Analysis And Discussion Of Project Problems In Construction Of Sydney Opera House - Causes Of Failure Essay.

Discussion and Analysis of Project Problems

Sydney Opera House is a landmark opera theatre in Sydney, Australia that is not only a simple theatre but also an example of brilliant architecture work and design. The Sydney Opera House Project was founded in New South Wales after discussions in a certain conference in the year 1954. The Sydney Opera House was one of the first major construction projects that was developed and designed by the CAD or computer aided design. It had presented major revolutionary concepts of architecture and engineering that were not used before in Australia. A competition was started for the design of the opera house and out of more than 200 participants, only one participant was selected as his design was more attractive and unique. In the 1954 conference in NSW, the Premier of New South Wales, John Joseph Cahill proposed the building of a new opera house that will also become a landmark of not only Australia but also the world. According to Cahill, the new opera house would have the best facilities and will provide a grand stage for the expression of the best talents around the world and the best form of opera entertainment (Flyvbjerg 2014). Moreover, Cahill also wanted this new opera house not on a temporary few years but a grand opera house that will last for hundreds of years. The project had been deployed for construction and development of an Opera house that had been decided for constructing at Bennelong Point, a peninsula of 2.23 hectares (240000 ft2). The Sydney Opera House was one of the first major construction projects that was developed and designed by the CAD or computer aided design (Pollak et al. 2014). It had presented major revolutionary concepts of architecture and engineering that can be revised for the completion of the construction project operations.

In this report, the causes of failure experienced during the construction of the opera house have been analyzed and discussed.

Discussion of the Project

In a certain conference held in New South Wales in the year 1954, the premier John Joseph Cahill proposed and founded a project for building a landmark opera house in Sydney. According to Cahill, the new opera house would have the best facilities and will provide a grand stage for the expression of the best talents around the world and the best form of opera entertainment. Moreover, Cahill also wanted this new opera house not on a temporary few years but a grand opera house that will last for hundreds of years. After a suitable site was chosen (on a land beside a harbor, where there was a tram shed), Premier Cahill started an international competition calling all the talented architects around the world to prepare a design for the Opera House (Drew 2016). Before starting the competition, the requirements of the opera house building were communicated to the participants. The requirements included a large hall for the different international symphony concerts, ballet and dance performances, pageants, choral and other mass meetings with seats for around 3500 people. In addition, inclusion of a 250-seater restaurant, two meeting rooms for 200 and 100 people respectively were also proposed. For the design competition, there were 233 entries from various parts of the world including England, Australia, Germany, Kenya, Iran, Morocco and others. After evaluation and judging of all the designs submitted by the participants, the design of the Danish architect Jorn Utzon was selected in January, 1957. After everything was finalized, the project was started in 1958. The estimated time for the completion of the project was somewhere around 1962 i.e. four years from the project initiation. However, due to a number of problems and flaws in the plan, the project took more than 14 years for completion. For this particular reason, even though the project was completed successfully, it is mainly considered as a failed project. The failures were in different parts of the project including the unrealistic and controversial design of the opera house, unrealistic budget and procurement of funds, unfeasible time schedule and finally the quality of the work (Howsawi et al. 2014). All of these factors contributed to the failure of the project. However, in spite of all these, the project was completed in 1973 and in the same year, the opera house was open for public. This particular project had presented major revolutionary concepts of architecture and engineering that can be revised for the completion of the construction project operations. The failure of the project operations had been resulted due to the lack of the proper planning and operations. The project was not being able to cope up with the expectations of the main stakeholders. The slackness of operations and illicit planning had caused the major downfall for the project. The modification of the existing facilities had caused the project to be lingering over the project and moved out of the scope.

Discussion of Project

Scope

The project had been deployed for construction and development of an Opera house that had been decided for constructing at Bennelong Point, a peninsula of 2.23 hectares (240000 ft²). The Sydney Opera House was one of the first major construction projects that was developed and designed by the CAD or computer aided design. It had presented major revolutionary concepts of architecture and engineering that can be revised for the completion of the construction project operations. There was lack of proper planning and operational issues that lead to the overall failure of the project operations. The scopes of the project can be divided into in scope and out of scope items and their explanation are given below,

In Scope items – The project in scope items includes all the activities that would be required for the construction project of the Sydney Opera House. The construction project would be formed for the development of specific actions that would be involved for the successful implementation of the project operations. The project owners had not considered the employment of a specific project manager for management of all the activities of the project. The chief designer of the Sydney Opera House Jorn Ultron and the chief engineer Ove Arup had been acting as the project managers for maintaining the activities of the project. It would develop the issue of slackness of the operations (Ribas, Gutiérrez and Sebastián 2014).  The design for the construction of Sydney Opera House was selected from 233 entries and the project was based for the development of the most magnificent construction project. However, the project was not being able to cope up with the expectations of the main stakeholder Jorn Utzon. The slackness of operations and illicit planning had caused the major downfall for the project. The project progress reports and the scheduled meetings are very helpful for the development of the implemented process and it would involve the analysis of the improved processes for the organization. The timely report would be involved for the improvement of the system inbuilt operations. The development process would endure the processes of the subjective improvement for the formation of the improved processes. The successful completion of the project would involve the formation of the successive development method. The project implementation would form the promotion of the models for the operations.

Out of Scope Items – The project for the construction of the Sydney Opera House would involve the formation of the development of the processes would involve the operational processes. The travelling and conveyance would form the development of the systematic processes and support for the development of the operations. The travelling and transportation methods would not be included in the project plan development. The designs of Jorn Ultron had been chosen from over 200 other designs and the process of selection of the design is also not a part of the project planning. However, the government was the first stakeholder of the project as they were allocated the power, legitimacy, and urgency for the completion of the project operations. The judging panel was the secondary stakeholder of the project and they were appointed by the NSW government for the selection of design of the project (Cohen, Rozenes and Horowitz 2017). They do not have any power for doing anything more than selecting power. However, the project was not being able to cope up with the expectations of the main stakeholder. The slackness of operations and illicit planning had caused the major downfall for the project. The modification of the existing facilities had caused the project to be lingering over the project and moved out of the scope.

Analysis of Project Problems in Terms of Scope/Time/Cost/Quality

Time

The construction project for Sydney Opera House was not officially authorized or funded by the NSW government. The project had been deployed for construction and development of an Opera house that had been decided for constructing at Bennelong Point, a peninsula of 2.23 hectares (240000 ft²). The Sydney Opera House was one of the first major construction projects that was developed and designed by the CAD or computer aided design. However, there were some major problems while developing the project of the Sydney Opera House Development. The project had formed for integrating the functions of the construction theories and it would form the development of the project operations. The implication of the systematically developed operations would involve the progress of the development of the operations. The development of the project had been hindered by the various aspects of the time slackness. The completion of the project had not been easily completed as there were hindrance factors like absence of the proper management and time consumption of the other activities. The overall completion of the project was expected to be completed in 3 years of time however it took almost 13 years for the completion of the project. The designing took almost 4 years of time as the chief designer Jorn Ultron had focused on the roof design more than the other aspects of the project. It had caused the major depletion of the overall time resource for the project. The project faced another major blow in terms of the time when Jorn Ultron had to resign from the project due to the financial crisis. The project of construction of Sydney Opera House had no proper project manager and Jorn Ultron, the designer of the project had been acting as the project manager by managing all the activities of the project. Later on Jorn Ultron resigned from the job and it resulted in the employment of Todd, Hall, and Littlemore as project managers. The change of the project managers also had influence on the extension of the project duration as they had to examine the operations of the project from the start (Newton, Skitmore and Love 2014). They required time for the completion of the project. The project was supposed to complete in 3 years. However, due to issues the project completed in 14 years and it had resulted in forming the failure of the project in terms of time. The project was to be completed in 4 years of duration that extended to 14 years of time and it is more than thrice of the expected time. The project operation implementation had caused the overall development of the functions of operations. The timely actions had been required for systematic development of the operations and significance of the effective operations in the estimated time. The change of the acting project director from Jorn Ultron to Hall, Todd, and Littlemore had brought about necessity of debilitating more opportunity for the consummation of the project. They required time for the finishing of the project and it should finish in 4 years.

Scope

Cost

The development project for Sydney Opera House was under the primary approval of the NSW government. The project had been sent for development and advancement of an Opera house that had been chosen for building at Bennelong Point, a landmass of 2.23 hectares (240000 ft2). The Sydney Opera House was one of the main real development projects that was produced and planned by the CAD or PC supported outline. Notwithstanding, there were some real issues in the finishing of the development project that brought about the failure of the project (Christensen 2015). The project would assemble the deliberate sending of the enhanced procedures and operations of the association. There are three major financial issues of the project,

Excessive expenses: The project had lack of proper planning due to the absence of the proper project manager and it had resulted in causing the major hindrance in the successful completion of the project. The project was expected to complete in AUS $7 million dollars and it took almost AUS $102 million dollars. The design for the roof had taken almost four years under the guidance of the chief constructor Ove Arup and chief designer Jorn Ultron. It used much of the resources and caused the excess expenditure of the resources in the project. The project would assemble the deliberate sending of the enhanced procedures and operations of the association. The operations of the project had required a considerable sum of money for the successful completion of the project.

Change in Management: The project of construction of Sydney Opera House had no proper project manager and Jorn Ultron who was the designer for the project had been acting as project manager for the project. According to Doloi (2014), the change of the acting project manager from Jorn Ultron to Hall, Todd, and Littlemore had resulted in requirement of exhausting more resources for the completion of the project.

Lack of Funding: The project of construction of Sydney Opera House had been supported by the lotteries. The people who were poor had to endure the lottery tickets for trying their luck and getting financial benefits. The funding activities had been formed for ensuring the completion of the project. The Australian Broadcasting Commission requested for proposing the change of larger opera hall into the concert hall as symphony concerts had been managed by Australian Broadcasting Commission. The project would assemble the deliberate sending of the enhanced procedures and operations of the association.

In Scope items

The details of the expenses through different phases of the project are shown below.

Year	Stage	Cost (million AUS $)	Cost Per Year	2010 Value of Costs
1957	Stage 1 Start		708840.01
1958			708840.01
1959			708840.01
1960			708840.01
1961			708840.01
1962			708840.01
1963	Stage 1 End Stage 2 Start	5,200,000.00	2,929,354.62	193,606,463.28
1964			2,929,354.62
1965			2,929,354.62
1966			2,929,354.62
1967	Stage 3 Start	13,200,000.00	10,959,757.05	361,239,653.59
1968			10,959,757.05
1969			10,959,757.05
1970			10,959,757.05
1971			10,959,757.05
1972			10,959,757.05
1973	Stage 3 End	80,400,000.00		1,386,548,297.03

Quality

The project was also considered failure because of quality issues. However, it was not about poor quality. Instead, the quality of the design of the opera house was too ahead of time for 1960s. The initial design chosen was very unrealistic during 1960s as there was low support of modern technology. Moreover, the architect also produced the plan without evaluating its feasibility and realistic nature of the design. In addition to the unrealistic nature of the design, the architect was somewhat inexperienced and could not be able to handle this type of large scale construction efficiently. Moreover, he was chosen as the project manager and with time, he failed to cope up with the progress of the project (Bronte-Stewart 2015). In order to meet the quality standard of the design made by the architect, the project team encountered expenses of millions of dollars without the expected outcome within the preset time schedule. Furthermore, during the progress of the project, the government told the project team to make certain changes in the opera house building. As a result, the architect felt it hard to comply with all the requirements during construction of the opera house. However, after spending millions of dollars and about 14 years, the project was finally completed and the opera house was opened to the public in 1973.

Project Priority Matrix

	Scope	Time	Cost	Quality
Constrain				¡
Enhance	¡		¡
Accept		¡

The above table shows the project priority matrix with four columns for the four factors of this particular project and the three rows for the three checklist factors against which the project factors are evaluated. In this matrix, the four project factors are scope, time, cost and quality. The scope is checked with enhance because the scope was modified and updated in order to suit the need of the project progress. The time is checked with accept because the initially estimated time was changed several times during the project and the total time taken to complete the project was extended to fourteen years from four. The cost is checked with enhance as the cost also gradually increased from the pre-determined and estimated value. Finally, the quality is checked with constrain as the quality of the project was kept constant and not compromised to fulfil other factors related to the project.

Recommendations through the Relevant Stages of the Project Life Cycle

Based on the analysis of the causes of failure of the project, certain recommendations can be provided. These recommendations are listed as follows.

Out of Scope Items

Project Initiation Phase – There were a number of flaws in this particular phase of the project. The first flow was in the selection of the design of the opera house. The judges’ panel selected the design that was flashy and attractive but they did not judge whether that design was realistic or not. The initial design chosen was very unrealistic during 1960s as there was low support of modern technology. Moreover, the architect also produced the plan without evaluating its feasibility and realistic nature of the design. Another flaw in the plan was the estimation of the time schedule. From the nature of the design, it was evident that construction of such a structure would take much bigger period of time than only four years. In order to avoid these flaws, firstly, a much more realistic and simple yet a grand design could be selected. There were no shortages of ideas as there were 233 entries from around the world. Again, before starting the competition, the authority should have cleared it to the participants that they should prepare simple yet grand designs rather than flashy and unrealistic designs.

Project Funding – This phase had one of the biggest flaws in the project. As the New South Wales government did not fund this project, the opera house project team used lotteries to generate funds for the project. The common people had to participate in lotteries and the generated income went to the opera house project fund. Apparently, this was a huge mistake as there was no assurance of sufficient funds. Moreover, the citizens were drained of resources in order to pay for these lotteries. However, in ideal case, the project should not have been commissioned at all without procurement of sufficient funds. The authority needed to convince the government to fund for this project or they should have got some sponsors for this project.

Time Management – Finally, another biggest flaw in the project was time management. The estimation of the requirement time for project completion was flawed from the beginning. Judging by the complexity of the design, it was never possible to complete the construction of the opera house within four years from the initiation. As the overall project life cycle lasted for much more than four years, a huge amount of resources as well as manpower were wasted through the course of the project. The time scheduling should have been better estimated in the beginning and the overall time for project should have been set at least 8 years with some buffer time (preferably 12-18 months).

Conclusion

In this report, the causes of failure experienced during the construction of the opera house have been analyzed and discussed. Sydney Opera House is a landmark opera theatre in Sydney, Australia that is not only a simple theatre but also an example of brilliant architecture work and design. The Sydney Opera House Project was founded in New South Wales after discussions in a certain conference in the year 1954. However, the project was not being able to cope up with the expectations of the main stakeholder Jorn Utzon. After everything was finalized, the project was started in 1958. The estimated time for the completion of the project was somewhere around 1962 i.e. four years from the project initiation. However, due to a number of problems and flaws in the plan, the project took more than 14 years for completion. For this particular reason, even though the project was completed successfully, it is mainly considered as a failed project. The failures were in different parts of the project including the unrealistic and controversial design of the opera house, unrealistic budget and procurement of funds, unfeasible time schedule and finally the quality of the work. These are some of the primary factors that resulted in the failure of the project. However, in spite of the failure, the project was continued and finished after 14 years from the start. After the project was complete, the opera house was opened to the public and the opera shows were staged with success.

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