Project Management Course: Issues, tools, and leadership in project teams

Learning Outcome:

This course provides students with the necessary project management skills, techniques and tools, and knowledge from project initiation until project execution when planning and executing their organisation’s projects.

Learning Outcome:

Course learning outcomes:-
1.Evaluate current issues in project management and its application in the business environment. (C5, PLO2)
2.Discuss appropriate tools, techniques and strategies in managing a project. (C5, PLO6)
3.Discuss management and leadership issues and problems in a project team; issues associated with effective operations and activities associated with managing people. (C5, PLO8)

You are required to use existing concepts and models to illustrate in your report. A good source to search information is the Information Highway (Internet), journals from TARUC databases, other sources like newspapers, business magazine, the Edge are encouraged in assisting you to do your report. It is also recommended to use academic journals to support your arguments.

Date of submission: Week 7 second tutorial

a)    Late submission 1-3 days after the stipulated deadline : Maximum marks capped 
at 50%.
b)    Late submission 3-7 days after the stipulated deadline : Reject and fail the 
coursework with 0 marks. 
c)    No coursework shall be accepted 7 calendar days after the deadline.

?If a student reasonably expects, envisages or estimates that he will be late in submitting his coursework, and that the same may be due to Extenuating Mitigating Circumstances (EMC); he shall before the deadline write to the Dean submitting his case together with relevant documentary evidence for the Faculty’s consideration.
determination of the fate of the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). Given the numerous delays, tests, conditional approvals, and retests, the EFV had been no stranger to controversy. Although the EFV was loudly defended by senior officers in the Pentagon, a growing army of critics cited the vehicle’s poor test performance, and costs continued to balloon. 

As one reporter noted, “After 10 years and $1.7 billion, this is what the Marine Corps got for its investment in a new amphibious vehicle: A craft that breaks down about an average of once every 4. hours, leaks, and sometimes veers off course.” The biggest question is: How did things get to that point with what was viewed, for many years, as one of the Marine’s highest priority acquisition
programs?

The EFV program began more than 20 years ago when this armored amphibious vehicle was designed
to replace the 1970s-era Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The purpose of vehicles such as the EFV is to provide armored support for the early stages of amphibious assault onto enemy shores. The EFV was designed to roll off a Navy assault ship, move under its own power at 20 mph on the water’s surface for distances up to 25 miles while transporting a Marine rifle squad (up to 17 Marines), cross hostile beaches, and operate on shore.

Date of submission: Week 7 second tutorial

The EVF was moderately armored and carried a 30-mm cannon in a turret for offensive firepower. The EVF often was described as a Marine Corps variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The EFV began as a state-of-the-art acquisition program for the Department of Defense (DoD). Following a concept exploration phase to determine the viability of the project that began in 1988, the project entered a program definition and risk reduction phase during which it was considered “a model
defense acquisition program,” winning two DoD awards for successful cost and technology management.

The original contract was awarded to General Dynamics Corporation in June 1996 for full engineering and design work, and that corporation was awarded a subsequent contract for the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the program in July 2001. It is during this critical stage that all the complex engineering, systems development, and functionality of the program must be successfully demonstrated. Perhaps unwisely, General Dynamics budgeted only 27 months for total testing and system verification. 

This far-too-ambitious schedule soon became a problem for General Dynamics and the EFV as a series of technical problems began to surface. Two additional years were added to the SDD phase as it became apparent that the EFV concept was beset with numerous unforeseen problems. In December 2004, tests of EFV prototypes demonstrated further problems. The tests showed severe failure in the vehicle’s main computer system, causing the vehicle’s steering to freeze.

The hydraulic systems powering the vehicle’s bow flap, installed to make the EFV more seaworthy, began leaking and failing. The EFV was originally intended to operate for an average of 70 hours between mission failure breakdowns, but because of the numerous reliability problems, the Marines reduced this figure to 43.5 hours.

Following these prototype tests, an additional two years were added to the program development schedule. The year 2006 was not a good one for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. The EFV was put through a critical operational assessment, which is a series of tests to demonstrate that it could meet performance requirements and was ready for production.

The EFV performed abysmally, experiencing numerous system failures, breakdowns, and failure in
its reliability assessment. During the tests, the vehicles were able to operate on average for only 4.5 hours between breakdowns, and it took nearly 3.5 hours of corrective maintenance for every hour of operation.

Poor reliability resulted in 117 mission failures and 645 acts of unscheduled maintenance during the tests. The EFV’s reliability was so poor that it successfully completed only 2 of 11 attempted amphibious tests, 1 of 10 gunnery tests, and none of the 3 land mobility tests. Other problems included the fact that the prototypes were nearly one ton overweight, suffered from limited visibility, and were so noisy that the driver was advised to wear ear plugs while in the driver’s chair, despite
the fact that doing so would make it nearly impossible to communicate with the EFV’s commander. 

Late submission policy

In fact, so poorly did the EFV fare during the operational assessment that the Marines announced they were going back to the drawing board with the design, aiming to complete a new SDD phase by 2011, eight years behind the original schedule. Meanwhile, the program’s costs just kept rising. When the EFV was first conceived, the Marines planned to purchase 1,025 of them at a total cost of $8.5 billion.
Subsequently, a DoD estimate put the program’s cost at upwards of $14 billion dollars, while the Marines had trimmed their order to 573 vehicles.

In effect, even assuming those final figures were to hold, the cost of the EFV had risen from $8.3 million per vehicle to slightly more than $23 million. Overall, the Pentagon estimated it had spent $2.9 billion on the program in R&D and testing costs before buying a single vehicle.

Wrong weapon for the wrong war?

The ongoing litany of failures associated with the EFV’s development gave rise to some more fundamental questions about the purpose behind developing the vehicle. Critics argued that the EFV simply did not serve a meaningful role in the modern Marine Corps’ mission.

Final rounds of funding began to limit additional money for the EFV and to tie continued support to
the ability of General Dynamics and the Marines to demonstrate much improved reliability and overall system effectiveness. For example, in 2010 the Senate Appropriations Committee authorized $38 million for one more round of tests and set aside $184 million to shut the program down in the event the vehicle failed the tests again. The axe finally fell at the start of 2011, when Secretary Gates sent his preliminary budget to Congress. Among the casualties of the cost-cutting knife was the EFV program. The program had long been teetering on the brink, so in a world of smaller Pentagon budgets and more aggressive program oversight, perhaps it was inevitable that the EFV would finally slip over the edge.

Questions

1.The EFV has been labeled, “The wrong weapon for the wrong war at the wrong time.” Do you agree or disagree with this characterization? Why?

2.Why does the EFV failure illustrate the dangers of long lead-times for weapon systems? In other words, when a project’s development cycle takes 20 years from start to finish, what dangers do the project developers face when the project is finally operational?

Case study 2: Rolls-Royce Corporation
Although the name Rolls-Royce is inextricably linked with its ultra-luxurious automobiles, the modern Rolls-Royce operates in an entirely different competitive environment. A leading manufacturer of power systems for aerospace, marine, and power companies, Rolls’s market is focused on developing jet engines for a variety of uses, both commercial and defense-related.

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program

In this market, the company has two principal competitors, General Electric and Pratt & Whitney (owned by United Technologies). There are a limited number of smaller, niche players in the jet engine market, but their impact from a technical and commercial perspective is minor. Rolls, GE, and Pratt & Whitney routinely engage in fierce competition for sales to defense contractors and the commercial aviation industry. The two main airframe manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus, make continual multimillion-dollar purchase decisions that are vital for the ongoing success of the engine makers.

Airbus, a private consortium of several European partner companies, has drawn level with Boeing in sales in recent years. Because the cost of a single jet engine, including spare parts, can run to several million dollars, winning large orders from either defense or commercial aircraft builders represents an ongoing challenge for each of the “big three” jet engine manufacturers.

Airlines in developing countries can often be a lucrative but risky market for these firms. Because the countries do not maintain high levels of foreign exchange, it is not unknown, for example, for Rolls (or its competitors) to take partial payment in cash with assorted commodities to pay the balance. Hence, a contract with Turkey’s national airline may lead to some monetary payment for Rolls, along with several tons of pistachios or other trade goods! To maintain their sales and service targets, these jet engine makers routinely resort to creative financing, long-term contracts, or asset-based trading deals. Overall, however, the market for jet engines is projected to continue to expand at huge rates. Rolls-Royce projects a 20-year window with a potential market demand of 70,000 engines, valued at over $400 billion in civil aerospace alone. 

When defense contracts are factored in as well, the revenue projections for jet engine sales are likely to be enormous. As Rolls sees the future, the single biggest market growth opportunity is in the larger, greater thrust engines, designed to be paired with larger jet aircraft. Rolls-Royce is currently engaged in a strategic decision that offers the potential for huge payoffs or significant losses as it couples its latest engine technology, the “Trent series,” with Airbus’s decision to develop an ultra-large commercial aircraft for long-distance travel.

The new Airbus design, the 380 model, seats more than 550 people, flying long-distance routes (up to 8,000 miles). The Trent 900, with an engine rating of 70,000 pounds thrust per engine, has been created at great expense to see service in the large jet market. The project reflects a strategic vision shared by both Airbus and Rolls-Royce that the commercial passenger market will triple in the next 20 years. As a result, future opportunities will involve larger, more economically viable aircraft. Since 2007, Airbus has delivered a total of 40 A380s to its customers, with 17 in 2010. Their total order book currently sits at 234 aircraft ordered. Collectively, Airbus and Rolls-Royce have taken a large financial gamble that their strategic vision of the future is the correct one.

History and design of the EVF

Questions

1.Who are Rolls’s principal project management stakeholders? How would you design stakeholder management strategies to address their concerns?

2.Given the financial risks inherent in developing a jet engine, make an argument, either pro or con, for Rolls to develop strategic partnerships with other jet engine manufacturers in a manner similar to Airbus’s consortium arrangement. What are the benefits and drawbacks in such an arrangement?

Case study 3: California’s High-Speed Rail Project

With the announcement that California would be committing $4.3 billion to the construction of a 29-
mile rail link between the towns of Fresno and Madera in the state’s Central Valley, California’s 20-
year-old quest for a high-speed rail line was finally coming true. The California High-Speed Rail
Authority (CHSRA), first established in the mid-1990s, had long pursued the goal of linking the San
Francisco Bay metropolitan area in the north to the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego in the
south.

Under the administration of President Obama, the federal government set aside money from a
stimulus package to fund high-speed rail initiatives in several states, including Wisconsin, Florida,
Ohio, Illinois, and California. The election of Republican governors in Ohio and Wisconsin led to a
rethinking of the projects in those states, which ultimately refused the seed money grants from
Washington, suspicious that the rail projects were both unnecessary and likely to be subject to
huge cost overruns, for which state taxpayers eventually would be held responsible.
As a result, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood reclaimed $1.2 billion from those states to be
presented to 13 other states. One of the states that stood to benefit most from this redistribution of
federal money was California, with its ambitious, and many argue, ultimately foolhardy decision to
support a massive transportation project to link its cities with high-speed rail. The history of
CHSRA’s drive to create high-speed rail is a fascinating one, with supporters and critics in equal
measure.

As part of its initial pitch for the project, CHSRA argued that the system would lead to multiple
benefits. For a one-way $55 ticket, passengers in Los Angeles would be able to travel to the Bay Area
in less than 3 hours or reach San Diego in 80 minutes. Estimating that 94 million passengers would
use the rail system each year and that its development would generate hundreds of thousands of
permanent jobs, CHSRA used these projections to help convince state voters to approve a nearly $10
billion bond issue and support the project in a 2008 referendum.

Other advantages the organization cited included the reduction of pollution and fossil-fuel use by
diverting millions of people to the rail line who otherwise would use automobile or air travel between
cities. With revised estimated cost of at least $69 billion, the overall project would first operate trains
up to 220 mph along a 520-mile route between Anaheim and San Francisco. Extensions to San Diego
and Sacramento would be built later. A total of $3.18 billion in federal funding has been approved for
the state’s bullet train proposal so far, the largest amount for any pending rail project in the nation.

Problems during the development of the EVF

With matching state funds, the amount available for construction is about $5.5 billion, according to
CHSRA. Since its approval, a number of events have led insiders to reconsider the wisdom of
pursuing the rail project. First, based on other high-speed rail projects, CHSRA has revised its
projections for ridership downward, suggesting that the project will serve 39 million passengers by its
tenth year of operation, which is about 40% of its original estimate prior to getting funding approval.
Second, another change in the original business model is that projected ticket prices have
been raised to $105 for a one-way trip, although critics suggest that actual prices, based on
comparable cost per-mile data from Europe and Japan, are likely to be closer to $190.

A third concern relates to the decision to start the project with a 65-mile link between two small
Central Valley communities; that is, though the high-speed rail project is specifically designed to join
major metropolitan areas, the first pilot stage is to be constructed along the route that is the least
populated segment of the line. This decision sits poorly not only with rail critics, but also with rail
supporters, who recognize the need to make a more significant statement in order to answer other
objections of critics. “It defies logic and common sense to have the train start and stop in remote areas
that have no hope of attaining the ridership needed to justify the cost of the project,” U.S. Representative Dennis Cardoza (D., Calif.) wrote in a letter to Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. A fourth closely questioned element in the project is the projected final price. Though CHSRA and state officials hold to the latest $69 billion price tag (a figure that has doubled since the original $33 billion estimate approved by voters in 2008), others, including the transportation consultants at Infrastructure Management Group, have suggested that this figure, based on historical data, grossly underestimates the final cost, while inflating the likely number of passengers.
Economists suggest that a more likely range for the final cost of the project would be anywhere from
$100 to $250 billion, and a more reasonable estimate of annual passenger traffic is in the range of 5
million. If these numbers are close to accurate (and they are disputed by CHSRA), they point to a
project that cannot ever hope to pay for itself, will require long-term annual subsidies, and will
place the already cash-strapped state even deeper into a financial hole.
The state, which recently averted a budget crisis when it agreed to cut $15 billion in public spending,
says it will match federal spending dollar for dollar and also hopes to secure private-sector
investment. However, with unemployment in California remaining steady at nearly 8%, these claims
are being called into question. A recent study by three economists found the CHSRA business model to be deeply flawed, concluding that it relies too heavily on federal grants and does not adequately address risks posed by
fluctuating ticket prices. “When an investor looks at an assertion by the CHSRA that says you’re
going to earn an operating surplus of $370 million in the first year of operations and $1.5 billion profit by the third year, they shake their heads and smile,” said William Grindley, former World Bank analyst. “It doesn’t pass the smell test.”

Operational assessment of the EVF

This new study calls CHSRA’s revenue estimates “unreasonably optimistic” and is confirmed by a 2013 study by the Reason Foundation suggesting that CHSRA could require over $350 million in annual subsidies to stay in business. One key linchpin to attaining sustainability, for example, is CHRSA’s ability to secure billions of dollars in additional funding from the federal government. For its part, CHSRA acknowledges that the project hinges on additional funding coming from the federal government but believes that making a good faith effort to produce a workable rail network is critical for securing additional money.

Recent court decisions have put the brakes on the project as well. The California 3rd District Court ruled that the state could not continue to sell bonds supporting the project as the CHSRA had failed to comply with its own guidelines regarding funding. Voters were originally told that state financial exposure would be l imited and that the federal government and private investors would put up most of the money— promises that so far have failed to materialize.
However, Washington has committed only a few billion dollars and there is absolutely nothing else
the state can expect from the federal government to support the project. The court ruled that the state’s attempt to sell $6.8 billion in bonds to fund the project violated the original provisions of the 2008 referendum. Jerry Brown, California’s governor, has vowed to continue the court battle as long as it takes to get the bonds approved. However, in the meantime, the project is stalled for lack of funding to continue building the phase one, 29-mile stretch of track. The project also faces a ticking clock: If the federal grant money is not used by a specific date, it will be reclaimed by Washington. As of now, one could argue that the project’s future is simply a debate between “dueling economists”; however, there is no question that the future of California’s high-speed rail is uncertain. Will the outcome be a case of the best intentions meeting economic realities? Only time will tell.

Questions
1. Assess the benefits and drawbacks of the high-speed rail project. In your opinion, do benefits outweigh drawbacks, or vice versa? Why? Justify your answer.

2. What are the implications of starting a project based on tenuous projections that may or may not come true 10 years from now?

Case Study 4: Boeing’s Virtual Fence 

On January 14, 2011, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano made it official: The Virtual Fence Project was to be officially cancelled. In her statement explaining the decision, Napolitano cited the difficulty in creating a unified, fully integrated security system and promised to “pursue a new path forward.” What was left  unsaid were the reasons that led to the final decision—principally, struggling with a too- complicated technical system that did not work but was leading to ballooning costs. Illegal crossing into the United States along the Mexican border has reached epidemic proportions in recent years. 

New SDD phase and cost increase

Fear of drug smuggling, illegal aliens, and possible terrorist incursions have made the issue of homeland security one of the major “hot buttons” in the political arena, both in Washington, DC, and within states located along the southern border as well as those in proximity to Canada. The problem is compounded by the sheer sizes of the borders involved. The Mexican/ U.S. border runs for nearly 2,000 miles, much of it across desert wastelands and inhospitable and remote areas. Establishing any sort of border security, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, is a national necessity but a daunting and difficult task. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), organized following the attacks on the World Trade Center towers, is charged with the responsibility of securing all borders and points of illegal entry into the United States, in cooperation with Customs and Border Protection. 

As part of its mandate, it has developed plans for creating a more secure and stable border with Mexico to prevent the continuous flow of undocumented immigrants, drugs, and potential terrorists. For the first stage in this process, DHS proposed a project to physically and electronically seal the stretch of the desert between the United States and Mexico under a multibillion-dollar contract named the Secure Border Initiative Net (SBInet). President Bush in May 2006 called SBInet “the most technologically advanced border security initiative in American history.” 

A 28-mile stretch of desert, centered on Nogales, Texas, was to be the pilot stage in a project that eventually would be used to monitor and control some 6,000 miles of border with both Mexico and Canada. In late 2006, Boeing was selected as the major contractor for the SBInet project. Although better known for their military weapon systems, Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems Unit was made responsible for overall coordination of a massive system of towers as well as listening devices, motion sensors, cameras, and radar to be used to detect and help apprehend illegals crossing the border. 

In fact, the U.S. government chose to outsource the entire project to private firms; that is, they expected that contractors would design the program’s elements, build them, and then handle full oversight of their own work. In a nutshell, the system used a chain of 100-foottall towers that each scanned a 360-degree radius for a distance of 10 miles. Ground radar sensors also attempted to detect footsteps, bicycles, and vehicles. The first $20 million pilot phase, named Project 28 after the length of the part of the desert that it was supposed to cover, was to be completed by mid-June 2007. Boeing selected more than 100 subcontractors to build various components of the system, with its project managers maintaining overall control of the development process. 

Criticism of the EFV

Unfortunately, their structure was unwieldy, and the project was further compromised by the sheer number of distinct elements and technical systems Boeing was attempting to integrate. The technical challenge of integrating systems including watch towers, sensors, radar, and specialized cameras was beyond anything Boeing had attempted before. The problem was particularly noteworthy when we consider that integration, in many ways, was the project. The various technical elements were difficult but attainable. 

The challenge for SBInet lay in the ability of Boeing to find a means to bring all these new and unproven technologies together under one umbrella. So complicated was the challenge, in fact, that the virtual fence failed a series of initial tests, significantly delaying the full deployment of Project 28. Unfortunately, these technical and coordination problems were never resolved. In the nearly three years after original testing was done on one section of the fence, SBInet had cost the government $672 million dollars, with the end nowhere in sight. Although the total project cost was anticipated at $1.1 billion, congressional watchdog groups argued that the final cost of the project could soar to over $30 billion. Costs, in fact, were a sore point with the project from the time it was bid. Originally promising to complete SBInet for $1.1 billion, Boeing’s revised estimates went to $2.5 billion and then, just a few months later, to $8 billion. 

This rapid escalation of projected costs finally prompted a congressional oversight committee hearing, in which Boeing endured withering criticism from Representatives who questioned their motives in asking for more money and time to complete the project. In the meantime, beset by continuing problems, Boeing had also revised its estimates for the completion date to 2016, more than seven years after the date in the original plan. 

A major concern was Boeing’s pyramid-like management structure that critics said caused confusion and a lack of clear responsibility. Worse, it made it easier for hidden costs to be charged to the project. Because Boeing embedded multiple subcontracting layers in the Virtual Fence development, they were able to add charges at each level. The larger problem was the clear conflict of interest that emerged by placing Boeing in charge of project oversight, while allowing them to manage sub-contractors, and monitor the progress of the project. Not surprisingly, with this configuration, little information came to light about cost overruns or schedule slippages until quality and overrun problems were simply too large to  ignore . . . or hide. 

Final rounds of funding

Critics compared this attitude of easy oversight and loose control to the huge problems that had plagued Boston’s “Big Dig” construction project (see Case Study 8.2 in text). Admittedly, the problems that sank the SBInet project were complicated and came from multiple sources. Besides the technical challenges of managing 100 subcontractors, all required to provide critical components that Boeing would integrate, the project had effectively shut out most federal agencies and oversight groups. It was difficult to get accurate project status information given the government’s decision to “farm out” border security to private contractors. 

As a result, congressional investigators found that Homeland Security officials were simply standing by while Boeing provided information that was “replete with unexplained anomalies, thus rendering the data unfit for effective contractor management and oversight.” Furthermore, many critics questioned the feasibility of the original intent of the project itself, wondering about the likelihood of ever effectively sealing a border that runs through some of the most inhospitable terrain in North America. Whether through a combination of poor oversight, over- optimistic scope expectations, or simple inability to make this cutting-edge technology work, SBInet remains an example of a significant program failure at the taxpayer’s expense.

Questions 
 
1.What problems do you see emerging from a project such as SBInet where the government allows the contractor to determine scope, manage all contractor relations, and decide how to share project status information with oversight bodies? 

2.Consider the following two arguments: “The failure of SBInet is due to poor scope management,” versus “SBInet failed because of poor oversight and project controls.” Take one side or the other in this argument, and justify your response.

Case study 5: The Building that Melted Cars

Driving a car in London just got a lot more dangerous. A soon-to-be-completed skyscraper in the downtown area is having an impact that no one could have imagined: It is starting fires and melting cars. The building—designed by internationally renowned architect Rafael Viñoly—is a dramatic edifice with curved exterior walls. Built at 20 Fenchurch Street in London’s financial center, the 38-story skyscraper is known locally as “the Walkie-Talkie” for its unusual shape.
But that curvilinear shape is exactly what’s causing the problem: The south-facing exterior wall is covered in reflective glass, and because it’s concave, it focuses the sun’s rays onto a small area, not unlike the way a magnifying glass directs sunbeams onto a superhot pinpoint of light.
“Fundamentally it’s reflection. If a building creates enough of a curve with a series of flat windows, which act like mirrors, the reflections all converge at one point, focusing and concentrating the light,” says Chris Shepherd, from the UK’s Institute of Physics. “It’s like starting a fire with a parabolic mirror.”
The beam caused by the curved skyscraper concentrating the sun’s rays was measured at more than 110 degrees Celsius (230 degrees Fahrenheit) in September. So far, the building has been responsible for partially destroying a parked Jaguar XJ luxury car, catching carpets on fire in nearby shops, and shattering slate tiles at local restaurants. This situation is likely to be a recurring problem for any structure built within range of the powerful reflected light coming from the building.
Because the effect is caused by the sun’s elevation in the sky at certain times of the day and during a specific time of the year, experts expect the intense light and dangerous heating effect will last about two hours a day over a period of three weeks. To help in the short term, the building’s owners have contracted with local authorities to block off a limited number of parking spaces that are right in the reflected beam’s path. Longer term solutions are more problematic; the design of the building will not change and of course, the sun’s path is not likely to alter in the near future!
This isn’t the first time Viñoly’s architecture has been the subject of similar controversy: His Vdara Hotel in Las Vegas has been criticized for directing sunbeams onto the swimming pool deck that are hot enough to melt plastic and singe people’s hair. The technical term for the phenomenon is a solar convergence, but the hotspot more popularly became known as the “Vdara death ray.” The Vdara resolved the “death ray” effect with larger sun umbrellas, but fixing the problem in London might take a lot more work. “There are examples in the past where an architect has had to rebuild the façade,” said Philip Oldfield, an expert in tall buildings at the University of Nottingham’s Department of Architecture. “If this is serious, then I dread to think how expensive it will be.”
Architectural critic Jonathan Glancey says the story is not unprecedented. In 2003, the opening of the Walt Disney Concert Hall in Los Angeles, designed by architect Frank Gehry, had a similar problem. “The building was clad from head to toe, right down to the pavement, in stainless steel panels, and they would send the sun dazzling across the sidewalks to hotspots where people were. It was measured up to 60C (140F). Local people living there complained they were having to crank their air conditioning up to maximum to cool things down,” he says. Blinding glare also affected drivers passing the building. After computer models and sensor equipment identified the panels causing the problem, they were sanded down to break up the sun’s rays.
In the case of the London Walkie-Talkie building, developers could employ a number of possible solutions. “They could coat the windows to reduce reflection—which would be a cheap fix—but the downside of that is it could reduce the light entering the building. Another solution would be for them to misalign the window frames, to slightly alter them by about a millimetre, but that would be very expensive,” Chris Shepherd noted.

1.Search “London Walkie-Talkie Building” on the internet, then click through pictures of the structure and read some of the articles posted. For example, note that the building won the “Carbuncle Cup” by the Building Design Magazine for “Worst Building of the Year” in 2015. What are some of the reasons the building has been so ridiculed? 

2.What are some of the challenges with assessing risk when constructing a building? In other words, what risks can be assessed up front, and what risks are examples of “unknown-unknowns”?