Oil Companies International Marine Forum Ship: ISM Code Development And Role Of Organizations

ISM Code Development

Discuss About The Oil Companies International Marine Forum Ship.

There has been some development on the ISM code which includes coming up with other bodies ISPS code which in the year 2004 and the recent one being the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC) (2006) (Berg, Storgård & Lappalainen, 2013). There are other initiatives, besides the development of the code of conduct that is mandatory, taken by ship owners and stakeholders in the shipping industry as well as marine insures, chatters and more specifically Protection Indemnity Clubs Association and other bodies who are fostering marine environment protection as well as safer operations of ships (Berg, Storgård & Lappalainen, 2013). Pressure arose from the oil majors, and these are the Oil Companies International Marine Forum and Ship Inspection Report from which resulted to the vetting inspections introduced. (Celik, 2009).

 There is an unveiling of the Tanker Management Self-Assessment to boost safety and quality assurance. This made the P&I clubs to conduct their own "conditional surveys" more vigorously (Hänninen, Banda & Kujala, 2014). Where deficiencies were identified, the P& I clubs imposed restrictions and at times refused to provide insurance covers. This was to reduce and prevent loses and accidents. This initiative was also developed actively by the clubs to assist their members with operational risk management which will, therefore, reduce these accidents and claims (Hänninen, Banda & Kujala, 2014). Industry bodies were developing initiatives and projects to encourage the safer operation of ships and risk reduction. These bodies are International Association Of Ship Manager (INTERMANAGER) IFS, the Baltic and International Maritime Council, the International Association Of Independent  Tank  Owners, the International Association of Dry Cargo  Ship Owners and the International  Chamber  Of  Shipping. (Celik, 2009)

These bodies proceeded to develop countless projects and initiative majorly on practical subjects which assist in ensuring the safety of the ship.  The inspection of foreign vessels intensified and became more sophisticated when visiting its ports; this was aimed at identifying deficiencies and assisting international conventions with the implementation of compliance (Hänninen, Banda & Kujala, 2014).

Intergovernmental organizations and the government were actively coming up with a variety of maritime safety. ISM code had an excellent chance of contributing to significant progress protecting the marine environment and more importantly upon collaborating with some safety and risk management responsibilities taking place in other places of the world at that time. (Celik, 2009). However, ISM code was never meant to bring about new interparty dependencies.  Basing on the better –known disasters which occurred in the late 1980s and to the 1990s, the catastrophes triggered of the origin of ISM code. This was attributed to a formal investigation that was carried out to look into the crushing of the MV Herald of Free Enterprise(ferry) in  March 1987 (Praetorius, Lundh & Lützhöft, 2011).  This was carried out by Sheen J. This capsizing led to the death of 193 passengers and crew members. Not only did this incident shook the shipping industry together with the marine insurance provider, but also the measure of this setback was rising to the world media triggering need to emanate and depend on national governments without excluding politicians to act (Hänninen, Banda & Kujala, 2014).

The Role of Organizations

The findings of the report of Sheen Jehu reports about the aforesaid errors of omission that led to the disaster was the fault of the Master, Chief Officer, and his assistant (Praetorius, Lundh & Lützhöft, 2011). The captain failed to issue and also was unable to enforce orders. This resulted in the report concluding that the crucial faults lay in the Company.  Failure of assuming responsibility for the safe management of ships by the Board of Directors. In other words, the directors did not comprehend their duties properly (Hänninen, Banda & Kujala, 2014). All of the administration from top to bottom was guilty of the failure of management in so far as sharing responsibilities are concerned. This chain of control involved the Board of Directors all the way down to junior superintendents. The management and the corporate body were sloppy. This was proved by the person who was the Operations Director and the one who was the Technical Director (Praetorius, Lundh & Lützhöft, 2011).  These two failed to share management and to give proper directions, therefore, contributing to the disaster. The court was unimpressed with both gentlemen. In July 1986, the Government issued M Notice 1188. This was as a result of the publication of a report that was investigating the loss of MV Grainville (Andersen, 2018).

The notice was entitled ‘Good Ship Management.' This probed the ICS and the ISF to come jointly and produced a publication entitled   “Code of Good Management Practice in Safe Ship Operations.”  A section from M notice 1188  which was titled  ‘Good Ship Management' avails some knowledge which eventually evolved in the process into the ISM code (Bhattacharya, S. 2012).  The loss of MV Herald of Free Enterprise, in the UK, in March 1967 was tragic a led to the introduction of Operations (Kristiansen, 2013). .   

These regulations were laid before the Parliament and came into action in December 1988 as a Statutory Instrument. These rules and regulations apply to passenger ships in the UK (Héritier, Knill & Mingers, 2011). These ships should be on short sea trade. The controls are developed in two classes. Class II and Class IIA, which in turn were established in two central tenets. The tenets are as follows; every ship is required to carry an ‘Operation book' for efficient and safe operations. Owners of the ship are required to appoint a designated person to oversee the activities and the operations of their ships. The designated person will ensure that the requirements of the book (Operation Book) are strictly followed. In October 1988, M Notice1353 was issued (Héritier, Knill & Mingers, 2011). . It stipulated detailed guidance on how to comply with these measures so that they could be achieved.  M Notice 1424 superseded M Notice 1188, therefore, drawing more attention. ‘The  ICS/ISF publication; Code of Good Management Practice in Safe Ship Operations’  (Bhattacharya, S. 2012). Statutory Instrument1988 no.1716, (Operation Book) this was also called the Merchant Shipping Regulation, It was superseded by The merchant Shipping ISM code  1997 no.302, .the Merchant shipping( International Safety Management  (ISM) code)  regulation  1998,  and  (RO-RO Passenger Ferries regulations in 1997  in the United Kingdom (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). IMO assembly decided to adopt Resolution A.596 (15) which was interpreted as RO-RO Ferries, this called upon Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).  The role of MSC was to develop every guideline concerning shore-based management and shipboard to ensure safe operations on RO-RO passenger ferries (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014).

Human Contribution in Ship Safety

 The resolution eventually evolved toward the development of ISM code. There is yet another important issue that was instrumental in the development and evolution of ISM code (Praetorius, G., Lundh, M., & Lützhöft, M. 2011. That is the more accidents that were occurring appeared to be blamed on ‘human error.' This was evidenced by the formal inquiry on MV Herald of Free Enterprise.   This resulted in the attribution of the accident on human error. About the P&I insurance and H&M having raised their cost by 200 percent, led to various reports which were commissioned by agents and agencies of the government to try to investigate and come up with findings which attempt to explain what is behind the problem or the causing problem (Lappalainen, F. J., Kuronen, J., & Tapaninen, U. 2012). The report titled The Human Element in Shipping Casualties, which were the findings of the UK Department of Transport concluded that the accidents and incidences were a result of human failings (Bhattacharya, 2012).  

This situation was a common factor that kept on appearing in many reports that were a commission to look into the incident. The report also stated that human was the causative because over 75 percent fires and explosions, they also were responsible for over 90 percent of collisions. Human error was attributed to these tragedies and accounted for 58 percent of all claims as stated by the UK and P&I reports (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). Over the years the maritime accidents have been found to be caused by human factor and human errors. They eventually rated 100 percent statistically as the cause of the marine accident as well as responsible for the destruction of the marine environment. In the late 1970s most of the world economies had been plunged into a deep recession, therefore, affecting  the industry  directly  in a crucial way;  first,  the cost of fuel which was  an essential need for the daily operation of any ship, second there was a slowdown in the world trade(Praetorius, Lundh & Lützhöft, 2011. The trend had a significant influence on the quantity of cargo to be carried. This eventually resulted in low supply and demand. Therefore most ships at that time were not able to generate profits even at the least cost. This resulted in too many ship own wars caught up in a dilemma, and therefore to make toughest decisions. Some sold their ships and got out of shipping business. Those who remained in the industry had to adopt short-term methods that will help cut down costs. (Anderson, 2015).  

ISM Code

 The same way the ship operators had no control over fuel costs, they also did not influence insurance cost as well. IMO held the 18th session on 4th November 1993, where Resolution A74 (18) was formally adopted (Atkins, J. P., Burdon, D., Elliott, M., & Gregory, A. J. 2011). This led to the revocation of Resolution A680 (17) which constitute the International Safety Management which advocates for the "Safe operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention.” This later evolved into SOLAS as chapter IX. There are steps needed and are mandatory in so far as the implementation and interpretation of ISM code is concerned (Anderson, 2015). The IMO Assembly in the year 1995, while recognizing the need for uniform implementing of the ISM code saw that there might raise a need for the agreement with the issuance of certificates following the Chapter IX of SOLAS. Therefore, the ISM developed the ‘Guidelines for the administration.'  The result led to the formation of flag administrations. Flag administrations are parties responsible for verification, certification and monitoring the compliance with the code requirements. This qualifications of the code apply to that fly their Flag and also applies to the companies operating those ship. A research was conducted to find out if the ISM code is implemented (Anderson, 2015).  

 The findings show that since the code was implemented, the number of serious loses increased but a count of total losses gradually reduces (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). Therefore a slow but steady improvement was indicated. The Tokyo MoU had also inspected to find out the effectiveness of the ISM code.   P&I clubs did not produce meaningful statistics. The insurance premiums increased progressively in the mid-2000s and stabilization was recorded only during the recent years (Glässer, U., Jackson, P., Araghi, A. K., & Shahir, H. Y. 2010). Although it is not possible to draw definite conclusions, there are indications that there is room for improvement where reducing accidents and claims is talked about, and these provided some significant findings (Anderson, 2015).

The Paris MoUs concluded that out of five inspections, one showed ISM deficiencies. These deficiencies were recorded during inspections and resulted in detention where one major deficiency (major non- conformity MNCs) were found.  In the results, three MNC categories came up; effective management ship and equipment, preparation for emergency, and a report on deficiencies and accident occurrences (Anderson, 2015). The flag states were measurable by reference to detentions rates.  The statement states that the inspection was aimed at determining if the SMS that is on board inspected ships were not only effective and implemented but whether it has been effectively maintained.  General Multi cargo ships rendered the lowest in detention performance. Offshore service vessels were rendered with the highest detention rate (Patraiko, D., Wake, P., & Weintrit, A. 2009).  The pleasing performance of bulk carriers has been 27 percent of all inspection with 1.7 percent only detentions, drew specific attention from the secretariat.  Panama happened to have 28 detentions of 1440 inspections (1.9 %), while Cambodia 26 detentions of 256 inspections (10.2%). There appear to be serious and significant differences between the Flag Administration in their verification and monitoring compliance of onboard ships which normally fly their flag operate the same ships with the requirements of the ISM Code (Anderson, 2015).

 An error is a generic term that encompasses every occasion in which the planned sequence or mental activity fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency (Reason, 2016). The human error arose when no accurate measures were taken. Most of these errors are non-voluntary. This unintended error could be termed as a mistake (Tzannatos, E., & Kokotos, D. 2009). James Reason in his book Human Error further defines the word mistake a failure in the assessment and inferential guidelines followed in the selection of an object or in the specification of the means to achieve it, nevertheless the actions directed by this decision amking plan.  In many cases, mistakes usually are unnoticeable and are subtle, and well understood (Reason, 2016).  

This is so far harder to detect. In most cases when human factors are talked about, it is mainly accustomed to wrongdoing, mistakes, and errors especially in the technical field (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). Human error is mostly attributed to casualties like the capsizing of MV Herald of Free Enterprise in the shipping. These can be termed as shipping hazards. In those errors, there were standing orders that contained stringent rules against improper stowage of cargo, overloading, abuse of berth and deck space, the substitution of experienced men with new ones and enlistment of unqualified mariners (Reason, 2016). "These orders were introduced mainly to curb to the large losses of galleons and their expensive, lavish cargo, rather than as a risk-reduction strategy for preventing any further loss of lives."  In those days also there was a rule on communication if any crew was found guilty of ineffective contact with their colleagues; the pilot instituted the death penalty (Yang, Z. L., Wang, J., & Li, K. X. 2013). The Second World War opened a springboard for human scientific factors work.  This was attributable to human limitations mainly.  This, however, was however not as a   result of escalating marine accidents (Reason, 2016).  

Research on human factors which were conducted during the World War II brought about an increment in personnel efficiency. The following are few activities and services offered by the human element (Chauvin, C., Lardjane, S., Morel, G., Clostermann, J. P., & Langard, B. 2013). ‘The manning scales on board,  Surplus of human resource, the unveiling of competitive technologies, shorter port clearance periods, lack of goodwill from employers and irrelevance of existing skills and embracing of new skills are all having an impact on human( Batalden, B. M., & Sydnes, A. K. (2014).  The human factor is a central and focal point and influences the result or performance of a ship. This has been made possible by the new introduction of new technologies which one way or another has generated problems that otherwise could not have been seen (Berg, H. P. 2013). This aspect of new technologies was not given sufficient focus regarding equipment. Human factors foster human relationships (Reason, 2016).

A group of workers working together in unison, pulling their resources and expertise to achieve a common goal or task, therefore, building a team. The marine environment is known to be a stressful working environment (Barsan, E., Surugiu, F., & Dragomir, C. 2012). The cohesion of workers provides cushioning in the harsh lengthy voyages. This helps workers to perform better. Accidents can be caused by fatigue and stress issues, this will, in turn, be called human hazards (Reason, 2016). Many of marine workers carry out their duties for long hours. Human bodies function at best when the body takes adequate rest of about 8 hours. Some voyages are considered in the latitude 30 degrees (Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010).  

Either south or north during the winter season, the trips can be severe and hectic. However, this issue is dealt with by increments of freeboard lines using applicable zones of the load line rules (Weintrit, A., & Neumann, T. 2013).  This enhances the safety of ships producing a more realistic solution. Fatigue and stress factors can be reduced by reducing manning activities and adoption of new technologies. A seafarer must always be focused and motivated to perform the task of seafaring (Reason, 2016). The seafarer must be able to withstand harsh and the changing dynamics of the marine environment. In conclusion, the ISM code was developed to counter the numerous marine accidents. It was formulated to prevent losses and protection of the marine environment (Reason J. 2016).

The law evolved gradually from time to time. Most of the insurance like H&M and P&I also took part in preventing accidents and severe losses ashore (Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010). They did so by hiking the cost of their policies (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). The IMO keeps in check ship owners and ship companies on their compliance with the regulations of the statutory instrument. This is achieved by inspecting every flag administrations (Kristiansen, S. 2013). . Human factors are proven to be the cause of most of the marine accidents. However efficient working can be performed if a performer is decisive and accurate (Reason, 2016).

References

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