Negotiating A Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula: Strategies, Tactics, And Conflicts

The purpose of this assignment is to apply negotiating strategies, opening negotiating tactics, making concessions, closing negotiating tactics, managing conflict, and ethical considerations when negotiating.

For this assignment you will work in groups to negotiate a resolution to a nuclear free Korean Peninsula.  You will work in groups of three where two individuals will take the position of the DPRK and two will take the position of the USA.

The fifth member will scribe the interactions that take place as the two sides meet continually to rectify the issue.  You will be expected to draw from all sections of the book, along with information from the videos, to prepare your report.

What the Parties Are Negotiating For and Their Interests

Since the DPRK’s became a ballistic missile threat, it has called for the United States and the superpower nations to intervene. These parties are trying to forge a negotiated talk to ensure that denuclearized peninsula is restored. In the past, the United Nations was forced to cut its diplomatic ties with DPRK and commissioned sanctions to this state (Chang & Gordon, 2016. It has been hard trying to convince this nation to stop its nuclear plans. These plans are a major threat to the global stability and security forcing the United States one of the superpowers to initiate a dialogue. Kim Jong-un’s regime had provoked the United States in particular through their implication that their ballistic capabilities must be felt globally.

The first interest that the US has is to bring Pyongyang into a leverage and stop these provocations and threats. Despite the sanctions slapped on its diplomatic ties, DPRK had not agreed to come to a negotiating table (Chang, 2016). The other interest that the United States has over this negotiation is to stop future endeavors of countries like Iran who have been ignoring the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). However, this conundrum has forced Trump’s administration to use DPRK allies to stop further escalation from these threats.

The major interest that DPRK has is trying to restore its image and its fragile internal condition with South Korea. It is understood that DPRK is pursuing this mission having lost in the Korean War back in 1950 and 1953. The nation had several missiles launched, nine in total for a period less than five years. However, this feeling of weakness grew when Kim Jong-Un took over the reign and changed the constitution claiming that it was his father’s bequest to declare DPRK a nuclear state. Economic and nuclear development were his priorities while changing the constitution (Snyder, 2016).

The Obama’s administration had initiated a six-party talk but the implementations of the agreements reached were stalled. DPRK took advantage of this stall and continued to implement its missile and nuclear program with the view that no agreement had been reached (Rinehart, Nikitin & Chanlett-Avery, 2016). One of the officials on Pyongyang’s regime had asserted that their common interest was not to come to a negotiating table but to restore the vital rights and the sovereignty over the hostile US nuclear threat policy that had lasted about 50 years (Mullen, 2015).

The Korean peninsula has been under military threat and DPRK has been calling for negotiated talks to defuse this threat and restore their trust between itself and South Korea. On a keen eye, Pyongyang’s regime has been coming to a negotiating table only to buy time and continue testing and building their nuclear weapons (Kim Tae-woo, 2016). Despite agricultural and economic reforms announced in 2014, the country is still impoverished as the country is keen on restoring its survival on the tie. According to Noland (2016), food security has been an advantage to the privileged elite but a chronic insecurity for non-elites.

Power Position and the Rights of These Two Parties

The new American government elected in 2009 had promised to eliminate national security threats by entering into negotiated talks with regimes like DPRK. In that particular year, North Korea had conducted its 2nd ballistic test. This had forced the United Nations council on security to slap sanctions on North Korea. The United States had embraced these sets of sanctions but later abandoned this approach and called for a ‘strategic patience’ policy that did not bear any fruits (Green, 2016).

These actions forced DPRK to launch 2 long-range missiles and a 3rd nuclear test in 2013. DPRK’s defense commission uttered that it would continue testing these weapons to fight against the United States their common enemy (Griffiths, 2016). Unlike the Bush and Clinton’s regime that had adopted a foreign policy against North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Obama’s government had turned out to be an inconvenient proposition that enemies had turned into friends.

The American government piled pressure on DPRK to return to the six-party talks. The major aspects of this strategy were to convince Pyongyang’s regime to denuclearize in close coordination with allies like South Korea and Japan and convincing China to pile pressure on DPRK through sanctions and interdictions. However, the sanctions that were applied toward DPRK were lesser compared to the ones applied to Iran.

According to Stanton (2015), the American policy was meant to bring DPRK to its senses but not its knees. The American government had built this approach bearing in mind that the rate of a nuclear test by Pyongyang’s regime was not rapid to be capable of striking the American boundaries (Chang, 2016). The United States had accused DPRK of human rights abuses and nuclear proliferation. This policy adopted measures to bar dollar transactions in close connection to Pyongyang and no bank whether American and foreign would handle these deals.

According to Philipp (2016), the power that the American government had over DPRK was to involve Pyongyang in the diplomatic ties, pressurize Pyongyang through sanctions and determents. However, these attempts were frustrated by the Chinese economic ties with the DPRK. It was very hard to convince DPRK to denuclearize without impinging Chinese economic and commercial engagements (Konishi, 2011).

The first approach that saw the progress of the negotiations to a state that they are in today was to engage China. China shares a long land border that was used to support Pyongyang with oil and food supplies. The initial step was to negotiate with China to bring an end to the threats in the peninsula. The major road to this state passes through Beijing and China was used to deliver this common plan to DPRK in matters that interested this regime (Stravidis, 2016).

China was keen not to break their bilateral relations and it was interested in the status quo present in DPRK as it is a buffer zone. China knew that the turmoil that would arise would spread to its territory. It advised the US and North Korea to come to the negotiating table to end these bilateral issues. China agreed to enforce sanctions completely and fully in an economic and strategic dialogue headed by Xi Jinping in Beijing. China agreed to interrupt the flow of materials such as valves, vacuum pumps, computers and uranium hexafluoride cylinders (Snyder & Byun, 2016).

What Happened In the Past and Why the Negotiations Are Where They Are Today

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense drafted in Washington forced the Chinese government to cooperate. Wang Yi, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs reiterated that this move would go beyond their defense and reach other regions apart from the peninsula. Pyongyang who rose into power in 2011 had refused to denuclearize with a motive of restoring the pride of sovereignty in the peninsula (Chang & Gordon, 2016. There has been a missile and nuclear negotiations from 1994 to 2012 and successive American regimes had held the talks to halt the building and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. In this timeframe, these two parties have held a series of four major negotiations. These are the bilateral leap day deal held in 2012, the six-party deal held from 2003 to 2009, bilateral missile negotiations conducted from 1996 to 2000 and the agreed framework to defuse nuclear weapons instituted from 1994 to 2002 (Nikitin, 2010).

After the collapse of the leap day talks in 2012, North Korea continued testing its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Available negotiation options for the United States include elements of denuclearization moratoria such as verification of weapons stocks, freezing of facilities for nuclear production, dismantling of nuclear testing premises and pledges not to sell nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to other nations. North Korea should then request for security concessions and economic incentives as discussed in the leap day agreement and the six-party talks (Nikitin, 2010).

Having tested ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, the North Korea leader has achieved the capabilities he needed and is in a better negotiating position. After all, North Korea should be receptive and less aggressive since it has the capability of launching a long-range missile that can strike the United States territory. However, the United States should stop the food supplies it has been providing to North Korea to make it food insecure and come to a negotiating table. The major bargain available is the sanctions removal and economic benefits in exchange of missile dismantlement and nuclear weapons limitations to end this ceasefire (Lukin & Zakharova, 2018).

Despite the North Korea leader not pulling out of the agreement, analysts believe that talks are the solutions to ending conflicts. The United States should employ diplomacy since there would be a loss of life if a conflict escalates from the restrictions discussed above. A center for strategic and international studies in 2017 conducted a research on US-DPRK negotiations and found out that provocations did not bear any fruits as North Korea continued producing and testing these arsenals (Philipp & Elisabeth 2016.

Lastly, previous agreements with this nuclear states have produced some tangible benefits. The shutting down of the plutonium nuclear plant in Yongbyon and subjecting it to international monitoring have slowed the development of these weapons. This was from the agreed framework of 1994 to 2002 and a further moratorium abiding by a six-party talks from 1999 to 2006. Some of these benefits have been achieved before Kim Jong-un became the leader for DPRK (Chang & Gordon, 2016. The United States should focus on these partial developments to materially slow the nuclear weapons and missiles development by DPRK.

The United States and its allies ought to seek limited goals which are achievable rather than continue inducing sanctions and determents. North Korea had reiterated severally that it would not stop producing these arsenals unless the United States lifts these sanctions. Therefore, to lower tensions and stop nuclear developments, a near-term goal should be adopted. This involves freezing of missile and nuclear programs and continued international monitoring of nuclear production plants (Panda, 2017).

On my view, I believe that confidence-building measures should be given the first priority over missiles and nuclear weapons agreements. The continued pressure on North Korea to abide by the agreements could escalate conflicts causing military intervention. Some transparency measures and hotlines like the ones between US and Soviet Union (cold war) and the ones between Pakistan and India. Again, resuming the contact channels could reduce inadvertent and miscalculation which could escalate conflicts (Bandow, 2018).

A possible course of action that could be addressed to end this nuclear production is to focus on other contentious issues. These are the North Korea’s conventional forces, its biological and chemical weapons, building the confidence levels with measures like increasing the transparency between the United States and DPRK to prevent conflict arising on this Korean peninsula. Others include releasing of United States citizens detained in North Korea, sports, educational and cultural exchange (Pak, & HASS, 2017).  Finally, searching the remains of US MIA servicemen who died during the Korean War should begin. Also, the development of humanitarian assistance should be instituted. Another vital issue that can be addressed is the reunification of the North Korean relatives with American based Koreans.

There are preconditions to be considered before these negotiations can be successful. The United which is the main beneficially of these negotiations should insist on these preconditions. In 2017, Trump’s administration reiterated that for US to negotiate with DPRK, it must be ready to negotiate in good faith. Trump in 2017 speech emphasized that for a total, verifiable and complete denuclearization should begin with a halt of North Korea aggressive regime.  North Korea agreed to dialogue if other nations dropped their preconditions. First, the United States should stop protecting South Korea while Russia and China should drop their suspensions (Zaharia, 2016). If these preconditions are met, I have the view that North Korea will be ready to dialogue and bring an end to its nuclear advancements.

References

Bandow, D. (2018). Avoiding a Korean Calamity: Why Resolving the Dispute with Pyongyang Requires Keeping the Peace. Retrieved from https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/avoiding-korean-calamity-why-resolving-dispute-pyongyang-requires

Chang, Gordon G. (2016, February 19). Could a Missile Defense Plan Turn China on North Korea? World Affairs Journal. Retrieved from https://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-gchang/Could-missile-defense-plan-turn-china-north-Korea.

Chang, Gordon G. (2016, June 15). China Likely Cheating, Again, on North Korea Sanctions. World Affairs Journal. Retrieved from https://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/chinalikely-Cheating-again-north-Korea-sanctions.

Chang, Gordon G. (2016, June 7). US Pressures Kim Regime in North Korea. World Affairs Journal. Retrieved from https://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/us-pressures-kim-regimenorth-Korea.

Green, Michael (2016, January 7). Strategic Patience With North Korea Gets You Nowhere. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/strategic-patience-with-north-korea-getsyou-nowhere.

Griffiths, James (2016). Timeline: How North Korea went nuclear. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/05/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline/.

Kim, Tae-woo (2016). Iran Lessons Key for North Korea's Denuclearization. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/iran-lessons-key-for-north-koreas-denuclearization/

Konishi, W. S. (2011). Denuclearizing North Korea: Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Lukin, A., & Zakharova, L. (2018). Russia-North Korea Economic Ties: Is there more than meets the eye?. Orbis, 62(2), 244-261.

Mullen, Jethro (2015). North Korea: We're not interested in Iran-style nuclear talks. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/21/asia/north-korea-not-interested-in-iran-type-deal/.

Nikitin, M. B. (2010). North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874. DIANE Publishing.

Noland, Marcus (2016). The Elusive Charm of the 28 June Reforms, North Korea: Witness to Transformation blog. Retrieved from https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witnesstransformation/elusive-charms-28-june-reforms.

Pak, J. H., & HASS, R. L. (2017). Beyond Maximum Pressure: A Pathway to North Korean Denuclearization. Brookings Institution.

Panda, A. (2017). US Intelligence: North Korea’s Sixth Test Was a 140 Kiloton ‘Advanced Nuclear’Device. The Diplomat.

Philipp, Elisabeth (2016). Resuming Negotiations with North Korea. North Korea Nuclear Policy Brief, pp.1-2. Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/files/2016_06_24_Policy_Brief_North_Korea.pdf.

Rinehart, Ian E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth D. & Chanlett-Avery, Emma (2016). North Korea:U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation. Congressional Research Service Report.Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf.

Snyder, Scott & Byun, See-won (2016). China - Korea Relations: New Sanctions, Old Dilemmas, Comparative Connections, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 91-104. Retrieved from https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/1601qchina_korea_0.pdf.

Snyder, Scott (2015, November 19). U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Weighing the Urgent, the Important, and the Feasible, Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound blog. Retrieved from https://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/11/19/u-s-policy-toward-north-korea-weighing-the-urgent-theimportant-and-the-feasible/

Stanton, Joshua (2015). North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions. Fletcher Security Review, Vol. 2 No. 1: Money & War. Retrieved from https://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!stanton/c1vgi

Stavridis, James (2016, January 12). How to Plan for the Worst in North Korea. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/12/north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-china/

Zaharia, A. A. (2016). United States, China and the North Korean Nuclear Program. Acta Universitatis Danubius. Relationes Internationales, 9(1).