Operation Desert Storm: Iraqi Objectives, Operational Reach Issues, LOO, And Joint Force Support

What are the Iraqi main objective(s) during Operation Desert Storm?

Explain the Operational Reach issues involved in General Schwarzkopf’s scheme of ground maneuver if the ground war had lasted longer.

Explain which type of LOO best characterizes General Schwarzkopf’s Operational Approach for Desert Storm.

Explain how the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) supported General Schwarzkopf’s scheme of ground maneuver.

What were the Operational Level objectives (end state) for Operation Desert Storm?

Overview of Operation Desert Storm

Instructions:  The C402 Operational Art & Design Exam is worth 35% of the C400 block grade. The exam is worth a total of 200 points and consists of a Part One and Part Two.  C402 Part One has six requirements; Part one focuses on the strategic theater level of war. C402 Part Two also has six requirements for you to answer; Part Two focuses on the operational level of war. 

You may use the C400 online lessons and readings to help you answer the exam; moreover, you should not start the exam until you have finished both C401 and C402 lessons.  View the computer-based instruction (CBI), complete the lesson readings, and watch the instructional videos prior to starting the C402 Exam. 

All work must be your own.  Do not discuss this examination or your answers with anyone other than a Department of Distance Education (DDE) instructor or your academic advisor.  Your answers to the exam questions must be typed and double-spaced throughout, and must use Times New Roman 12-pitch font and one-inch margins.  Write your answers as complete sentences, not as bulletized comments.  This assignment does not have an associated CGSC Form 1009W Writing Evaluation.  

There is1 reading for the exam. Usethe“Operations DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM” readings found in Blackboard.  Read this document thoroughly, and then answer the exam questions, which begin on page three of this document.  The primary doctrinal reference is Joint Publication 5-0 The Operations Process (2011).  Other references include:

• JP 1-0 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013)
• JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2016)  
• JP 3-0 Joint Operations (2017)

If you state information from the lessons, readings, or doctrinal references as part of your answer, you must give a citation in accordance with ST 22-2(Turabian endnotes or footnotes). 

Overview:On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intent of placing what it claimed as its ‘nineteenth province’ under Iraqi control.  President Bushcondemned the invasion and met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell;US Central Command Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf; and National Security Council members in determining a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.A decision was made for US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to develop potential military options while other senior United States Government officials conferred with neighboring nations in the region.  On August 4, USCENTCOM Commander, General Schwarzkopf, briefed President Bush on a proposed plan for the deployment of a defensive force to Saudi Arabia.The following day, senior United States Government (USG) officials consulted with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on the proposed defensive plan and to assure Saudi leaders of President Bush’s pledge of support for the Kingdom’s security and stability. On 9 August 1990, an element of the XVIII Airborne Corps arrived in Saudi Arabia in preparation for the arrival of the ready brigade of the 82d Airborne Division in support of Operation Desert Shield.  Operation Desert Shield would serve as a defensive force to defend Saudi Arabia and to buy time for follow on heavy forces to arrive into country.  Operation Desert Storm is a clear example of the use of operational art that guides joint operations today.  Modern warfare demands a joint approach (JP 5-0). 

Operational Art and Design Exam Requirements

Note: Regurgitating doctrine is NOT enough to receive a passing grade on the exam; you must be able to APPLY what you have learned about operational art and design.     

CGSC does not tolerate cheating, plagiarism, or unauthorized collaboration.   Therefore, you should review CGSC Bulletin #920, Academic Ethics Policy (February 2016) and the DDE Academic Ethics brief posted on the course information page.  Violation of academic ethics will result in an investigation and possible removal from the course. 

Final note: Put your answers in the spaces provided underneath the respective question.

Part One: Strategic Theater level of war [100 points possible]

Questions in this part of the exam are about events that occurred during Operation Desert Shield but are focused on the Theater Strategic level.Operation Desert Shield (Defense of Saudi Arabia 2 August 1990-16 January 1991) was a Major Operation in support of the Southwest Asia Campaign.A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0 pages II-22). Your answers on this portion of the exam will focus on the Theater Strategic issues of Operational Art.

1.  Describing the Operational Environment [20points]

JP 5-0 states that “The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these areas are the adversary, friendly, and neutral actors that are relevant to a specific joint operation.”   See JP 5-0 pages III-8 to III-11 for additional detail.¹

United States and her coalition forces launched a launched Operation Desert Shield to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army from toppling Saudi Arabia government after the Iraqis successfully took over Kuwait and renaming it its nineteenth Iraq district. The US and the allied forces therefore made a strategic decision to first secure Saudi Arabia from impending invasion by the Iraq army. This was to help the US and the coalition forces base to launch attacks aimed at recapturing Kuwait from Iraq². Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait because he accused them of stealing Iraqi’s fuel using slant underground drills that made fuel flow towards Kuwait from Iraq. The then US President Bush did not agree with Saddam and when Saddam decided to invade Kuwait Bush demanded that Iraq withdraw forces from Kuwait and have legitimate government restored. But Saddam refused these demands and thus the US and the allied forces decided to launch recapture of Kuwait by first securing the neighboring Saudi Arabia where they will use a base to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Thus Operation Desert Shield was meant to shield Saudi Arabia from Iraqi’s attack¹.

Part One: Strategic Theater level of war

² Joint Operation Planning, ebook, 1st ed. (New York, 2011), accessed January 24, 2018, https://grugq.github.io/resources/jp5_0.pdf.

2.  U.S. Theater Strategic Level objectives [10points]

- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;

- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and

- Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad³

3.  Identifying Operational Risk [20points total]

“Operational design supports operational art with a general methodology usingelements of operational design for understanding the situation and the problem.” (JP 5-0, III-2)

JP 5-0 states that an “Operational risk defines aspects of the campaign or operation in which the commander will accept risk in lower or partial achievement or temporary conditions.  It also describes areas in which it is not acceptable to accept such lower or intermediate conditions.”

The United Sates and her coalition partners accepted operational by deploying elements of the 82d Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia so that the forces could buy time by engaging adversary forces before the US and the allied forces could arrange themselves and launch a serious offensive forces to defeat the Iraqis. The early forces sent to Saudi Arabia risked being killed all of them because they were mainly defensive and not offensive forces.  So in exchange of this risk the US and the allied forces got time to prepare and assemble forces which will now try to overcome Saddam’s forces in Kuwait. Another advantage is that the earlier 82d Airborne Division forces prevented Iraqi forces from invading Saudi Arabia and taking up strategic positions in Saudi Arabia which will mean before US and the coalition forces could rescue Kuwait they will have first needed to defeat Saddam in Saudi Arabia to open the leeway to fight Saddam in Kuwait. Geographically, Saudi Arabia borders Kuwait the other side is the Persian Gulf which is a water mass which connects to Arabian Sea. Therefore, to launch operations from Iran which is further to the East of Kuwait would have brought great logistical challenges to the ground forces as they would have to cross a considerable water body in size before crossing to Kuwait, giving Saddam upper hand thus the only viable place to launch attacks to Iraqi forces in Kuwait was via Saudi Arabia therefore a decision was made to secure it first before launching the main attack³.

4.  Decisive Points [10 points]

A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). 

The Objective of Operation Desert Storm

First decisive geographic function was securing Saudi Arabia from attack from Iraqi forces. This enabled the US and the allied forces to have a good ground to launch attacks to Saddam’s forces.

A key event is when the 82d Airborne Division successfully defended Saudi Arabia from invasion by the Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces.

A critical factor was when the US collaborated with other countries around the region to prevent the war taking religious angle which would have easily called Jihad war. Jihad war is quite emotive and Mujahedeen fight to kill or die not to live or escape.

5. Culmination [20points]

A culmination point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Understanding the concept of culmination is critical to success in operational warfare.  It helps operational planners determine those factors or events that could cause either an attacker or defender to fail to achieve its operational objectives (increasing the risk of its eventual defeat).

Saddam Hussein backing down and removing his army from Kuwait and having legitimate Kuwait government reinstated. This would have achieved the objective of the US and the allied forces fighting the Iraq’s forces. The aim was to have Kuwait get back its legitimate government in place and ensuring that the people in the region enjoy peace without being attacked and maimed by anyone. Thus in this scenario the US and her coalition forces would not have experienced defeat but since there objectives of liberating Kuwait would have been achieved by Saddam withdrawing his army from Kuwait and having legitimate government in place.

Another scenario is that Saddam and Kuwait reaching an agreement to cease fire for sometime to give room to dialogue to discuss how issues at hand about fuel theft would be resolved such that Iraq stops feeling that they are being robbed of their fuel and at the same time having Kuwait satisfied that they are getting what is legitimately there’s. This would have had the US and the allied forces to stop war and wait for the dialogue process to be concluded ⁴.  

6. Ethics [20 points.  Do not exceed one typed page.]

Part Two:Operational level of war [100 points possible]

Questions in this part of the exam are about events that occurred during Operation Desert Storm andare focused on theOperational Level of war. Operation Desert Storm (Liberation and Defense of Kuwait 17 January-11 April 1991) was a Major Operation in support of the Southwest Asia Campaign. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0 pages II-22). Your answers on this portion of the exam will focus on the Operational Level issues of Operational Art. 

1.  Operational Level end state [10 points]

Operational Reach Issues Involved in General Schwarzkopf’s Scheme of Ground Maneuver

JP 5-0 defines the military end state as “a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining objectives.”

The Operational Level Objective for operation desert storm was when Kuwait is liberated from the grip of Iraq and that the legitimate government has been installed and running smoothly. Apart from this there should be peace in the neighboring region and that all the citizens of these countries as well as foreigners in this region are safe⁶.  

2.  Operational Approach[20 points]

“The operational approach reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state” (JP 5-0, p. III-13). [Related doctrine: JP 5-0, Chapters III and IV]. 

General Schwarzkopf’s Operational Approach for Desert Storm involved several key components including maneuver by VII Corps, a direct attack into Kuwait by Coalition forces and a potential amphibious assault.

The purpose of the VII Corps was to ensure that the enemy forces that is, the Iraqi forces are surrounded and prevented from retreating where they could go and plan themselves again. Therefore as several other battalions were advancing towards the key strategic Iraqi forces the VII corps work was to ensure that these key strategic units would not escape.

In a military operation envelopment is a key strategy that makes sure that the enemy is cornered well in such as way that calling for reinforcement is difficult for them and also trying to occupy other strategic positions further back is also challenging and almost impossible. Thus the enemy is subdued. ⁷

3. Maneuver [20 points]

JP 3-0 describes maneuver as “the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.  Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s mission accomplishment.  Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological effects, and physical momentum.  Maneuver also may enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.”

As the ground maneuver team attacked the Iraqi forces in fast paced attacks that the Iraqi forces were not prepared for the Air component of the attack was instrumental in further destabilizing the enemy. This because as the ground force made maneuvers the Iraqi forces were being forced to reposition from time to time which exposed them to attacks from the air done by Joint Air Component. Thus Saddam’s forces were not given ample time to reposition themselves strategically as aerial attacks both killed and injured some of them as well as blowing a physiological stress to those soldiers who were lucky not be touched by the airborne artillery.

General Schwarzkopf’s Operational Approach and LOO

The maritime forces on the other hand ensured that the retreating Iraqi forces could not find solace in Persian Gulf Sea where they could escape or plan further resistance or attacks. ⁸

4. Lines of Operation (LOO) [10 points]

“A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related intime and space to an objective(s).”“A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from acentral point.” “A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on theenemy.”(JP 5-0 p. III-27)

General Schwarzkopf forces mostly operated on exterior lines whose main aim was to surround the enemy. The General identified the locations of various Iraq forces and made plans to ensure that his forces converge on the enemy which gives little room for the enemy to run away⁹.

5.  Operational Reach [10 points]

“Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint forcecan successfully employ military capabilities. Although reach may be constrained or limited by the geography in and around the OA, it may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effectiveness of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and contract support (system, external, theater) and maximizing the through put efficiency of the distribution architecture. The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of LOOs.” (JP 5-0 p. III-33)

There could have been a number of Operational reach issues had the war lasted longer. One of them is the armored personnel carriers (APC’s) could have started to break down due to prolonged fighting in a very rough desert terrain. There could also be n issue of tankers and APC’s also running out of fuel thus greatly affecting movement of the forces.

6.  Operational Center of Gravity [30 points total]

1. Operational Military Objective(10 points)

• To ensure that the US and the allied forces do not occupy strategic positions that would make their work harder in trying to consolidate their gains in Kuwait.
• Take over considerable part of Saudi Arabia to enable them prevent enemy attacks in the newly captured Kuwait¹⁰.

1. Center of Gravity (20 points.)Centers of Gravity (COG) are linked to objectives that achieve the military end state.   COGs can be derived from an ends, ways, and means analysis and have associated critical factors—critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.   You will identify the Iraqi Center of Gravity during Operation Desert Storm and its critical factors.The required video from C402, Arguing the OE, Episode 14: Identifying the Center of Gravity, Eikmeier Method, describes center of gravity as the actor that possesses, or is the executor of, the critical capability that will achieve the desired objective.  JP 5-0 states; “At the strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will.  At the operational level, a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities – such as a powerful element of the armed force.”  

¹⁰Charles Hordern and H. Fitz M Stacke, Military Operations (Uckfield, England: Naval & Military Press, 2011).

***** FOR INSTRUCTOR USE ONLY ON THIS PAGE *******

C402 PART ONE SCORING

Requirement #	Requirement Value	Requirement
1	20	Describing the Operational Environment
2	10	U.S. Theater Strategic Level objectives
3	20	Identifying Operational Risk
4	10	Decisive Points
5	20	Culmination
6	20	Ethics

 

Requirement #	Requirement Value	Requirement
1	10	Operational Level end state
2	20	Operational Approach
3	20	Maneuver
4	10	Lines of Operation
5	10	Operational Reach
6	30	Center of Gravity

 

References

Aspinall-Oglander, C. F, and Archibald F Becke. Military Operations. Uckfield, England: Naval & Military Press, 2011.

Cobb, Alexander L. Military Operations, Health And Technology. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2012.

Hordern, Charles, and H. Fitz M Stacke. Military Operations. Uckfield, England: Naval & Military Press, 2011.

Joint Operation Planning. Ebook. 1st ed. New York, 2011. Accessed January 24, 2018. https://grugq.github.io/resources/jp5_0.pdf.

Joint Publication 1. Ebook. 1st ed. New York, 2013. Accessed January 24, 2018. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1.pdf.

Joint Publication 1-02. Ebook. 1st ed. New York, 2016. Accessed January 24, 2018. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf.

JP 3-0 Joint Operations. Ebook. 1st ed. New York, 2017. Accessed January 24, 2018. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-86/jfq-86_122-123_Rowlett.pdf.

United States Army. War In The Persian Gulf. Ebook. 1st ed. Washington, D.C, 2018. Accessed January 24, 2018. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-117-1/CMH_70-117-1.pdf.