Analysis Of Competitiveness In Premier League Division

You should also preferably use a division or conference where the teams haven’t changed over the decade of results you will need.

I. For the division you’ve chosen, calculate the standard deviation of winning percentages for each year over a ten year period (preferably the last decade but you can fudge on that a bit). Calculate as well the “ideal” standard deviation and present your ten years of results as ratios of the actual to the ideal. Comment on any trend you
might observe and on how the division you’ve chosen compares to the results across the five pro leagues we looked at in class.

II. For three of the teams in your division (first, last, middle from last year) calculate the between season variation in winning percentage over the decade of results you have.

III. Provide a listing of the division winners over the decade. Depending on how the league works you can provide the regular season winner or if the playoff structure leads to a division champion, the champion list. Calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for this and comment on the result (Table 5.4 in the text gives some comparative numbers for the major pro leagues).

IV. Draw a Lorenz curve for the distribution of points earned by your division in the last season you’re using.

V. Drawing on what we’ve learned about factors (rules, financing etc.) that influence competitiveness, describe efforts or actions taken by the League you’ve chosen over
the past decade that might have influenced the degree of competitiveness in your league. Is there any sense in your data that such actions (or lack of them) might have
had a result?

Standard Deviation of Winning Percentages

I). The standard deviation of the six team seems to be decrease and then increase at the same time compared to the trend in class. The ideal standard deviation trend for the six teams also decreases and then increases at the same time as compare d to the one in class.

II). The Herfindahl-Hischman index for the six teams during the pro-league increases in the beginning and then decrease to zero which is the minimum value. Afterwards, the Herfindahl –Hischman start increasing from 0.04 to 0.09 and 0.26 in the end.

IV). Efforts taken by premier league to ensure competiveness of the teams. 

This denotes the capacity to visualize space vividly across the whole football ground.

The footballers have been made conscious of the instant space around them. Moreover, the logical footballers are conscious. There are two major reasons why footballer’s require to have an understanding where the members of the team are to anticipate the position of the teammates and tell them where they should be .

The structure for the team affects the methods how the team will utilize to succeed the division. Throughout the years soccer formations have adjusted radically 

Expenses on salaries are believed to hike the quality of the team, and increased spending, than competitor will rise a team’s probability of winning a game (Allan, 2004). The football teams are supposed to hike the spending not completely, but in relation to the teams that are competing (Paul et al, 2010). This scrutiny, integrated with the debates that the football teams objective role is an impartial function that is linear of winning and profit. This insinuates that football teams will pursue to maximize spending above their means. 

Table 1.0 Revenue, wage expenditure, profit and funds, Premier League (2010 - 2011)

	Revenue	Wage Expenditure	Profit before tax	Net Debt
Arsenal	226,825,000	124,401,000	14,776,000	-97,827,000
Aston Villa	92,028,000	94,795,000	-54,013,000	-153,169,000
Chelsea	228,574,000	191,214,000	-78,262,000	-816,038,000
Everton	82,021,000	58,026,000	-5,413,000	-44,914,000
Fulham	77,109,000	57,672,000	4,792,000	-192,947,000
Liverpool	183,690,000	134,768,000	-49,317,000	-61,274,000
Man City	153,186,000	173,977,000	-197,491,000	-42,900,000
Man Utd	331,441,000	152,915,000	12,004,000	-308,258,000
Newcastle	88,464,000	53,585,000	32,619,000	-130,485,000
Norwich	23,391,000	18,445,000	-7,065,000	-16,778,000
QPR	16,229,000	29,739,000	-25,383,000	-53,963,000
Reading	23,138,000	20,511,000	-5,371,000	-34,842,000
Southampton	13,370,000   66,809,000   79,447,000	13,460,000   47,093,000   60,882,000	-11,740,000   -5,558,000   -7,838,000	-26,450,000   -339,000  -76,841,000
Stoke
Sunderland
Swansea	11,669,000	17,392,000	-11,173,000	-754,000
Tottenham	163,486,000	91,255,000	402,000	-56,080,000
West Brom	65,086,000	43,903,000	18,934,000	-1,948,000
West Ham	80,939,000	55,704,000	-18,565,000	-41,614,000
Wigan	50,507,000	39,948,000	-7,155,000	-72,696,000
Sum	2,057,409,000	1,479,685,000	-400,817,000	-2,230,117,000
Average	102,870,450	73,984,250	-20,040,850	-111,505,850

The division is selected for evaluation as UEFA declared tactics to control spending in the course of this period. Nearly one and a half billion bounds were utilized on paying the workers of the division in the course of this period (Barnett & Hilditch, 2013). A mean of 79.9 million euros per football team was spent in each year (Rascher, 2019. The division accumulated revenue, which is two billion euros offsets the division accumulate amount utilized on salaries (Pawlowski et al, 2010). Nevertheless, the Premier League salary spending went up at a high rate than proceeds, therefore causing a rise in the accumulated loss of pre-tax (Peel & Thomas, 2015). Within this time, premier league teams have minimized the gross debt. This is greatly witnessed in richer football teams such as Manchester United who reimburse an income in every division (Peel & Thomas, 2012).

As definite spending has a minimum effect on the positions of the league, guidelines embraced to counter spending are observed regularly. These tactics mostly take the structure of an increased salary spending allowed. There were no such tactics in the division of Premier League that were intended to supervise salary spending until the opening of the UEFA Regulations on Fair Play (Reep & Benjamin, B. 2018). 

Ideal Standard Deviation

 UEFA FFP indicators for Premier League teams (2010 - 2011)

 Table 1.1 UEFA FFP indicators for Premier League clubs (2010 - 2011)

	NED	CBE <-£4m		CBE <-£36m		Debt/rev		Wage/rev		Red Flags
Arsenal		70,744,000		70,744,000		-0.43		55%		0
Aston Villa	Yes	-91,584,000	*	-91,584,000	*	-1.66	*	103%	*	5
Chelsea	Yes	-138,258,000	*	-138,258,000	*	-3.57	*	84%	*	5
Everton	Yes	-6,016,000	*	-6,016,000		-0.55		71%	*	3
Fulham		-8,886,000	*	-8,886,000		-2.50	*	75%	*	3
Liverpool		-13,477,000	*	-13,477,000		-0.33		73%	*	2
Man City		-308,471,000	*	-308,471,000	*	-0.28		114%	*	3
Man Utd		-16,819,000	*	-16,819,000		-0.93		46%		1
Newcastle		102,828,000		102,828,000		-1.48	*	61%		2
Norwich		-9,602,000	*	-9,602,000		-0.72		79%	*	2
QPR	Yes	-37,671,000	*	-37,671,000	*	-3.33	*	183%	*	5
Reading		1,123,000		1,123,000		-1.51	*	89%	*	2
Southampton	Yes	-19,050,000  -9,355,000  -33,407,000	* * *	-19,050,000  -9,355,000  -33,407,000		-1.98 -0.01 -0.97	*	101% 70% 77%	* * *	4 2 2
Stoke
Sunderland
Swansea	Yes	-9,835,000	*	-9,835,000		-0.06		149%	*	3
Tottenham		1,913,000		1,913,000		-0.34		56%		0
West Bromwich		13,674,000		13,674,000		-0.03		67%		1
West Ham	Yes	-32,832,000	*	-32,832,000		-0.51		69%		3
Wigan	Yes	-10,810,000	*	-10,810,000		-1.44	*	79%	*	4
Sum		-555,791,000		-555,791,000
Average		-27,789,550		-27,789,550		-1.13		85%		3

In the year 2010, the organization commended a number of regulations on Financial Fai Play with the aim of initiating more specialty within the team’s resources and advocating for more investment, which is responsible (Welki, & Zlatoper, 2014). Notwithstanding a reduction of rising commercial and public interest in the football cub of European at this period, many teams all though Europe are experiencing a financial health that is poor. Equivalent to several the division of Premier League teams, other teams are observed to be wriggling to cope with obligations on finances and have recorded constant losses on finances. Table 3.5 Premier League revenue and payments (2003 - 2013)

	Total Revenue (TR)	Premier League Payment (LP)	% of TR	Fixed Payments	% of LP	%of TR	Variable Payments	% of LP	% of TR
2003 2004	1,327,770,000	436,995,370	33%	205,644,980	47%	15%	231,350,390	53%	17%
2004 2005	1,333,575,000	467,682,048	35%	262,953,160	56%	20%	204,728,888	44%	15%
2006 2007	1,530,430,000	463,640,898	30%	259,284,480	56%	17%	204,356,418	44%	13%
2007 2008	1,927,358,000	766,793,964	40%	462,268,340	60%	24%	304,525,624	40%	16%
2009 2010	2,030,000,000	830,958,732	41%	494,780,860	60%	24%	336,177,872	40%	17%
2010 2011	2,271,000,000	952,749,977	42%	634,912,513	67%	28%	317,837,464	33%	14%
2011 2012	2,360,000,000	968,180,900	41%	651,054,740	67%	28%	317,126,160	33%	13%
2012 2013	2,525,000,000	972,165,620	39%	654,695,280	67%	26%	317,470,340	33%	13%

Based on the regulation of the FFP, the Premier league division revealed controls on expenses to begin from the 2013 to 2014 division (Baimbridge et al, 2016). The guidelines affirm that every team, beyond the coming 3 divisions, cannot make an accumulated deficit of more than one hundred and five million euros (Beckman et al, 2011). In a similar time, teams whose accumulated salary bill is above fifty-two euros will only be permitted to raise their wages by a total of four million euros per division (Peel, & Thomas, 2017). Moreover, any team generating a deficit great than five million euros yearly must warrant those deficits against the asset of the owner (Verbeek, 2008). The harshest penalty for violating the guidelines is the subtraction of division points. The effect of these guidelines will probably be seen past the 2015 -2016 division (Rascher, , & Solmes,. 2007).

Table 1.2 Club revenues from the Premier League and UEFA competitions (2007-2008)

	Club total revenue	Total Payment from FAPL (as % of TR)		Total Payment from UEFA (as % of TR)		Media Payment (PL + EUFA)  (as % of TR)
Manchester United	257,116,000	49,851,273	19%	33,788,652	13%	83,639,925	33%
Chelsea	213,648,000	46,058,490	22%	28,663,500	13%	74,721,990	35%
Arsenal	209,294,000	47,524,659	23%	18,285,540	9%	65,810,199	31%
Liverpool	164,222,000	45,923,106	28%	21,130,220	13%	67,053,326	41%
Tottenham	114,788,000	36,465,219	32%	365,494	0%	36,830,713	32%
Newcastle	100,866,000	39,684,372	39%			39,684,372	39%
Manchester City	82,295,000	40,106,571	49%			40,106,571	49%
West Ham United	81,726,000	23,655,817	29%			23,655,817	29%
Everton	75,650,000	42,568,569	56%	412,774	1%	42,981,343	57%
Aston Villa	75,639,000	42,720,000	56%			42,720,000	56%
Portsmouth	71,556,000	40,831,632	57%			40,831,632	57%
Sunderland	63,597,000	34,003,221	53%			34,003,221	53%
Bolton	59,072,000	32,401,668	55%	365,494	1%	32,767,162	55%
Reading	58,023,000	30,951,546	53%			30,951,546	53%
Blackburn	56,395,000	40,680,201	72%	78,800	0%	40,759,001	72%
Fulham	53,670,000	31,676,607	59%			31,676,607	59%
Birmingham	49,836,000	30,226,485	61%			30,226,485	61%
Derby	48,558,000	29,501,424	61%			29,501,424	61%
Middlesbrough	47,952,000	34,576,851	72%			34,576,851	72%
Wigan	43,455,000	33,851,790	78%			33,851,790	78%

The team’s quality is affected by the price of the specific players. The wage expenditure is likely to be a strong predictor of the strength of the team, given a competitive market for players. Chelsea sent the largest amount on salaries, which is one hundred and fifty four million euros every year, on average over the data period, while Manchester United have the finest results of match win with a salary bill of one hundred and eighteen million per year Wooldridge, . 2010). There is a great association between the number of matches won (correlation index 0.77) and the spending on wages, indicating that a rise in expenditure on salaries hikes the quality of results for the team (Vrooman, 2011). This great association is significant indication backing up the allegation that the market of labor for players of soccer is competitive. Figure 1.1 depicts the association for the year 2011 to 2012 division (Vrooman, 2015). The football teams that sit north have more expenditure on salaries to obtain similar points such as those ones below the line. For instance, NewCastle and Chelsea managed to reach 65 and 64 points progressively but the salary bill was 64 and 174 million, progressively

Conclusion

There is sense that regulation of debt and spending on players have a an effect on the results released by the team.

Table 1.3 Results from modelling match results by ordered Probit

	All Clubs				Top 5		Bottom 5			All Clubs with fixed effects
	Coeff.	SE		Coeff.	SE		Coeff.	SE		Coeff.	SE
Spending on wages Home Wages	0.47	0.08	**	0.43	0.12	**	0.70	0.26	**	0.58	0.18	**
Away Wages	-0.48	0.06	**	-0.64	0.14	**	-0.46	0.11	**	-0.45	0.06	**
Additional Competitions Home FA Cup	0.01	0.08		-0.24	0.18		0.29	0.16	*	-0.03	0.11
Away FA Cup	-0.09	0.08		0.06	0.17		-0.28	0.16	*	-0.08	0.10
Home Champions League	0.12	0.15		-0.02	0.19		6.39	6.22		0.10	0.15
Away Champions League	-0.26	0.15	*	-0.14	0.31		-0.25	0.26		-0.25	0.15	*
Home Europa League	0.02	0.15		-0.51	0.36		0.03	0.24		-0.18	0.16
Away Europa League	-0.02	0.14		0.14	0.35		0.01	0.23		-0.06	0.15
Legacy performance Home Form	0.03	0.03		0.05	0.08		-0.01	0.05		-0.06	0.03	*
Away Form	-0.05	0.03	*	0.04	0.06		-0.05	0.05		-0.07	0.03	**
Attendance	6.7E-06	3.1E-06	**	1.5E-05	4.8E-06	**	-8.8E-06	7.3E-06		-1.6E-05	1.3E-05
Distance	3.1E-04	3.4E-04		-1.8E-04	7.1E-04		1.2E-03	6.1E-04	*	4.3E-04	3.7E-04
Fixed effects significance: Team	-			-			-			Yes
Day	-			-			-			No
Month	-			-			-			No
Season	Yes			No			Yes			Yes
Cut 1	-0.43		**	-0.26			-0.41			-1.87
Cut 2	0.36		**	0.62			0.33			-1.06
Log likelihood	-1766			-344			-612			-1726
Observations	1824			434			598			1824

 Table 1.4 Premier League Competitive Balance between(2003 - 2013)

		(1) HHI	(2) Champions		(3) SD		(5) DN
2003 2004		0.054	Manchester Unitedd		0.197
2004 2005		0.055	Manchester United		0.215		0.345
2005 2006		0.055	Manchester City		0.192		0.330
2006 2007		0.054	Manchester City0.193	0.285
2007 2008		0.056	0.213	0.265
2008 2009		0.055	0.204	0.260
2009 2010		0.055	Manchester United		0.207		0.285
2010 2011		0.052	Manchester City		0.186		0.195
2011 2012		0.055	Chelsea		0.202		0.215
2012 2013		0.055	Chelsea		0.216		0.200
Average		0.055			0.203		0.264
(2) HHIC			0.360
(4) CBR					0.262

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