Epistemology Of Naive Realism And Representative Theory Of Perception

Discuss about the Epistemology of Naive Realism and Representative Theory of Perception.

Perception is the way we recognize and interpret sensory information and how we respond to that information so as to be able to interact with the environment. All perceptions involve signals in the nervous system that later result from stimulation of physical or chemical of the sensory organs. Perception is not the reflexive receipt of these signals, but it is formed by learning, memory, anticipation and concentration (Thursfold, 2000). The empirical knowledge is based on how one sees, hears, touch and taste the surrounding. The difference that is drawn between perceptions that involve concept and the perception that does not and distinct epistemic relations are between our perceptual beliefs and perceptual knowledge. The particular theories to be addressed in the paper are the theory of Naïve realism and representative theory of perception. Comparison of the two theories will be shown; however, the theory of Naïve Realism remains to be the most superior to the representative theory of perception. 

When it comes to direct and indirect perception, Naïve Realism sees perception as a process of a single state as being direct and immediate while Representative theory sees perception as a multistage with processes of meditational prevailing between stimulation and percept and its perception is not direct. On relying on information that is stored, Naïve Realism perceives no function for memory and connected phenomena in perception. On the other hand, Representative theory, there is a role for memory and experiences of the past play a significant role in perception. Additionally, when it comes to process versus stimulation, Naïve Realism excels at the stimulation examination of the observer while Representative excels at examines the processes and mechanism underlying the perception.

Furthermore, On the Object of awareness, Naïve Realism gives an instant answer on the subject matter of awareness and that it is not anything but physical existing that exists individually of the awareness of it. On the other hand, representative theory shows that objects that are physical are not identical with objects that are immediate, rather they are quite different from, and can exist independently of these objects that are immediate.

This realism is also called direct realism or naïve because it maintains itself that perceptions by giving us undeviating knowledge on the external world contrary to the mediated knowledge of something else like an internal representative such as sense-datum (Audi, 2010). It appreciates that all sort processes of physiological get involve in our coming to perceive the external world. These methods enable one to be aware of the external world directly, and it does not deny that it produces an intermediary that allows one to be aware of the world indirectly.

Naive Realism

Putnam (1968, 1975) objects in the state of mental can have great, diverse realizations of physical or biological in various kinds and structures. For instance, both humans and mollusks do undergo pain, but that pain is arbitrated by a particular neural mechanism thus no state of mental can be recognized by any state of physical or biological (Genone, 2016). On spinning the argument the other way, there is little to be said about the neurophysiological that correlates our old pain, if at all the pain experienced can potentially be implemented in different ways. This evidently absolves the philosopher not to worry at all and allows us to treat the exceptional of physiological as two distinct domains.  

Properties of mental or cognitive are distinctive areas and are to be investigated independently in their interpretations of physical or biological since he asserts that, mental forms and resources are purposeful kinds of higher level of construction than the physiochemical or natural kind (Tarr, 2016). Although properties of mental are recognized and applied in physical properties, he persists that they are neither indistinguishable nor reducible to them. The law of isomorphism advocates that "It must be a spatial mechanism of three spatial dimensions, because its spatial nature is clearly evident phenomenological" (Popper, 2013) despite the spatial perception of the neurophysiologic mechanism. There are many probable apprehensions of a spatial illustration, and so the actuality of the phenomenal experience of spatiality can't itself choose between various spatial realizations. Nevertheless, there can be the exclusion of non-spatial representations by phenomenology so as to account for the perception of spatial nature.

This argument gets extensively acknowledged in the case of color perception despite it being seen controversial when in the application of spatial perception. In the experience of color, it has shown to encode a three dimension of color value i.e. shade, intensity, and dissemination. Even though one can't surely recognize the mechanism of neurophysiological accountable for programming the experience of color, it can be said with assurance that the "mechanism must encode at least three dimensions of information of color" (Gram, 2012). Various comprehensions of experience of color in distinct phyla and species may well match to several qualia of experience of color, and the extreme side of those experiences in other species might be unknown to us (Pinder, Davids, Renshaw & Araujo, 2011). Conversely, experiments of psychophysical in humans and animals have been used to resolve the dimensions of the experience of color, and in turn, they have given information about the representation of color in the brain. Therefore, there is no reason why this dispute should not also hold for spatial experience. 

Representative Theory of Perception

This theory affirms that when one perceives an object, the instant object of one's awareness is a sensory experience which signifies the object. One is not instantly or directly aware of the object itself. The primary motivation for the representative theory of perception is the argument from illusion. However, it does not impress by the fact that when one hallucinates the instant object of one's consciousness is a sensory experience which signifies the object, and not the object itself (Massaro, & Simpson, 2014). They persist that when one perceives an object, the instant object of one's awareness is the object, and not just a sensory experience as of it. So when one seems to see a dagger, the direct object of one's awareness is either the dagger which one is seeing or a sensory experience as of a dagger which one is merely hallucinating.

This Theory of perception is mainly connected with the 17th century English philosopher, natural scientist, and political activist John Locke (1632 – 1704). Locke who was born in England and educated at Oxford University supposed that when we enter the world as babes, the mind is a ‘blank sheet of paper' (De May 2012). He firmly rejects the notion that we are born into the world with some thoughts that we acquire prenatally or before we were born. Locke was led to make an essential distinction between what he called the primary traits of objects and the secondary characteristics of objects; he showed that there are two totally diverse types of property, matching to this dissimilarity.

One, there are primary qualities, which objects have sovereign of any viewer. The object is supposed to be square or cumbersome, regardless of whether anybody perceives it to be such. The primary qualities are the shape and weight. Next, there are secondary qualities, which objects only have since they are alleged. Qualities of secondary, like color, are anticipated onto surrounding by perceivers (Gomes, 2013). The Apple is not usually the shade of red, it just seems that way to me; I scheme redness onto the apple in the action of perceiving it. Then, the secondary quality is color and us apt to use varieties of secondary to signify qualities of the primary. Thus the red manifestation of the apple, which is a quality of secondary that I scheme onto it, signifies the fact that it replicates certain wavelengths of light, which is a quality of primary that it has regardless of whether I am looking at it or not. "Many suppose that the representative theory of perception must be false, because if it were true, then we would be stuck behind a veil of appearances, never having direct contact with objects in the external world. Since one could directly perceive objects in the outer world, one would never be able to check that the world is as it seems to be" (Jansen, 2014). 

Locke's theory is that when we perceive an external object, we attribute to that object what he called primary and secondary qualities. Our perception of that external object is caused by what Locke calls ‘powers' in the object which is the precise nature of which was not yet known to cause certain impressions in us. It is these subjective impressions of which we are directly aware. Together they make up our representation of the object (Smythies, 2013). Some of the elements within that representation exist only in us, namely all our representations of secondary qualities such as colors and fragrances. The other parts in the description do correspond to objective conditions of the external object. They are the object's size, shape, and relative position.

About the external object itself, Locke's answer is that it is an ‘unknowable somewhat' – a substratum to which the primary qualities are attached. Also, in which they inhere the various powers in the object whereby it acts on our sense organs to produce the sense impressions of which we are directly aware. According to him, we are in a sense trapped behind the veil of our perceptions. The object itself is unknown, ‘a thing I know not what' - because we have no way of discovering what it is like in itself when it is unperceived. To those who support it, Representative theory has a significant strength of merging the world as we perceive it with a growing scientific comprehension of the processes at work in generating that perception – a strength Locke intended (Bennet, Hoffman & Prakash, 2014). But to its critics, its principal mistake lies in unreliable concluding that all we can instantly perceive are states of ourselves, namely those states which are our subjective demonstrations. Thus to critics such as the Naïve Realists, the fact that such representations do occur within us does not mean that these are what we perceive   (Siemens,2014).         

To use an analogy, it may be that the only way you can see the world clearly is by wearing spectacles. But this does not mean that all you directly see is your side of the spectacle lenses – indeed provided they are clean you do not see them at all – you see with the aid of them, but you do not see them. The Naïve Realist's major criticism of the Representative Theory of Perception affirms that the direct object of perception is a subjective depiction of what is in the external world fallaciously deduce from the fact that subjective processes arbitrate our world experience the false conclusion that therefore what we immediately or directly perceive must be the final step in that set of personal progressions (Kamp, Van Genabith & Reyle, 2011). To the Naive Realist, this objection to Representative is lethal.

Conclusion

In modern philosophy, both approaches of perception of Naïve Realism and representative theory are valid descriptions of perception, Naïve Realism is said to be superior to the representative theory of perception since it is these view that we perceive independent objects directly when we train our senses on them and gives us a distinction that is not in representative theory. . Naïve Realism holds that our ordinary perception of physical objects is direct while the Representative theory of perception holds that the physical objects are not direct.'

References

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