person was Babar Imran alias Abu Akasha who was from Multan (Pakistan). The assaulter kidnapped many people out of which one was a hostage couple and other 4 were the visitors (Start.umd.edu, 2017). The child hostage along with the nanny rushed out of the place wisely to get an escape and help their members in a possible manner. The responsibility of this attack was taken by Deccan Mujahideen which was not so popular terrorist group before this attack. But yet the conformity was not gained; only estimates were made that these people and the group belong to Pakistan and the actual leader or group behind this massive attack was Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). On investigating the person of Lashkar gave the statement that they were not responsible for these attacks. One of the assaulters was caught namely Ajmal Kasab who admitted that they were planning for this attack from last 6 months and came into Mumbai through waterways and resided in Mumbai to know about the places and locality, selecting the area with a high population so that maximum devastation could take place. The idea was to kill about 5,000 people in this attack and the basic target were foreigners visiting India (Maps of India, 2017).

Perpetrators

Kasab visited Mumbai as the student and evaluated the entire area and the best place has been selected where huge crowd gathers, the entire screening has been made to implement the planning and decreases the chances of failure and by carefully handling the situation (Debu, 2017). Kasab, at last, confessed that he was the member of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba from the suicide squad. Also in trials, Kasab openly talked about the mastermind that was involved in this attack and some other assaults that took place in the previously. In the year 2010, Kasab was sentenced to death for killing innocent people thereby being the major part of the mass destruction. The attack type was armed assault and kidnapping of people. The status of attack was successful and the target was Chabad-Lubavitch center, Hotel Taj, and the main location was Nariman point. There were total 6 hostages out of whom no one was from the US and they were kidnapped for 2 days of which some hostages were killed. The loss to the property was less than $1 million but the life destruction was major that left the imprint in the history and many commandoes sacrificed their lives as well and every year this date is remembered and people mourn for the departed souls (India TV news, 2017).

Date	Hotel Taj Palace	The Oberoi-Trident	Nariman House	Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus
26th November 2008	The attack started around 9:43pm. The hostages were kidnapped and bombing started. The tandoor chef was shot dead on the spot by the terrorist.	Gun firing took place at the Oberoi and the gatekeeper was killed on the spot. In the lobby the grenade explosion took place.	The attack happened was on the Chabad House which was the Jews community centre, it was located in Colaba and the hostages and many other Jew people were trapped over there. Many out of them were the visitors from around the world.	2 commandos went to the railway station and there were 4 terrorists involved in the firing at the place. Among the four there were two terrorists that were caught out of which Ajmal Kasab who was the one who was the only which were captured alive and the justice has been drawn out. The firing end up at 10:45 pm IST and it was found that 52 people were dead and 100 people were heavily injured.
27th November 2008	Group of 200 commandoes headed to Mumbai from Delhi.	The arms have arrived by now and rescue operation had started. People were praying for the safety of their loved ones. The hotel started to vacant and around 31 people were rescued by the time. The fire explosion took place at 4th floor.	Commandoes came for the rescue but the terrorists were well planned and they destroyed all the entry points to create more difficulty for the commandoes to enter into the building.
28th November 2008	The explosion of ten grenades took place within the premises of Hotel Taj Palace.	The rescue program was concluded by now and the 2 terrorists that were involved have been killed.	Around nine hostages were killed and the NSG team landed on the terrace through the air drops. The explosion and heavy firing took place.
29th November 2008	The Hotel was vacated and the savage was made. At NSG and JJ hospitals the beds and wards were full and constant body bags were arriving.

The brief description of the Perpetrators and masterminds behind the Mumbai attack has been quoted underneath:

• Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab

There was the only one attacker caught alive by commandos and it was Kasab, aged only 21-years. The only picture that supported the involvement of Kasab was the one in which he was walking at the CST station with AK-47 which gave the recognition and helped the army to catch him. He was basically from Faridkot village which is situated in Dipalpur taluka at Okara district within Pakistan’s Punjab province. Kasab was initially a small thief before joining Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. For the operation of 26/11, the code was assigned to Kasab so that identity does not get revealed in case if the police is able to catch him. In May 2010 Ajmal Kasab was sentenced to death and on November 21, 2012, he was hanged till death (India today, 2012).

• Hafiz Mohammed Saeed

Saeed was an escape from the 26/11 attack and played a major role in programming the entire attack. He was one of the trainer and member of Lashkar. Along with Saeed, there were 2 more Pakistani professors namely Zafar Iqbal & Abdul Rehman Makki. He was also involved in many Anti-India insurgencies that happened in Kashmir (India) or any other attack that took place in India leaving people fiercely. Hafiz Saeed was the chief conspirator to plan the Mumbai attack and he also took part in providing training to 10 terrorists who were involved in the 26/11 (Indian Express, 2017).

• Zarar Shah

Shah was another leader that provided training to the terrorists in context of Mumbai attack. He constantly monitored the training session and even he continued to be in touch with the group at the time of the attack. The Anti-Terror Squad recorded the calls of Zarar with that of the terrorists. He got arrested after the scenario of 26/11 along with companion Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi. The report states that while in custody Shah confessed regarding his role in the 26/11 attack (Mumbai Mirror, 2017).

• Abu Kahfa

Abu Kahfa was anescape from 26/11 case and he played the lead role in planning the destruction of Mumbai 26/11 Attack. He was the mentor of Ajmal Kasab along with the remaining 9 accused. He monitored the training program and made terrorist learn the crucial points in the context of the attack. Kahfa's name was first released when the team was figured out by the Anti-Terrorism Squad in relation to the Mumbai attack. He was just not physically present on the attack site but he was constantly passing on information to the terrorists over their phones (Chaturvedi & Sen, 2017).

Along with these attackers, there were certainly more muggers involved. Analysing the situation the defect of attack could be clearly understood and it could be estimated form this that behind such havoc a big team was involved and many people played various and crucial role in incorporating the fearful event of destruction. Some of the other people related to the 26/11 attack were Javed Iqbal, Abu Al Qama, Abu Hamza, Yusuf Alias Muzammil and Colonel R. Saadat Ullah (The Indian Express, 2017). 

The tactical rationale analysis has been implemented to examine the actual issue and all the tactics which have been used to synthesize the information related to the battle and bloodshed that took place (Pawar, 2017). The analysis has been conducted with the assistance of OODA loop. This loop is based on military cycle which is used to win the battle. OODA stands for Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action (Close quarter combat, 2017).

Stage 1: Observation

The observation argues that the power of Indian intelligence service lies in the fact that the network of police must be aware of the scene and should monitor the suspicious entry of terrorists. Analysing and reviewing the present case, it could be quoted that in the present scenario wherein several technologies have been developed and intelligence machines have been developed.

There has been forecast that LeT will cross the borders and it has been identified that some fishy things are going to take place; therefore, it was necessary that Indian intelligence makes pre-preparation to safeguard the country. Due to certain slips and ignorance, Indian navy was not able to predict the arrival of terrorist in the nation. The situation could have been controlled if Indian army and Mumbai police were more aware about the signals. Thirty-five new sim cards were purchased; however, the police took the actions later after getting the information. It could be depicted that LeT have been well-prepared than the Indian army.  As a result, such an event took place successfully and caused disasters in the lives of people as well broke down the economy of the country (Machold, 2017).

Stage 2: Orientation

When the attack took place, the police was needed to take the responsibility and should have performed the immediate actions. However, contrary to it, the police denied the occurrence of such an event. Later, the inspector responsible for the action was suspended and the responsibility was handed over to police housing. In comparison to the tension in the situation, the police was not much trained as well as they were not having efficient and advanced artillery. When the commandoes from the military came and took over the charge then only the situation became under control. The attack was made is in the military style and the training was provided to the ten people which was also high class (Sen & Dutta, 2017).

Stage 3: Decision

The decisions are the best suitable solutions to resolve the issue and solving the scenario. The entire planning has to be made and the optimum solution needs to be identified for every operation.  The best decision has to be taken under the challenging situation. There was a lot of political pressure on the police and military because important people were staying in Hotel Taj and a number of lives were at risk. In Oberoi, around 31 soldiers got injured though they had the best training. The decision has to be taken by the commander; therefore, police should have undergone the detection process. Also the observation was not very specific to reach the good decisions (The Hindu, 2009).

Stage 4: Action

After the decision making has taken place, the final implementation of actions done. The results should be estimated in such a manner which matches the understanding of the rivals. The police were not able to obtain the information and figure out the plan that is to be carried out. The police and the intelligence officers could have acted well if appropriate training has been provided to the police (Menon, 2016).

The police should have been more aware and they should have figured the attack earlier using advanced technology. The Indian navy must have caught the suspects and spotted them when they crossed the borders. The terrorists were not well-trained and planned an advanced attack. The commandoes handled the situation and wisely construed a plan to stay a step ahead of the terrorists. They were well trained and fought the situation in an extremely wise manner. Due to this incident, the economy faced ample amount of fall which affected the GDP of country to the great extent (Khan, Estrada & Yusof, 2016)

The fear of terrorism has been increasing all over the world and has become a huge threat. The terrorist attacks are frequent in the world. Most of these activities are carried by Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). The 26/11 attack which took place in Mumbai was fierce and scary and destroyed a large number of innocent lives. The attack started on 26^th November 2017 and ended on 29^th November 2017 (Acharya, 2017). Sixty crucial hours were spent in terrific situations threatening the life of people in Mumbai. The ten attackers were well trained and had advanced technology and weapons. Around 260 people were killed who belonged to 10 different countries (Morakabati & Beavis, 2017). The modus operandi of the attack has been explained in detail and an investigation report has been made by Indian Government which has been shared with the Government of Pakistan. The terrorism is represented as network activity which used the technique commonly stated as Social Network Analysis (SNA). It studies the social relationships represented by the nodes and the ties. Upon researching, it was found that the terrorist and the members of the terrorist group are known as the nodes and the healthy flourishing relationship between these members are referred to be ties among these nodes.

After the attack of 9/11 in the World Trade Centre, the study of SNA has increased and research in the counter terrorist activities has increased. The capability of SNA is evaluated to elucidate the activities of the group, selecting the target and deciding the motives that behind these attack (Azad & Gupta, 2017).

Conclusion

The report argues over the terrorist attack which took place in India destroying the amenities and breaking down the value of money along with destructing the economic condition of the country. Initially, the event map has been discussed by giving the blueprint of the popular event 26/11 Mumbai attack in India. Thereafter, the study was made over perpetrators who were involved in the Mumbai attack and investigation was made which states regarding the terrorist activities. The assessment has been conducted and the target was identified. Tactics rationale is thoroughly described in stages and the conclusion has been drawn out of it. Lastly, the impact of the assessment has been made which describes the damages caused and injuries which have occurred. The attack was massive loss to humanity and the threat towards the country also increased, it even affected the tourism for long period of time. The lack of police efforts and less provision of weapons and other facilities were noticed. Better training to police should be provided along with better invigilation at the borders and navy areas to avoid the suspects to enter and destroy the country.

References

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