Assuming Command of 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team

Task:

You are LTC (P) Shane. A month ago, you arrived on post to assume command of the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The current brigade commander, COL Joe Gould, is retiring for medical reasons. Your change of command is in 30 days. COL Gould was very gracious in facilitating your access to many aspects of the brigade to help prepare you for assuming command. Your initial meetings with COL Gould and CSM Thornberry, the brigade command sergeant major, gave you a very positive review of the ABCT. In the last 30 days, you had opportunities to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade.

The 4th ABCT returned from Afghanistan and is in the midst of preparing for deployment as part of the European Reassurance Initiative, (ERI). The brigade deploys to Europe on a nine-month rotation intended to provide a more robust rotational US presence throughout Europe for defense and deterrence. The initial plan calls for one battalion to participate in Atlantic Resolve North in the Baltic Region, with another battalion moving to Romania and Bulgaria to participate in Atlantic Resolve South. The main portion of the brigade will spend most of its time in Poland occupying Polish barracks and sharing ranges with the Polish Army. Prior to deploying to Europe, 4th ABCT will execute a decisive action rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) focusing on defeating a near peer hybrid threat.

During the Afghan deployment, the 4th’s parent division headquarters and the other divisional BCTs did not deploy with the brigade. Instead, the 4th ABCT worked for two other divisions and with a number of other BCTs during their deployment. Further, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 4th detached one of its combined arms battalions for nine months. This battalion, “The War Hawks,” gained a reputation for being star performers and they are very proud of the other division patch they wear on their right shoulder.

From your conversations with several individuals in the last thirty days, you learned that prior to the brigade’s deployment to Afghanistan 4th ABCT had a great reputation. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high and it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The brigade had focus. Leaders and Soldiers were dedicated to the mission and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, but the prevailing attitude was that most problems could be resolved. More often than not, leaders solved problems at lower levels; they rarely reached the brigade command level. There was competition within the brigade, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Often the brigade and battalion officers met informally for social events. Although these were definitely social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely, with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. Other officers in the division often ridiculed brigade officers as “whackos” who always wanted to discuss work issues. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade non-commissioned officers.
Now it appears the environment is different. The battalions are competing, not to improve the brigade, but to set themselves apart from their sister units. Camaraderie amongst the battalion commanders and command sergeants major appears superficial.

Over the last month, you had the opportunity to review a number of historical documents, observe routine meetings, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade area.
Your review of the brigade’s historical unit status reports indicates the 4th ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departure. The ABCT deployed at 92 percent strength, although the assigned strength was 105 percent. The commander’s comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well trained and qualified. The majority of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that surfaced within 60 to 90 days prior to the departure date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-combat-related medical problems. While the installation’s medical providers addressed many of the non-deployable Soldiers’ medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remain on unit roles. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable Soldiers increased above pre-deployment numbers.

You noticed in the recent unit status reports (USR) that commanders highlighted a personnel readiness issue- a mismatch of open positions in the brigade and no one with the proper skill set to fill them; high turn-over of mid-grade personnel (significantly SSG and Majors), and shortage of Soldiers available for training. The commanders considered these issues training, not personnel shortfalls. While the brigade assigned strength ranges from 85 to 102% in the past reports, the shortfall is in enough healthy properly assigned Soldiers to fill out its tank, artillery, or other crews at each stage of training. While the shortage is reflected in the USR as low training readiness, it seems to be a question of personnel availability and readiness.

The brigade’s historical records from Afghanistan indicate the unit was successful in accomplishing all missions. Two battalions successfully performed security force advisor team (SFAT) missions, albeit with fewer support people than expected. The brigade commander reassigned personnel from the battalions not involved with SFAT requirements to other battalions of the 4th. The documents suggest violence in the 4th’s area of operations did not significantly increase, nor did it decrease, and casualties were light. Security of the populace and US forces was a major priority that they accomplished very well, but the records indicate the ABCT’s ability to support the host nation as mixed; the SFATs had marginal success influencing Afghan Army units and police forces. It appears the ABCT staff managed day-to-day operations effectively, but struggled to capitalize on opportunities and to anticipate and adapt to a changing situation.

Even though the casualties were few in numbers, one critical incident dramatically influenced the ABCT. Approximately three months into the brigade’s twelve-month deployment, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated on a patrol in one of the maneuver battalion’s area of operations. The attack killed the brigade commander, COL Timmons, the brigade command sergeant major, CSM Mullens, one of the battalion commanders, LTC Sandra Page, and wounded several other Soldiers and Afghan security forces. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the brigade deputy commanding officer (DCO), LTC (P) Allan assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Gould and CSM Thornberry.

Another document you reviewed is a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report compiled from observations of the 4th in Afghanistan. From all accounts, the ABCT and its leaders performed well in Afghanistan given the circumstances. However, the official record indicates significant challenges requiring attention. The extensive study identified several specific issues that may have an impact on the organization’s future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report.

Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion and below levels, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of multiple combat outposts and forward operating bases (FOBs) created significant digital network challenges for the brigade’s network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed, making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancy, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade created operational friction. Subordinate units did not work together to overcome the issues.

Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to allow 24-hour operations over a sustained period. Often battle captains were taken “out of hide” to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion tactical operations center functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs. While BN staffs were undermanned, the BDE Staff was adequately manned.

The Army’s decision to align two battalions with the SFAT mission just prior to the military readiness exercise (MRX) required the leaders to rethink combat organization. The ABCT never quite compensated for this additional mission even after COL Gould, who had SFAT experience, arrived to take command. Many key leaders and Soldiers in the ABCT, as well as the division staff, were aware of the strain between the SFAT mission and the combat role of the ABCT.

The stability operations mission created unique issues for the 4th ABCT. Although the size of the ABCT staff had a positive effect on shaping operations within their area of operations, the additional tasks associated with resourcing and supporting the SFATs from members of the staff created a “dual-hatted” staff, reducing the staff’s effectiveness.

During the brigade’s deployment, the brigade commander tasked the deputy brigade commander to supervise the SFATs operating within the brigade’s area of operations; synchronize the operations of the brigade support battalion at a different forward operating base; be the “voice” of the ABCT to the media; act as liaison officer to coalition forces; and act as a chief of staff. These varied missions for the deputy created confusion within the brigade and this confusion created the perception of a weakened ABCT command structure. COL Gould contributed to this confusion when he left many of the responsibilities for daily operations with the deputy brigade commander.

The Afghanistan environment placed severe demands upon available resources. Specifically, the need to protect the population and expand operations in previously unsecured areas increased the need for infantry squads. As a result, armor, engineer, artillery, and other Soldiers filled the void, performing civilian protection tasks and not their own military occupational skills. Soldiers from the forward support companies also augmented as vehicle drivers and alternate quick reaction forces within the maneuver battalions.       

The 4th ABCT trained for the wrong mission-essential tasks during its training for deployment to Afghanistan. The brigade trained predominantly on combined arms maneuver tasks, with little emphasis on wide area security scenarios. Upon arrival in theater, operational necessity required use of seven versions of mine-resistant armor protected variant vehicles. The brigade was able to train on only one version at home station. The brigade created a driver’s training program to train drivers during the first two months in combat with the few assets they had available at the Bagram Airbase reception, staging, onward-movement and integration (RSOI). Lastly, during pre-deployment train-up, the artillery battalion focused on fire support tasks and not small unit operations.

The CALL report also indicated a potential problem existed within the culture of the organization. The desire to be an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of behaviors that were generally good-natured and helped instill an esprit de corps within the unit. The CALL reports contain information that implies some non-commissioned and junior officers allowed these esprit de corps building events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. The report suggests that the events have progressed from esprit building to “sanctioned hazing” according to one junior non-commissioned officer.

The brigade is also working to overcome several equipment readiness challenges because of recurring shortages of class nine for several vehicles, as the brigade continues to train to meet objective T requirements. The division G-4 is working the issue as he mentioned at a division in-progress review (IPR) on the upcoming fleet modernization for 4th ABCT’s M-1s and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The upgrade consists of an improved suspension for the Bradley, as well as new integrated mission command systems. The ABCT’s tanks will receive an upgrade to the M-2, the crew remotely operated weapon systems, (CROWS). After the meeting, you had a chance to discuss some of the challenges inherent in this upgrade with a few of the company commanders. It was a long conversation, and in addition to the logistic issues, some of the CPTs complained that many of the field grade officers often provided conflicting guidance from what they heard from the brigade staff.  

You have access to the after action reports from the most recently completed series of battalion live fire exercises, as well as a set of interviews from a defense contractor survey conducted during the battalion exercises. Division tasked 4th ABCT to provide data to the contractor to support an AMC equipment and manning study. Training began in early fall with small unit gunnery for crew certification and progressed to larger units. As the weather grew colder, the scope of the exercises increased, with the goal to have 100 percent of the crews qualified for the brigade live fire exercise in February. The intent was for the brigade to use the spring to prepare for the upcoming National Training Center (NTC) rotation.

Personnel turn over continues to hinder unit training requirements. There is a lack of synchronization between Human Resource Command’s (HRC) centrally managed personnel system and the local long-range training plan. While HRC committed to stabilize track commanders and gunners in all crews after gunnery, there are still issues with battalions losing qualified Soldiers. Leaders at all levels have to plan training without a clear understanding of losses throughout the year or the ability to influence losses. One company experienced an 80 percent personnel turnover between scout team qualifications and the end of company level qualifications. Another company commander reported that after qualifying his 14 Bradley crews, in the next ten days he lost five crews because of personnel losses. In addition to personnel turnover, you notice some details in the after action reviews that support the USR reports you reviewed. One of the brigade support companies was projecting a fill of only 69 of its authorized 140 Soldiers for the NTC rotation. A shortage of licensed truck drivers was also noted. One of the cavalry troops was short 15 people, 78 assigned to 93 authorized, and expected to lose 27 more Soldiers before NTC. The troop cannot crew two of its 14 Bradley crews and expects to lose two more after NTC. One of the armor battalions is short two platoon leaders and had no SFCs in platoon sergeant roles. Many of the current ABCT staff PCS in the next few months.

You also reviewed a Leadership Assessment and Feedback Program 360-degree commander and staff assessment of the 4th ABCT from the Center for Army Leadership. Although Army has discontinued the multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) program, the summary of trends from the assessment indicates that the staff had the trust and confidence of the subordinate units. It also revealed the non-commissioned officers displayed confidence in their abilities and have good tactical and technical knowledge.

On the other hand, the assessment revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making and fell short of expectations on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. There is a perception by many officers of a lack of concern for leader development by the brigade leadership. The report indicated battalion commanders do not routinely counsel company commanders on their performance and the captains receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater. One company commander commented, “I have always been a top performer, I just do my best and hope it is good enough. If no one is yelling at me, I’m golden.”  

In the last ninety days, the ABCT headquarters (HQ) completed a command climate survey. There are some inconsistencies in the survey report. Many of the Soldiers within the HQ seem to like being a member of the ABCT, but report stress because of the unknown requirements of the ERI mission and the affect they anticipate it has on their families. There is clearly some disappointment amongst the leaders in the ABCT. One entry read, “COL Gould tells us in formations to take care of our families, but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My wife is really fed up with this unit.” Another comment reads, “Major Reins (brigade S4) goes out of his way to get certain females into his office. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. I think it is affecting the performance of the section, but what can I do, I am only a specialist.” Another comment read, “I am tired of getting chewed out about the smallest of issues. The leadership around here is on edge all the time. We never get anything done. We reinvent the wheel monthly to no purpose. Can’t wait to leave.” There were also several specific comments about a lack of time to complete assigned tasks and a frustration that despite working long hours nothing seemed to change. You can find no indication that the ABCT leadership took any action on the issues within the survey.

Last week while you were working out at the post gym, you had an opportunity to listen to a running conversation from a few company grade officers from two of the ABCT battalions. They were discussing the upcoming deployment to Europe. Two of them were enthusiastic and excited to get to Europe. “Look this should be fun. We spend nine months in Eastern Europe. We should have plenty of time to visit the sites.” “Plus it will be good to get away from the distractions here.” “Yea, we seem to wander in the wilderness in my battalion. At least this will give us a focus and a purpose.” We just go from one event to another.” Another officer chimed in maybe this will give us a focus. It seems to me we sure need it.”