Get Instant Help From 5000+ Experts For

Writing: Get your essay and assignment written from scratch by PhD expert

Rewriting: Paraphrase or rewrite your friend's essay with similar meaning at reduced cost

Editing:Proofread your work by experts and improve grade at Lowest cost

And Improve Your Grades
Phone no. Missing!

Enter phone no. to receive critical updates and urgent messages !

Attach file

Error goes here

Files Missing!

Please upload all relevant files for quick & complete assistance.

Guaranteed Higher Grade!
Free Quote

Taliban's harsh rule and threats to human rights

The Taliban are an Islamic fundamentalist organisation comprised mostly of Pashtuns that seized control of Afghanistan in 2021 after waging a twenty-year war against the government. Following the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban regrouped across the Pakistani border and began reclaiming territory less than ten years later (CFR, 2021). By August 2021, the Taliban had taken control of the vast majority of major cities, including Kabul. Following the signing of an agreement with the Taliban in 2020, the US will begin removing its remaining troops from Afghanistan (State, 2020). Even after promising to protect the rights of women and minority populations, and to provide amnesty to those who assisted the United States in their fight against the Taliban, analysts believe the Taliban would impose severe rule. Despite these difficulties, the organisation is nevertheless able to provide Afghans with security, healthcare, and economic possibilities.

Afghanistan's civil and political rights are in threat because of the Taliban threats to the constitution that the U.S.-backed state has drafted. If the Taliban do not however defend Afghan rights, foreign countries have said they would cease providing aid. This might lead to a severe humanitarian disaster. The Taliban have been warned. Furthermore, some analysts are fearful that the Taliban may one day enable terrorists to operate in Afghanistan, putting regional and worldwide security in danger.

Do the Taliban pose a threat?

Source: (Khan, 2021)

In the months after reclaiming power, the Taliban has engaged in behaviour reminiscent of its violent reign in Afghanistan during the late 1990s. It is said that they have imprisoned and assaulted journalists. Taliban have also reinstated its Ministry for both the Promotion of Virtue as well as the Prevention of Vice, which was founded during former Taliban control and was responsible for enforcing bans on conduct seen to be un-Islamic (Khan, 2021). A statement from the group's acting higher education minister stated that women would be able to study at institutions in classrooms that are separated by gender and in Islamic clothing (Shih, 2021).

The Taliban also pose a danger to the improvements in Afghans' living conditions that have occurred ever since the U.S. invasion. As the poverty rate increases, hunger levels grow, and the economy continues to worsen, Afghan authorities believe the country is on its way out, according to UNs officials. A hundred thousand people may be forced to flee their homes, adding to the millions of Afghans who are being displaced by the conflict in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2021). A cessation of funding from several nations and international organisations, which used to be the life line of the economy or public health sector, has exacerbated the issue. On top of that, the nation is dealing with a drought as well as the COVID-19 epidemic (Maizland, 2021).

As a result, foreign observers continue to be worried about the Taliban's backing for terrorist groups like as al-Qaeda, which they believe poses a danger to regional and worldwide security (Hoffman, 2018). The United States attacked Afghanistan because the country denied to hand over Osama bin Laden, the planner of the 9/11 attacks. A safe haven for terrorists could be set up in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, even though the Taliban says that "Afghanistan's soil will not be used against the protection of any other nation (NBC News, 2021)."

Taliban's backing for terrorist groups

According to a UN mission that watches the Taliban, al-Qaeda is still a major part of the organisation. Nonetheless, according to the UN experts, the Taliban has begun to "tighten their grip over al-Qaeda by collecting opportunities in foreign terrorist combatants and licensing and limiting them," a move that would "increase their authority over al-Qaeda." In return for funding and training, the Taliban has continued to support al-Qaeda and provide them with safety. The number of al-Qaeda militants in Afghanistan is reported to be approximately 200-500, with the organization's commanders believed to be headquartered in locations around the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. There have been reports that certain members of the Taliban's interim administration had previously collaborated with al-Qaeda, and it is believed that some of them still have ties with the organisation today (Daccess, 2022).

The Taliban have also been engaged in combat against their arch-rival, the Islamic State of Khorasan, a terrorist organisation with up to 2,200 militants in Afghanistan, simultaneously. While the Taliban is attempting to destroy the terrorist organisation, experts predict that it will continue to undertake strikes around the nation. In the midst of the United States' army departure from Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Khorasan took credit for an explosion at Kabul's international airport that took the lives of 13 U.S. service personnel and  around 170 Afghan civilians (Jadoon, 2021).

The United States has reported that the Taliban has taken huge numbers of small guns and ammo from Afghan security forces, along with armoured vehicles, combat aircraft, including heavy military equipment. They will strengthen the Taliban's capabilities, especially if they are able to recruit or persuade skilled operators to join the organisation. As a result of Afghanistan's internal war, some weapons will surely be obtained by other terrorist organisations or smuggled into neighbouring countries, and this will become even more probable (Wood, 2021). No evidence exists that the Taliban has obtained modern anti-aircraft weaponry, as well as the Taliban seems not to have an aviation force. Therefore, the Taliban does not presently represent a substantial danger to high-altitude military or civil aircraft. The government may, however, strive to obtain anti-aircraft weaponry or other advanced weapons systems in order to solidify power and discourage future military attacks.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan puts the country's security at risk immediately, as local terrorist organisations take advantage of the chaos and uncertainty. According to some sources, the Taliban may be able to operate more effectively in rural and isolated regions by centering its soldiers in metropolitan centres. An attack on Kabul airport on August 26th indicated that the international evacuation is itself a desirable target for terrorists. Evacuation operations were then put on hold due to the increased danger of terrorism by many nations.  The Taliban's capacity to improve security in Kabul as well as other areas has been questioned by IS-assaults K's on Kabul and other areas (Spagnolello et al., 2022).

The recruiting and training activities of extremist organisations and networks operating inside the area are expected to return to Afghanistan. Central Asia, China, Pakistan, Russia and Iran are all home to ethnic or political tensions that have sparked a number of hostilities in the area. If the fight in Afghanistan is resolved, it might bring more attention to other regional or worldwide jihadist fronts, similar to how the conflict in Kashmir escalated in the 1980s (Khan, 2013).

The risk to regional and global security

There will be more challenges to Pakistan in the near future, despite Pakistan's leadership claiming support for the Taliban. The head of the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Mufti Noor Wali, declared his commitment to the Afghan Taliban on August 16. In Pakistan's tribal regions, TTP assaults have escalated since late 2020, as well as a rise in threats motivated by events in Afghanistan, notably against infrastructure projects, is anticipated to come (Iqbal, and De Silva, 2013).

Terrorist attacks in Central Asia are expected to take a long time to occur, such as those carried out by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Nevertheless, if Taliban rule of northern Afghanistan is essentially uncontested, which seem to be the case, violent organisations targeting Central Asia are more likely to do so (Plastun, 2021). 

Years of counter-terror operations including rivalry with the Islamic State (IS) have weakened al-Qaida, which has evolved into a more grassroots, regionalized organisation as a result (in Somalia, Yemen, the Sahel and elsewhere). For about a year now, there have been rumours that Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri would be killed by 2020, and several of his possible heirs were murdered. According to the United Nations, al-Qaida is still present in at least 15 Afghan districts (Change and Naeem, 2021).

An chance to rebuild and restore influence only within global jihadist organization is unquestionably seen by al-Qaida in the Taliban's win on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. U.S. officials assert that al-Qaida continues to have "mutually advantageous contacts" with the Taliban, notwithstanding al-alleged Qaida's recent shift in policy toward the Taliban. Because of this, it is unknown if or how the Taliban would keep or show their commitment with the US in February 2020 to deny al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations safe shelter. According to US law, the Taliban must report to Congress on a quarterly basis on their compliance with the deal.  It's conceivable that the Taliban ignores al-existence Qaida's in Afghanistan rather than aggressively challenging it (Wood, 2021).

The biggest terrorist danger in numerous places is posed by IS-affiliated organisations, who are still operating in Afghanistan and across the globe. Homegrown violent extremists in the West continue to be inspired and motivated by the Islamic State (IS). Despite this, IS-K has often clashed with the Taliban in Afghanistan, so it is probable that the organization will continue to face significant pressure (Souleimanov and Colombo, 2021).

There will be no new global terrorist threats from either the Taliban or al-Qaeda immediately after a regime transition in Afghanistan. That's exactly what U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in June, and it's likely to happen sooner rather than later now that the Afghan government and security forces have failed (Wood, 2021).

Despite the United States "military failure" throughout Afghanistan, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi believes the nation now has a chance to achieve long-term peace. In the past, the United States has accused Iran of aiding Taliban members with clandestine help. An Afghan administration that includes all ethnicities and faiths is not supported by Iran. State television in Iran cited Raisi as stating that the defeat and departure of the United States forces from Afghanistan should be seen as a chance to restore stability and peace to the country. To help control Afghanistan, Iran offers its invitation to all Afghan factions to come to a national consensus as a neighbour and brother country (Tabaar, 2021).

The Taliban's combat against the Islamic State of Khorasan

China announced its embassy would continue open in Afghanistan as well as indicated a readiness to help the country’s rehabilitation. When asked if China would acknowledge the Taliban like a new government, Hua Chunying didn't say for sure. She said that China will indeed support the decision of the Afghan people. She added that the Taliban had promised to construct an inclusive Islamic government and also to protect both Afghans and foreign embassies. The Chinese government, she said, expects this would "guarantee a peaceful transition of the situation in Afghanistan (McCann, 2022)."

Qureshi promised a visiting group from the previous Afghan government that Pakistan will continue to play a role in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan, as per the foreign ministry. The mission was led by Mir Rahman Rahmani, a former Afghan parliament speaker. The Taliban's control of Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, was not mentioned in the statement (Boni, 2021).

Vladimir Putin's representative in Kabul has declared that Moscow would decide if to support the new Taliban administration depending on its behaviour. According to Zamir Kabulov, who spoke to Ekho Moskvy radio, "nobody is likely to expedite" the decision. There is no guarantee of recognition or non-recognition, according to Kabulov. Despite Russia's designation of the Taliban as a terrorist organisation since 2003, the group has been invited to multiple rounds of negotiations in Afghanistan since then, the most recent of which was in March (Stepanova, 2022).

President Joe Biden, who supported the decision to pull out forces from Afghanistan, has not addressed the situation there since then.   Taliban's rapid takeover of Afghanistan is due to Afghan military ineptitude, as per US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. He didn't want the US to go on a "third decade of war" in Afghanistan, as per Sullivan, therefore he wanted the Afghan army to safeguard the country, which had been trained and invested in by the U.S. for two decades. On CNN, Secretary of State Antony Blinken even said that the United States can only "operate with and recognise" an administration that "upholds the fundamental rights of its citizens and that does not harbour terrorists (Kamal, 2021)."

A statement from the German government had urged the Taliban to control themselves, preserve the lives of Afghans, and ensure that humanitarian supplies can reach people. "Germany is worried about the future of individual Afghans and the development of Afghanistan," stated a spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In light of the Western community's decades-long efforts in the region, Steffen Seibert stated, "these are painful events (Strand and Suhrke, 2021)."

One hundred days after the Taliban's harsh and unconstitutional takeover of power, Afghan civil society is under danger. Afghan women and girls are particularly vulnerable to violence if they choose to speak up for their rights. Human rights violations done by the Taliban and those who support them include arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, harsh beatings, and searches of people's homes in an attempt to suppress civil society and any kind of resistance. It's also worth noting that the rule of law has fallen apart in the last 100 days. Human rights breaches go unchecked because of a lack of effective tools to investigate them (FIDH, 2021).

The Taliban's military capabilities

Afghans as well as the international community were repeatedly assured by the Taliban that Taliban rule will indeed protect women's and girls' HRs and that Afghanistan's dynamic media will indeed remain operational, despite the fact that the Taliban had correctly identified these groups and individuals as being the most vocal critics and fear mongers of Taliban rule. Mujahid emphasised the Taliban's transformation by saying, "There's a significant difference between us, compared to 20 years ago (FIDH, 2021)."

According to the Taliban's assertions in Afghanistan, the stark reality quickly contradicts them. Women and girls have been assaulted as well as human rights advocates, judges and journalists are also targeted. Rather than being a radical departure from previous traditions, the Taliban's new coercive measures have shown a degree of continuity. All attacks that took place before to the Taliban's violent conquest on August 15th, when the Taliban's severe persecution of anybody defying the organisation worsened, are included in this list of actions (Maley and Jamal, 2022).

In September 2020, the Taliban launched a deadly assault against civil society, focusing on journalists, reporters, and HRs advocates. Five HRs activists and six media workers were assassinated between October 1, 2020 and January 31, 2021, as per UNAMA. It is indeed clear that the Taliban's strategy of repression is evident in reports of religious and ethnic minority rights being violated as well as reprisals targeting former members of the military forces, police, other government personnel, as well as systematic harassment or intimidation of citizens (Aljazeera, 2021).

Those living in Afghanistan are finding it more difficult to hold the Taliban accountable because of the Taliban's systematic suppression of civic society. Women and girls have been among those who have sought to speak out against the Taliban, but they have been silenced and mercilessly suppressed by the Taliban, have shown little interest in listening (FIDH, 2021).

All of these crimes have been carried out with no repercussions. Because to the Taliban invasion, the rule of law has completely crumbled in Afghanistan, resulting in a lack of accountability for HRs violations. Taliban customary courts in several parts of the country continued their operation despite the absence of functional national courts (UN News, 2021). Not enough is being done by the police and other law enforcement organisations. There is no sign that the Taliban plans to respect the current legal structure or judicial proceedings, and judges and prosecutors are living in terror of retribution assaults by former Taliban captives. Taliban founder Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, who was in charge of enforcing a narrow view of Islamic law while the Taliban governed Afghanistan, said that the Taliban will once again carry out killings and amputations, but possibly not in public. According to him, "cutting off hands is highly vital for security," and that such punishment was coercive (Gannon, 2021).

From August 15, the situation in Afghanistan was the subject of many international gatherings, including the United Nations Security Council, the UNHRC, and G7 and G20 summits. Rights have been protected and violators held responsible by the international community, but this has not been the case thus far (Davidson and Monteleone, 2022).

The Taliban's impact on Afghanistan's security

Millions of Afghan women and girls have seen their rights to justice, education, employment, and health care rapidly and sharply eroded. A number of international HRs treaties, such as the CEDAW, ICESCR, as well as the Convention on Children's Rights, hold Afghanistan to certain commitments, and these abuses are in direct violation of those obligations. Afghanistan is a signatory to all these treaties.

As long as the world is observing, the Taliban is aware of it. To show their support for women's and girls' rights, the group makes various public declarations. "All their rights under Islam" have been asserted by the Taliban for women and girls (BBC, 2021). To be sure, Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen offered this upbeat assessment on 18 August: Yes, women always had the right to go to school and work so that they may hold a variety of professions and vocations today. They get a right to higher education, those physicians who have already begun to serve the country. Teachers are now in session. Women are also employed in a variety of different professions. Women journalists have begun working while wearing the hijab (NPR, 2021). On the other hand, women's active participation and contribution to Afghan society is not yet a reality. Women's freedom of movement, education, health, and employment has all been severely restricted under the Taliban regime, despite the group's public declarations to the contrary, and this has had a devastating effect on wide sections of Afghan society.

Many formerly active members of society, such as women, are now confined to the house, unable to plan for the future because of the Taliban's reign.

The mahram norm, which forbids women from leaving their houses unless accompanied by a male relative, has had an effect on women's freedom of movement (HRW, 2021). It has been mandated that female employees of the government remain at home. Women and girls are suffering as a consequence of the Taliban's prohibition on female humanitarian workers. There are fewer women working in healthcare and education because of the limitations placed on their freedom of movement or employment by the organisation (HRW, 2021).

Accessibility to education and health care was already severely restricted in Afghanistan prior to Taliban control, thus restricting women's travel and work opportunities had far-reaching repercussions. 3.7 million Afghan children – 60 percent of them were females – were not attending school prior to the Taliban taking control of the country (Reliefweb, 2018). It is predicted that by 2020, one-third of the population would have "no access to a functional health centre within two hours of their home" (The Lancet, 2020).

The 23-year-old activist Kawsar worked for women's rights in Keshem in the Badakhshan Province before August 15th. Before that, she worked for women's rights in the city. In her neighbourhood, Kawsar promoted awareness about women's rights and domestic abuse. Even leaving our houses is forbidden for women in the Islamic Emirate the Taliban." Unknown callers threaten us, so we hang up the phone, scared to open it. According to her, living under the Islamic Emirate is very challenging for her and her family. According to Kawsar, women who ventured into the city without a mahram were subjected to physical and verbal abuse. When I was a women's rights activist, I didn't wear a chadari a full-body hijab that covers the whole head and body. Taking a mahram and a chadari to the hospital or the city is really tough for us (FIDH, 2021)."

The international evacuation and terrorist threat

Aspiring schoolgirls in Afghanistan are being marginalised by the Taliban, who are compromising their right to an education. A total disregard for the HR of Afghan women and girls in a society where the collective conscience of school-age girls having been forced to stay at home and lose out on an educational still exists. Girls' secondary education has been forbidden in Afghanistan, making it the only nation in the world where this is the case (The World Bank, 2022).

Girls' secondary schools, which serve students aged 12 to 18 years old, have been shuttered in all but two provinces until September 17, when the strikes started. Schools in Zabul, Sar-e-Pul, Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, and Kunduz, according to media sources, have reopened (France 24, 2021). There's no word yet on when the mall will be fully reopened (Rahimi, 2021). Although FIDH has been informed that two other provinces may soon be opening secondary schools for females, this has not been confirmed by the organisation. The "temporary" restriction on females' education imposed by the Taliban between 1996 and 2001 lasted the whole time the Taliban were in power (BBC, 2021).

The Taliban banned girls in schools seven to 12 from completing their yearly examinations in Herat, a further indication of their lack of dedication to deliver that females had access to school. For all females, but especially those in their last year of high school who are studying for the national university admission test, this will have a significant effect. Secondary schools in Herat reopened on November 6, 2021, in part because of the emotional address of youngster Sotooda Forotan to the Taliban, but only lasted for ten days before being shut down again (Rukhshana Media, 2021).

The Taliban continues to pose a threat to human rights advocates. According to UN Special Rapporteur on HRs Defenders Mary Lawlor, who spoke with 100 Afghan human rights defenders, those who stand up for human rights face a variety of violations, including physical abuse, arrests, arbitrary detention, and even murder. HRs defenders are under greater danger under Taliban control, according to a joint study by FIDH, OMCT, with Amnesty International issued in September (FIDH, 2021). Some NGOs had their bank accounts stopped by the Taliban, according to the study. Dozens of HRs advocates have received threats, warning letters, and raids of their workplaces from FIDH members. In a list of 830 important human rights activists created by AHRDC members, the AHRDC determined that most of them were at "high danger" or "very high risk." They were frightened to work for fear of being attacked by the Taliban, according to the AHRDC's contacts (Reuters, 2021).

There is evidence to support the idea that criminal or terrorist organisations may shift their identities along a continuum based on their activities and goals. These organisations have the ability to transform from one type to another, and to mutate or consolidate together to form hybrid organisations with terrorist and criminal capabilities mixed. When the existing condition of a converged organisation collapses, the organisation has the potential to fall into a black hole state. Terrorist organisations thrive in weak or failed governments, according to the black hole theory. Several studies have examined the state-level consequences of these "black hole states" or "terrorist safe havens" states (Phillips and Davis, 2022).

As previously said, the Taliban serve as an excellent case study for this purpose in that Makarenko (2004), in her work describing the crime-terror continuum (and others; see Campana and Ducol, 2011), describes Afghanistan as a failed state, but because the group's criminal and terrorist actions are widely documented. Terrorists who started out with strictly religious objectives have transformed into an organisation that is equally proficient at organised crime and terrorism, according to experts (Kausar, Shah, and Waqas, 2021).

We propose three elements that might cause a transitioning organisation to enter a condition of "black hole." First and foremost, the organization should be able to function in the geopolitical setting of a failed or failing state. Second, the organisation must be engaged in both terrorist operations or organised criminal activities at the same time and on an ongoing basis. Last but not least, the organization's founding organising principle, or 'reason for being, must continue to have strategic significance for the group. Each of these characteristics is discussed in more detail and demonstrated below, using the Taliban movement as a case study. It is important to note that the first two criteria are not discriminating, but rather preconditions for the black hole state. To put it another way, their presence is required for the existence of a black hole state by definition. This is why we put them here, even though they are only preconditions for the black hole state. The operational environment and abilities of a group are organizational-level characteristics, not state-level ones (Phillips and Davis, 2022).

The "black hole' theory', which is literally at the heart of Makarenko's (2004) crime-terror continuum model, highlights the final danger to international security presented by transnational organised criminal organisations. The black hole theory, which refers especially to the fusion of organised crime with terrorism, goes beyond the earlier stage of convergence because it happens in a weak or failing state that is unable to oppose such organisations, hence creating the circumstances for the continuance of the groups' illicit activities. This absence of political will on the part of the government is the first requirement for our expansion of black hole theory (Phillips and Davis, 2022).

It is difficult to find indications of black holes in the real world. It's because black holes need both a failing state and an organised criminal or terrorist organisation to exist at the same time. Afghanistan has been referred to as a "black hole state" because of its lack of central authority, constant instability caused by factional feuds between contending warlords, and the shelter provided by Afghanistan's political climate to a wide array of terrorist organisations and transnational organised crime gangs because the Soviet Union departed from Afghanistan in 1989 (Kausar, Shah, and Waqas, 2021).

After the Soviet Union withdrew its soldiers from Afghanistan, the Taliban were able to cement their dominance over the nation, eventually becoming the de facto dominant government in the country. According to Reese (2012), the Taliban offered social welfare services throughout its reign as the ruling party from 1996 to 2001, basically completing certain tasks normally associated with governing a sovereign state. The Taliban, on the other hand, did not undertake these initiatives for charitable motives, but rather for their own self-interest (Wani, 2021).

A significant portion of the Taliban movement's power may be found in an area of Pakistan that is also poorly controlled. Having followed the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban's central leadership abandoned the nation and relocated to Pakistan, where they were able to reorganise its operations. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Taliban arose, a loose confederation of local tribes and military leaders sympathetic to Mullah Omar, but distinct from the Afghan Taliban in terms of organisation and command. For a system to operate beyond what the Pakistani government is capable of providing, it must be found in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Kausar, Shah, and Waqas, 2021).

The legal governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are powerless to curtail the Taliban's criminal and terrorist activities, so they may do so with relative impunity. In order for a mutant organisation to exist in a failing or weak state, such as Afghanistan, it must enter the black hole (and the FATA and NWFP portions of Pakistan). Consequently, it is not a sufficient requirement in and of itself (Phillips and Davis, 2022).

For an organisation to be eligible to apply into the black hole, it must be actively involved in both terrorism and organised crime on a long-term basis. For better or worse, the organisation has to be a mutated version of itself, whose danger stems from its dualistic nature. The Taliban have a long history of religion inspired terrorism, which has been widely documented. As a consequence of their harbouring of Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan, the Taliban learned and adapted the terrorist organization's tactics. Suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were used in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of this strategy (Wani, 2021).

There is little doubt that, as previously reported Taliban activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrates the movement's fervour for using violence to accomplish its ideological goal. Militant Taliban fighters continue to wage war against NATO coalition troops, Afghan police, Pakistani military, even ordinary people in Afghanistan. The pervasive violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a paradigmatic example of the Taliban's target selection patterns or modus operandi, which they use in their quest to eradicate challenges to their extremist ideology, including their extreme ideology itself (Platt et al., 2013).

The Taliban, despite their long history as purveyors of religious violence, are also skilled in the world of organised crime. As a result of their accession to power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, the Taliban has been heavily involved in the opium and heroin markets. Afghanistan is home to a feudal society in which opium and heroin are the lifeline (Phillips and Davis, 2022), with profit being extracted at every level of the trade.

The Taliban's participation in the opium or heroin markets is a significant part of their identity, as well as the danger they represent to regional and international security, and it is crucial to understand why. However, it is also crucial to realise that Taliban commanders and their forces have expanded their interests in organised crime to include a wider range of commodities, including contraband (Reese, 2012), as well as contraband such as guns, narcotics, and chemical products (Rashid, 2010).

Unlike the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban has extended its organised criminal operations to include those of other countries. Bank robberies, car thefts, and abduction for ransom schemes are among the crimes committed by the Taliban groups that have assimilated experienced criminals from Pakistan in order to benefit from their experience. Kidnapping for ransom is said to be one of the most lucrative sources of income for the Pakistan Taliban (Reese, 2012). Almost all of the revenues from these endeavours are funnelled into the Taliban's coffers.

People in Afghanistan and Pakistan who work for the Taliban now do a lot of different kinds of illegal things. During the time when the Taliban was a tightly-knit resistance movement, they changed into a loosely connected as well as intersecting channel of organised criminals who could make a lot of money from a lot of different things. They could make a lot from drug trafficking. As a consequence, the second criteria for entering the black hole has been met by this mutation.

Black Hole theory extends to include a third component: an organization that has gone from being mainly driven by political or religious ideas to one that is equally concerned with making money. To summarise, according to Makarenko's (2004) original definition of the crime-terror continuum, it is very feasible for a type of entire transformation to occur wherein the organisation ends up on the opposite side of it as they began. This is known as a "reverse metamorphosis." An organisation that has entered the black hole condition, on the other hand, is not capable of completing this comprehensive change. For better or worse, the organisation cannot renounce its initial organising concept, or, as a result, its religious or political goals. In order to retain its strategic importance, an organization's raison d'être must remain an intrinsic part of the group's identity. Therefore, it may be possible to avoid creating a black hole by altering or discarding the original idea.

As a result of the Taliban's strict interpretation and application of Sharia law, the organisation is already built on these two principles from the start  (Atran, 2010). In the past, Mullah Omar as well as the Taliban's Supreme Shura (Rashid, 2010), who reigned over a hierarchical and monolithic organisation, presided over this radical agenda. On the other hand, the Taliban movement is no longer a single entity (Acharya et al., 2009). The Taliban movement may currently be described as a "fragmented, international force devoid of many of the group's former characteristics" (Peters, 2009). According to Schmidt (2010), the Taliban's organisational structure has evolved from a "spider" to a "starfish," illustrating the trend from consolidation to fragmentation (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006). To a large extent, this grouping exemplifies the Taliban's recent reorganisation into a more dispersed and decentralised structure.

The crime-terror nexus has received much interest lately, both in terms of theory and statistics showing how the two are interwoven throughout the world. It's more necessary than ever to understand the conditions that weaken national and international security because of the shift from monolithic organisations that specialise in certain transgressions to decentralised networks of multi-threat generalists. As an addition to the existing body of knowledge, this paper tries to specify the requirements that must be followed for a mutant crime-terrorist organisation to be allowed into the black hole, which is based on the black hole theory. This is what we've deduced by looking at the Taliban. Another effort to link crime-terror and black hole theory has been made by including elements of organisations required for forming black hole states. A small theoretical addition is provided by this article, which states that future assessments of black hole theory should include organization-specific properties. We propose that we should go beyond a narrow emphasis on attributes at the state level. Rather than nations, criminal and terrorist organisations pose the most immediate risks to national, regional, and global security under a black hole state. Theoretical and empirical evaluations will be incomplete if the characteristics of such players are not taken into consideration.

Aljazeera, 2021. Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

BBC, 2021. Afghan women to have rights within Islamic law, Taliban say. [online] BBC News. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

BBC, 2021. Article 26: Right to education. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Boni, F., 2021. Afghanistan 2020: the US-Taliban peace deal, intra-Afghan talks and regional implications. Asia Maior, 31, pp.465-478.

CFR, 2021. Timeline: U.S. War in Afghanistan. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Change, M. and Naeem, S., 2021. Pashtoon Culture and their Love for Islam. Journal of Islamic Civilization and Culture, 4(02), pp.25-31.

Daccess, 2022. UN Security Council. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Davidson, J. and Monteleone, C., 2022. The 2021 G20 and Italy: keeping our dreams alive?. Contemporary Italian Politics, pp.1-17.

FIDH, 2021. Afghanistan: Taliban wasting no time in stamping out human rights says new briefing. [online] International Federation for Human Rights. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

FIDH, 2021. Broken promises: Civil society under siege after 100 days of Taliban takeover. [online] International Federation for Human Rights. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

France 24, 2021. Some girls return to high school in Afghan province - France 24. [online] France 24. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Gannon, K., 2021. Taliban official: Strict punishment, executions will return. [online] AP NEWS. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Hoffman, B., 2018. Al-Qaeda’s Resurrection. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

HRW, 2021. Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid Workers. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Iqbal, K. and De Silva, S., 2013. Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism, 8(1), pp.72-86.

Jadoon, A., 2021. What is ISIS-K? Two terrorism experts on the group behind the deadly Kabul airport attack and its rivalry with the Taliban. [online] The Conversation. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Kamal, O., 2021. After the Collapse of the Taliban: A Study of the US Statebuilding Failure (Doctoral dissertation, Webster University).

Kausar, S., Shah, M.H. and Waqas, M., 2021. THE PORTRAYAL OF TALIBAN IN THE EDITORIALS OF ENGLISH PRESS OF PAKISTAN: AN EVALUATION FROM 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2007. Pakistan Journal of International Affairs, 4(3).

Khan, H., 2021. The Taliban is bringing back its feared ministry of ‘vice’ and ‘virtue. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Khan, S., 2013. Dynamic militant insurgency in conflicted border spaces: Ferghana, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and Kashmir. Center for Strategic and International Studies, p.12.

Maizland, L., 2021. The Legacy of the U.S. War in Afghanistan in Nine Graphics. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Maley, W. and Jamal, A.S., 2022. Diplomacy of Disaster: The Afghanistan ‘Peace Process’ and the Taliban Occupation of Kabul. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1(aop), pp.1-32.

McCann, D., 2022. Joe Biden and the struggle for the world. Quadrant, 66(1-2), pp.22-26.

NBC News, 2021. Opinion | Al Qaeda is loving our withdrawal from Afghanistan. [online] NBC News. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

NPR, 2021. Read What The Taliban Told NPR About Their Plans For Afghanistan. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Phillips, M. and Davis, S., 2022. The nexus of organized crime and terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In The Nexus Between Organized Crime and Terrorism. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Phillips, M. and Davis, S., 2022. The nexus of organized crime and terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In The Nexus Between Organized Crime and Terrorism. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Plastun, V.N., 2021. “Islamic State of Khorasan Province”-A Threat to the Central Asian Region. Vestnik NSU. Series: History and Philology, 20(4), pp.169-175.

Platt, P., Warrington, J., Maidment, J., Brennan, H., Arasteh, A. and Dickinson, G., 2013. Taliban attack American embassy in Kabul on Christmas Day. [online] The Telegraph. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Rahimi, G., 2021. Afghan Girls Urge Officials to Reopen Schools Across Country | TOLOnews. [online] TOLOnews. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Reliefweb, 2018. GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Reuters, 2021. Three dead after anti-Taliban protests in Jalalabad-witnesses. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Rukhshana Media, 2021. The Taliban closed girl’s secondary schools in Herat province 10 days after reopening – Rukhshana Media. [online] Rukhshana Media. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Shih, G., 2021. Taliban minister says women can attend university, but not alongside men. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Souleimanov, E.A. and Colombo, R., 2021. Vendetta and Jihadist Infighting. Middle East Policy.

Spagnolello, O., Gatti, S., Esmati, S., Shahir, M.A.A. and Portella, G., 2022. Kabul airport suicide attack: report of a mass casualty. European journal of trauma and emergency surgery, pp.1-2.

State, 2020. Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Stepanova, E., 2022. Russia, Central Asia and Non?traditional Security Threats from Afghanistan following the US Withdrawal. Global Policy, 13(1), pp.138-145.

Strand, A. and Suhrke, A., 2021. Quiet Engagement with the Taliban. Survival, 63(5), pp.35-46.

Tabaar, M.A., 2021. Iran's War within: Ebrahim Raisi and the Triumph of the Hard-Liners. Foreign Aff., 100, p.155.

The World Bank, 2022. Girls' Education. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

UN News, 2021. Anxiety in Afghanistan as Taliban struggles for legitimacy. [online] UN News. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

UNAMA, 2021. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres remarks to High-Level Ministerial meeting on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. [online] UNAMA. Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Wani, Z.A., 2021. Afghanistan’s Neo-Taliban Puzzle. South Asia Research, 41(2), pp.220-237.

Wood, J., 2021. Taliban takeover likely to drive regional, global terrorism threats. [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 5 April 2022].

Cite This Work

To export a reference to this article please select a referencing stye below:

My Assignment Help. (2022). The Essay On The Current State Of Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule." (70 Characters). Retrieved from

"The Essay On The Current State Of Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule." (70 Characters)." My Assignment Help, 2022,

My Assignment Help (2022) The Essay On The Current State Of Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule." (70 Characters) [Online]. Available from:
[Accessed 25 February 2024].

My Assignment Help. 'The Essay On The Current State Of Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule." (70 Characters)' (My Assignment Help, 2022) <> accessed 25 February 2024.

My Assignment Help. The Essay On The Current State Of Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule." (70 Characters) [Internet]. My Assignment Help. 2022 [cited 25 February 2024]. Available from:

Get instant help from 5000+ experts for

Writing: Get your essay and assignment written from scratch by PhD expert

Rewriting: Paraphrase or rewrite your friend's essay with similar meaning at reduced cost

Editing: Proofread your work by experts and improve grade at Lowest cost

250 words
Phone no. Missing!

Enter phone no. to receive critical updates and urgent messages !

Attach file

Error goes here

Files Missing!

Please upload all relevant files for quick & complete assistance.

Other Similar Samples

sales chat
sales chat