Controlling Nuclear Weapons On The North Korean Peninsula

Challenges of the international non-proliferation regime

Critically Discuss the risks and options for Controlling Nuclear Weapons with regards to the North Korean Peninsula. Be sure to mention the Non Proliferation Treaty.

The default assumption that has been made by most non-government, academic and government organization is that extension of all the efforts should be towards ensuring the preservation of the international non-proliferation regime, despite its structural weakness and shortcomings.^[1] There, however, remain little proof of the fact that that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the instruments subsidiary to it have been successful in preventing the spread of the capabilities of the nuclear weapons^[2]. There is also no foundation on the basis of which an assumption can be made that it future there will be any progress in what will be a global strategic environment that is even more challenging. It's essential to develop new control arrangements for arms that reflect the fact that there can only be management and not nuclear proliferation. In this essay, I will be focusing on the North Korean Peninsula and the risk of and options for controlling nuclear weapons. What needs to be understood in the onset of this essay that nuclear disarmament is a utopian idea that is difficult to achieve and what we need to begin with is a system that is multipolar for nuclear deterrence.^[3]

The only country which withdrew from the Non-proliferation Treaty for openly pursuing a program for a Nuclear weapon was North Korea. The nuclear capabilities of North Korea are viewed by many as a threat that is extremely serious to the neighbors of the country and the international community as a whole.

The events of 2010 raised various questions regarding the deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and what the response of the allied should be towards North Korea that would be appropriate. It was argued by the United States and South Korea that a response that was robust was called for of the recent provocations by the North Korea and it was essential to deter the regime from any further acts of aggression. It was argued by the experts in South Korea that the “proactive deterrence” policy of President Lee was essential for ensuring that there shall not be tolerance of the provocations by North Korea Indefinitely.^[5] It was added that there would be three messages that would be sent by this policy to the north. First that if there is another attack there will be proportionate retaliation by South Korea; Second that although a war is not something that South Korea wants, however, if it is inevitable it will not avoid one; and Third that the alliance with the United States by South Korea will strengthen continuously beyond the deadline  2015 for the transferring from the U.S. to the ROK Command of the wartime operational control.^[6]
There, however, was not a complete agreement on the new policy of "proactive deterrence" of Seoul by all the participant of IFPA Workshop. It was argued by one of the American participants that there are various reasons that this new policy could prove to be dangerous.^[7] It could among them lead to political hostage of President Lee to North Korea's future provocations by being forced to either retaliate or else risk the loss of his credibility. There would also be a binding on the policy makers in U.S. to any action that would be taken by President Lee in response to another attack, without taking an approach that is more co-ordinated and alliance oriented on the next provocation. The potential for there being an escalation is much higher in this situation.

The risk of North Korea's nuclear capabilities

A method of deterrence that could be used would be Amplifying of the preparedness of the military, in conjunction with South Korea and the Allies of the forces that are facing North Korea. There could be more exercises, drills, soldier deployment, aircraft, and vessels. The THAAD system of air defense by missile can be chosen to be expanded.^[9] Although there can be tricking with decoys, outflanking by launches of the submarine or overwhelming, it offers, a type of defense, in theory, against some type of missiles though not the ones that are intercontinental.^[10]

The main risk that exists with this type of approach is that it will lead both China and North Korea to rattle even louder their sabers. Although the chances that an international war may be caused by these events that are planned, the risks for the events that are unplanned caused by anger that is uncontrollable, accidents, paranoia or mistakes makes it a situation that is one of the most dangerous which humanity has faced since the time that it had a nuclear war almost in 1962 in Cuba.^[11]

Another option available is that of tightening of sanction, this might bring North Korea to come to the table for negotiations as it was done with other countries that were acting in the international community's defiance. Since 2006, the United Nations has been trying to implement various sanctions on North Korea. These have ranged from banning luxury goods and military supplies import to them to having shut North Korea out from the global financial system and putting a ban with few exemptions on coal, iron and precious metal. A third of exports from North Korea will be affected by the sanctions that were passed in the last round.

This ban and sanction method of controlling North Korea is not the best option mainly due to two reasons. The First being that it is quite impossible to obtain desired sanctions that are comprehensive because some countries, such as China which accounts for about 85% of the trade with North Korea, will not be willing to push down as hard as that upon some of its allies. Second, even if there could be an agreement from China that it would apply sanctions of the highest level there is no guarantee that the government of North Korea would be affected by it. In 2014 this country was accused of crimes of murder, extermination, torture, enslavement, rape, imprisonment, political persecution, forced abortion, grounds of gender and race, prolonged starvation and person disappearance that was enforced. North Korea government would not have much issue with weathering issues such as that of famine for the sake of achieving political goals which are long term. These sanctions will only lead to another dead end in the process.

Options for controlling nuclear weapons

The third option that is available is that of negotiations and talks to be undertaken with Kim Jong-un. These talk could be about the conclusion of a peace treaty for the last war in Korea that had ended in 1953 with a truce.^[13] There could be a number of confidence-building measures that a peace treaty could be supplemented with, such as scaling back on the exercise of the military, taking steps towards the ending of the isolation of North Korea and removal of the missile shield.

There could be some weight that could be carried in the promises that are made to North Korea of non-intervention however, it cannot be guaranteed that it would be all that would be required. The fear that Kim Jong-un would have is that if he gave up the weapons of mass-destruction that he has there is a risk that he would be suffering the same fate that was suffered by the dictators of Syria, Iraq, and Libya.^[15]  The security of his country would also be threatened and the country might have to face the same situation as Ukraine next to Russia after giving up their nuclear weapons with a promise that the sovereignty of the country would be respected. Meaning thereby that it would have to be accepted that North Korea will continue to hold the nuclear at least for a period of time. This would prove detrimental to the international community as other countries like Japan, South Korea may in all possibilities also try to seek similar rights for themselves. This option is something that would completely destroy the efforts across the globe of ensuring a nuclear non-proliferation and would certainly chronically upset the power balance in the said part of the world.

Treaties

Non-Proliferation Treat 1968

Books

Hans Blix, Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters (The MIT Press, 2008)

Wit, Joel S, Daniel Poneman and Robert L Gallucci, Going Critical The First Korean Nuclear Crisis (Brookings Institution Press, 2005)

Journal Articles

Allan R. Millett, "Book Review: Rethinking The Korean War: A New Diplomatic And Strategic History" (2005) 12 War in History

Arundhati Ghose, "Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation And Nuclear Disarmament" (2009) 65 India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

Daniel Leese, "Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16, “Inside China's Cold War” Edited By Christian F. Ostermann Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 2007/08 544 Pp. ISSN 1071-9652" (2009) 199 The China Quarterly

Daryl G. Kimball, "Nuclear Sword Of Damocles" [2012] Arms Control Today

Hans M. Kristensen, and Matthew G. McKinzie, "Nuclear Arsenals: Current Developments, Trends And Capabilities" (2015) 97 International Review of the Red Cross

Robbert S. Norris, and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010" (2010) 66 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

 Shirley Williams, "Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament" (2012) 83 The Political Quarterly

Report

Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University, "Reducing And Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives On The Challenges To Nuclear Disarmament" (The International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010) <https://www.fissilematerials.org>

Other Resources

Status Of World Nuclear Forces | (2017) Fas.org <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

Hans Blix, Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters (The MIT Press, 2008).

Non-Proliferation Treat 1968.

Arundhati Ghose, "Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation And Nuclear Disarmament" (2009) 65 India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs.

Daryl G. Kimball, "Nuclear Sword Of Damocles" [2012] Arms Control Today.

Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie, "Nuclear Arsenals: Current Developments, Trends And Capabilities" (2015) 97 International Review of the Red Cross.

Daniel Leese, "Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16, “Inside China's Cold War” Edited By Christian F. Ostermann Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 2007/08 544 Pp. ISSN 1071-9652" (2009) 199 The China Quarterly.

Allan R. Millett, "Book Review: Rethinking The Korean War: A New Diplomatic And Strategic History" (2005) 12 War in History.

Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University, "Reducing And Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives On The Challenges To Nuclear Disarmament" (The International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010) <https://www.fissilematerials.org>.

Robbert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010" (2010) 66 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Leese, above n  6, at 135.

Status Of World Nuclear Forces | (2017) Fas.org <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>.

Millet, above n 7.

Joel S Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L Gallucci, Going Critical The First Korean Nuclear Crisis(Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

Shirley Williams, "Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament" (2012) 83 The Political Quarterly.

Norris and Kristen, above n 9, at 120.

Leese, above n 6.