Putin’s Policy Towards China After 9/11: An Analysis

2001 September 11 has been one of the most tragic days in the chapters of American history. Devising the responses to an attack of September 11, American policy makers has been facing choice of difficulty with some of the significant however uncertain outcomes (Kuhrt 2007). The conflict against the extremist elements of the Islamic fundamentalism that adopted terror as their primary weapon, were new, multifaceted and protracted.

A new Russian picture of Chinese, that emerged in the 1990s as a result of fundamental changes in both China and Russia, has informed contemporary Russian government attitudes to China. Furthermore, under the new Russian Federation, public and elite perceptions have a far bigger impact on official policy than during the Soviet times (Cheng 2009). Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian international policy focused primarily upon diplomatic ties as well as entry into the "common European home," initially overlooking relations with closer neighbours.

This essay will argue on the policy of president Putin towards China after 2001, preceding the new national security doctrine and the new foreign policy doctrine of Russian federation identifying the key National interest and formulation of the strategy regarding implementation.

Russia and China have been enjoying bests of relations since the late of 1950s. The policy approach for securing the relation among Russia and China was inaugurated by the treaty of good neighbourliness and friendly co-operation among people’s republic of China and Russian federation. The strategic treaty that was signed under the international powers, Zemin and Putin outlined the broader strokes that served the basis of the peaceful relations, geopolitical and diplomatic resilience and economic co-operation. The approach and the treaty also encompass mutual, co-operation to the regulations related environmental technology as well as energy conservations, towards the international trade and finance. The documents afform the stand of Russia over Taiwan as the inalienable part within China (Yingyi 2018). The approach by Putin for the international peace signed under the treaty of co-operation bonded two major giants closer in the upcoming 20 years within the commitment of international security after the context of cold war. The treaty composed of 25 articles joins Russia and China for opposing the missile plans of United states. The approach also placed Russia more firmly behind the claim of sovereignty of China over the Taiwan island. The approach and the treaty approach also enabled in strengthening military co-operation among Moscow and Beijing after the rejection of the interventions undertaken by NATO in the year 1999.

Analysis of Putin Strategy

With the target of enhancing the strategic relations among Russia and China and provision of the stability of peace, the analysis of the Putin’s strategy can be depicted as follows.

The multipolar strategy during the latter half of 1990 have satisfied the rising nationalism as well as the demand for the major status of the power, however it failed in the improvement of the external environment. The overall crisis related to finance in 1998 majorly bankrupted the economy of Russia thereby reflecting the failure of the economic reforms that are underway due to the beginning of the comprehensive national power supply of Russia that sharply declined after the pressure of NATO (Hirss 2019). The policy overall targeted to serve for the interest related to the domestic development, development of goof and effective environment for a stable growth in economics for the improvement of the living standards of people. Though each of the economic development and security are the core objectives in the domestic ground, the nuclear capability of Russia has been adequate deterrence for guaranteeing the security and economic development. The expert of the China foreign policy had endorsed the approach noting the significance of the change under the orientation as the historic, since both, Russia and Soviet Union made economic development subservient towards the respective additional and external strategies related to expansion.

The overall foreign policy orientation overall contributed majorly to the security of China while also promoting the economic co-operation of Sino -Russian. In regards with emphasis over the domestic development of economics, administration of Putin focused over the close co-operation as well as the integration of the international community. The overall policy and approaches targeted to ensure that both the states are complete and independent systems and are attempting to reshape the entire world as per the respective ideological and geopolitical design.

As per the Russian Strategy document. The administration by Putin adopted the model related to selective participation. This resolutely defended the significant interest of Russia, thereby maintaining the principles, without confrontational strands at other significant issues. The overall documentation and agreement related to the collaboration and the co-operation among the states highlighted that selective participation is similar to external policy of China (Li et al. 2020). The most significant treaty, named the treaty of good neighbourliness and the friendly co-operation targeted ton solve the overall tension at the Sino -Russian Border war of 1969, emphasising the interstate co-operation within the areas of the strategic interest including effective co-operation at the UN security council. The treaty focused over the bilateral relation on the basis of the mutual respect on sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity. Further factors such as non-interference at the internal affairs, mutual benefits as well as equality falls under the overall summary analysis of the policy implemented by Putin over the Russia-China relation after 2001 (Huasheng 2018).  The treaty and the policy also focused over the years of the negotiations over the Chinese borders that culminated after receiving 340 kilometres of territory disputed from Russia in the return for Beijing and dropping of land claims against the context of Moscow.

Official Documentation And Agreements On Co-Operation Among Two States

It is evident that Russia has regained true autonomy under Putin. The quick rise in oil prices in the 2000s enabled the nation towards the transition for economic development on the new capitalist basis laid at the 1990s, thereby allowing to break free from the foreign dependency in the financial aspect.

During mid-2000s saw the nationalisation of a substantial portion of Russia's oil industry, laying the groundwork for a unified energy strategy. The armed forces reforms worked out during the first part of the early 21st century provided the Kremlin with a powerful tool for defending and promoting the nation's interests (Burrett 2020). The platform's stability was assured by the majority of the citizenry's consistent backing for Putin, whereas the authority horizontal offered a vehicle for the presidency could exercise his democratic authority.

The Russian aristocracy as well as population as a whole did not acknowledge American leadership, which was a prerequisite for integration into the Western system. Russia seems to be unable to establish its own power centre in Eurasia, owing to the unwillingness of the former Soviet states' elites to acknowledge Moscow's authority. With Russia, which was both autonomous as well as secluded at the time, great-power designation became critical (Ishii 2019).

Putin took a severe turn in the second part of the 2010s as little more than a result of his twin defeat. Externally, there appeared to be a shift away from Greater Europe and toward Greater Eurasia, which many saw as a shift towards to the East, notably China.

Along with China, Putin intended to strengthen the connection and ties with India, a major Asian power similar to China and a long-standing strategic partner for Moscow; Japan and South Korea, as sources of technology and investment; and the ASEAN nations, as a huge and rising market. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) commenced post-Soviet economic integration in 2009, and it took on a particular Central Asian flavour (Literáková 2020).

The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, as well as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, signalled triumph for the United States and the fall of communism. As the United States has become the world's single powerhouse, "corporate strategy" issues were far less essential in the perspective of the states involved. Furthermore, during the Tiananmen Square event, China confronted international sanctions, and its leaders felt the strain of the other's "quiet development" plan. Chinese authorities, on the other hand, claimed that a multipolar world would be the optimum option, both for China as well as for the rest of the globe, but that a single-phase condition would only have been temporary (Li 2018). Domestic goals were given a higher importance by the Putin administration than exterior goals. Igor Ivanov, the Putin government's first minister of foreign affairs, summed up the lessons learned from prior mistakes as continues to follow: Its "world super power" mindset, which was a remnant of the Soviet period, encouraged Russia to engage in international issues to the fullest degree possible, which was often beyond its locally available resources. As a result, he urged that Russian foreign policy should prioritise domestic development at this time, establishing a favourable atmosphere for sustained economic growth that raise citizens’ quality of life.

Success Steps

The Putin government has indeed welcomed tight collaboration and integration with the international community, in keeping with the emphasis over the economic development in the domestic platform. It meant that the traditional practise of recognising Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union as separate and complete institutions, each striving to remake the international order according to its own geopolitical as well as ideological plans, was abandoned. China's scholars indicate that the this embrace of international rules as well as unification is comparable to China's posture and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were simultaneously established during 1953/54 with India and Southeast Asia (Åslund 2019). The Putin government increasingly disclosed its intentions here in this context. Russia initially strived to establish its leadership role within the CIS while maintaining its sovereign independence and territorial integrity and supporting industrial prosperity. Because of NATO's aggressive eastward expansion, this geopolitical concern had become even more crucial, as well as the Putin government was ready to pay a significant macroeconomic price for it. Also, it wished to create a "circle of friendly neighbours" to alleviate the stresses from regional separatist as well as violent extremism (Ziegler 2020).

September 2001 to October 2004 -Sino-Russian relationships were strained during this time. During this time, the American government worked to enhance relations with Russia in order to provide a counterbalance to China, whereas neoconservatives inside the United States contended that Russia was indeed a democratic while China wasn't really (Li et al. 2018). Following 9/11, the Putin government provided significant support to the United States, including urging Central Asian countries to provide military bases for the US, expanding aid to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban rule, and so on. The conservative mainstream in the United States viewed Putin's government favourably at the time, and encouraged the growth of Russia and India so attempt to "encompass" China.

The Putin president's tactical concessions, according to China's Russia specialists, were intended at aiding the construction of a stable US-Russian partnership in order to secure a better atmosphere for Russia's economic development. This one was consistent with Russia's fundamental strategy of prioritising industrial prosperity. The Chinese leadership has been taking a similar approach in so many aspects (Pierri 2020). In the backdrop of China and Russia rising or re-emerging as great powers, these scholars tended to see bilateral disputes as unavoidable as well as reasonable. They remained worried, though, by the widespread sense of a "China danger" throughout many Russian quarters.

By downplaying frictions and bolstering mutual interests, Chinese policymakers worked to keep the strategic cooperative partnership moving forward. During this time, China's weaponry purchases from Russia were estimated to be worth $2 billion per year. Before 2003, Russia supplied 90% of China's weapons purchases; China remains Russia's largest significant client, swallowing 40% of its arms exports in 2003 (Stent 2020). Whenever it looked like the European Union's weapons embargo over China was about to be lifted, Chinese President Hu Jintao spoke with Putin just on telephone, stressing that military technology cooperation should continue to be an important component of their strategic alliance.

China has relied on Russia for modern weapons in recent decades, from Su-27 jet fighters to Kilo-class submarine as well as Sovremenny-class warships, and also the Russian weapons sector has benefited from either the exports. However, there has been disappointment on both sides (Raghavan 2020). There have been quiet protests from China that Russia has supplied more modern weaponry to Indians as well as other nations, although there have been efforts to guarantee that perhaps the armaments really aren't suitable for use along the Sino-Russian border. China's "decrypting processes," as well as its sales of weaponry based on Russian technologies to certain other Developing Countries, have alarmed Russia (Petrov and Gel’man 2019).

Within the central Asia, China has been the influential players. The overall prospect of the economic union of Russia Eurasian looks quite low against the initiative taken in China. The administration of Putin highlighted the priorities. This included defending for the sovereign independence as well as the territorial integrity followed by the promotion of the economic development that enabled Russia to maintain the leading role in the policy approach. The overall approach by Putin towards Russia and China relation during 2001 unequivocally motivated the interaction of financial assets for the monetary union.

Conclusion

With contrary towards the Western, Putin's autocratic policies appear to be well accepted in Beijing. The democratic Russia could potentially add towards the international relationship's uncertainty. There would be less motivations for such West should strengthen ties with Countries in order to control China if an authoritarian rule is restored in Russia. In the Russian Far East, a strong federal administration at Moscow has been far better able to repress the articulation of the local interests against the country, China. Putin's decision to stand down as president does not appear to have dampened his optimism. In Beijing, there is still a widespread belief that Putin will maintain power; the Chinese media are uninterested in suggestions that Medvedev would emerge from Putin's shadow and launch changes. Ever since mid-1990s, Russia's official attitude on ties with China as well as Asia as a whole has been one of "balancing" as well as "equal separation" behind power centres. President Putin hopes to end the organizational anarchy that characterised the Yel'tsin era and to restore order both inside the federal government and between the national government as well as the various regions. Few governors now venture to overtly contradict the international policy position, especially that here on China. Despite significant disagreements, most governments regard Putin as a much more competent protector of Russia's country's interests and to see less incentive to dispute state policies. These developments have indeed benefited Russia's relationship with China.

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