The Controversial Australian Involvement In The Vietnam War

Background of Vietnamese War

Why was Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War controversial?

The Australian continent today has been known to be a bearer of rich history, diversity and extreme progression in the era of technological development. However, on its way to reaching this aspect, it has undergone several political journeys and all of it is not reflected with glory to this day. One such event in Australian history has been stated to its involvement in the Vietnam War. Several literatures and historians state that the Australian involvement in the said war was uncalled for. Therefore, in due course of this essay, we will learn and analyze the aspects that made the involvement of  Australia in Vietnam war controversial to this date.

The French colonisation of Indochina in the 19th century was a major factor in stoking tensions that led to the Vietnam War (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam). As part of their invasion of Southeast Asia and war against the West, the Japanese conquered Vietnam in 1940. After World War II, France was eager to take back control of its former territories. With Bao Dai's appointment as head of state, France formally created Vietnam as a sovereign nation. After the Japanese occupation ended in 1945, Ho Chi Minh of the Communist Party of Vietnam issued a declaration of independence for Vietnam in September of that year.

By rejecting the proclamation, France set off an eight-year conflict that culminated in defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The communist North Vietnam was split in two by the Geneva Accords: the communist North was headed by Ho Chi Minh, while the South was governed by Ngo Dinh Diem, who ousted Bao Dai and announced October 1955 as the year of Vietnam's independence. National elections were called for in 1956 as part of the Geneva Accords' objective of uniting a fractured country. Claiming that the people of the North were unable to vote freely, Diem refused to participate in the election if the United States backed him. North and South Vietnam's relations worsened until the North, in 1960, created the National Front for South Vietnam's Liberation, vowing to overthrow Diem and bring the two nations back together under communist rule.

Its guerrilla operation, which it dubbed "the Vietnamese Communists" (Viet Cong), spread across the country's southern provinces in an attempt to instigate a nationwide revolt. Afraid of communism spreading throughout Southeast Asia, the United States increased its previously limited support for the South Vietnamese Army, which was unable to resist the rebels' methods.By the end of 1962, the United States had increased its previously limited support for the South Vietnamese Army 11,000 American military advisors had been sent to the nation. As a result of this escalation, US force numbers would ultimately rise to more than 500,000.

Furthermore, many of the problems that plagued South Vietnam in the early 1960s were resolved after the government faced internal dissatisfaction losing control of rural regions outside of major cities and towns to a growing communist insurgency. The leadership of South Vietnam sought assistance from the United States and Australia, a regional ally, and both provided it. Military and humanitarian aid were offered by both countries in response. Australia's contribution was small compared to America's, but it was enough to show Australia's commitment to the United States, its most important ally. America wanted to avoid seeming as though they were supplanting French colonialism, and other nations in the area, like Australia, helped to do this by suggesting that they were taking a more global approach.

Australia's Military Presence in South Vietnam

At the outset, Australia sent a team of 30 military advisors to South Vietnam under the direction of Colonel F.P. "Ted" Serong, who was in charge of the whole nation. An important part of Australia's military presence in the South Vietnamese countryside was the Australian Army Training Team (AATTV). Australians considered them to embody the "Forward Defense" philosophy, which advocated tackling dangers at their source rather than waiting to face an adversary on their territory.

The Vietnam War elicited minimal opposition among Australians at the outset. While popular opinion at the time supported a government strategy in Vietnam, the ALP suffered its greatest electoral setback in decades when its leader Arthur Calwell decided that the  1966 federal election would primarily feature the topic of Vietnam. From 1967 forward, anti-war sentiment grew rapidly, yet the majority of citizens remained opposed to the conflict. Calwell had attacked South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyn Cao K as "ruthless tyrant" before to his 1967 visit, indicating a change in the ALP's views toward communism. Ky was the leader of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force during the time. Ky's journey was a spectacular success the chaos that surrounded the visit's planning. He managed the media skillfully, despite the public and press's dissatisfaction.

Conscription was introduced by the government in response to a deteriorating regional strategic outlook during the war, and it was widely opposed. Some groups resisted conscription by either destroying letters alerting individuals of their induction, which was punishable by a financial penalty, or urging young men to refuse to join the military, which was punishable by imprisonment. Between 1967 and 1970, a succession of high-profile imprisonment of resistance movements, as well as reports of crimes against Vietnamese civilians, heightened public concern over the war's death toll, resulting in a significant surge in domestic opposition to the war. Resistance to government policies became increasingly apparent in public discourse over Vietnam following Labor lost another federal election in 1969, this time by a considerably smaller majority. Moratorium marches were organised in key Australian cities on May 8, 1970, to coincide with the US marches. The Melbourne march, which was organised by future deputy prime minister Jim Cairns, drew an estimated 100,000 people. It was anticipated that 200,000 people from all throughout Australia participated.

Nonetheless, polls at the time found that now the moratorium fell short of its objectives and had little influence on public opinion, with much more than half of respondents favouring national service and a smaller number opposing Australia's withdrawal from the war. The number of those who declined to be recruited was small. By 1970, it was projected that 99.8% of those who had gotten call-up papers had accepted them.

There was also a lot of dispute over how people felt about veterans at the time. All Australian units arriving from Vietnam participated in very well attended  parades in Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, and Townsville, even at the peak of the country's involvement in Vietnam in the early 1970s. Regardless, as anti-war feeling grew, service in Vietnam started to be seen negatively by certain Australians, and anti-war sentiment generated negative attitudes toward veterans in some areas. After the war, some Vietnam veterans faced social marginalisation and difficulties reintegrating into society. Nonetheless, because each soldier's Vietnam War tour of duty was limited to one year, the number of personnel afflicted from post traumatic stress was probably lower than it would otherwise be otherwise.

Introduction of Conscription

Despite widespread opposition to Australia's involvement in the conflict, the government put the US alliance first. It was unavoidable for Prime Minister Robert Menzies to send Australian troops into the conflict in 1965, but it was saddening that the devotion was unconditional, with no escape strategy in place. As a result, Prime Minister John Gorton, who served from 1968 to 1971, continued to struggle to get Australia out of a conflict that had turned into a major burden and lacked a convincing regional context.

When faced with the Vietnam issue in 1964–65, there is evidence that Menzies believed he was just duplicating the same strategy that had worked so successfully during his 15 years as Prime Minister. However, it was subsequently shown that he was unaware of certain significant distinctions. To proceed with, Australians at all thresholds, business, the media, and the general public—knew far less about mainland Southeast Asia, particularly the former French colonies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, than they did about maritime Southeast Asia, notably the former British and Dutch territories of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Australian politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, and military commanders had less chance to conduct independent political and military assessments or conduct independent diplomacy in the islands and peninsulas between Sumatra and New Guinea than in and around Vietnam. As a result, Australia lacked trust in and control over the military and political policies of its important partner.

Menzies' choice also had a problem in that he underestimated the likelihood of American loss or humiliation. To understand Menzies' views on the importance of keeping the United States in the war, it helps to understand his life anecdotes as a young military officer in 1917 and as a young prime minister in 1939–41. Rather than imperial conquest, they saw isolationism as the threat. Menzies and his collaborators overestimated Americans' potential to perform in comparison to the French by combining these factors and failure to acknowledge how little they knew about the subject.

Thus, in summation, the war accounted for numerous casualties for the United States as well as its allies, including Australia. The post-war losses and sacrifices of the numerous soldiers as well as the capital flown into it proved nothing short of worthless, and hence, the decision of Australia to be a willing participant in the war is termed as controversial.

Allen and Unwin, 1993 Payne, Trish, War and Words: The Australian Press and the Vietnam War, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2007.

Cox, Lloyd and Brendon O'Connor ‘Australia, the US, and the Vietnam and Iraq Wars: ‘Hound Dog, not Lapdog’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 47:2 (2012): 173-187.

Edwards, Peter, Australia and the Vietnam War, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2014. Edwards, Peter, ‘Now we know: A half-century perspective on Australia's Vietnam war’, Victorian Historical Journal, Vol. 90 (1), 2019, p.4-17

 Grey, Jeffrey, ‘Vietnam’, in Craig Stockings, Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010, pp. 190-213.

Kuhn, Rick, ‘Australia and the Vietnam War: Analyses, Actions and Attitudes’, Agora, 44: 2, (2009), pp. 28-34.

Lowe, David, Bridge, Carl and Lee, David (eds), Australia goes to Washington: 75 years of Australian representation in the United States, 1940-2015, ANU Press 2016.

Murphy, J., Harvest of Fear: a History of Australia's Vietnam War, Sydney.

Stanley, L. and Deery, P, ‘The Menzies Government, the American Alliance and the Cuban Missile Crisis’. Australian Journal of Politics & History, 59 (2013): 178–195. Woodard, Garry, Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2004 (ebook).

Woodard, Garry, ‘Australia's war in Vietnam: Debate Without End’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 71 (2), 2017, pp. 216-230.