Legal Analysis Of Ku-ring-gai Council V Buyozo Pty Limited Case: An Essay.

In the Ku-ring-gai Council v Buyozo Pty Limited case, Buyozo Pty Ltd sought to change a requirement of a development consent and lower the advancement obligations for the construction of a store room in NSWLEC 2 against Ku-ring-gai Council. It was decided that the petitioner could consolidate three existing lots and make improvements and modifications to an existing facility in order to construct a self-storage unit and discrete office complexes in accordance with the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW).

The developers had to provide "gross floor area" charges in compliance only with Ku-ring-gai Contributions Plan 2010 (KCP) as part of The Development Consent under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. According to the Appellant, the obligations were incorrectly calculated due to the development's corridor areas being included in the computations. Whether the applicant was entitled to a refund of some of the contribution he had indeed made was determined by the Court's examination of the word "gross floor area" in the Ku-ring-gai Local Environment Plan 2015 (Andrews, 2021). The challenge was granted, and a credit of $3113,091.32 was given to the petitioner.

Pepper J ruled that a self-storage facility's passageways did not count as "floor space" (GFA) under the standard protocol LEP definition. Those passageways weren't included since paragraph (h) excludes "any place used for the disembarkation of goods (particularly accessibility to it)" from the definition of the word. Required to this, the Council overestimated the s7.11 contributions payable in respect of the expansion since this obligations were computed by allusion to the GFA of the structure. Despite the fact that the payments was already deposited, Pepper J modified the s7.11 criterion. In Pepper J's opinion, this was nevertheless useful because: 1. the right calculation of "gross floor space" upon the proper construction of this phrase in the LEP was of public benefit; if it was altered, the Council would have to take the excess into effect before imposing any conditions on any potential development applications filed by the petitioner, as required by the EPA Act's sections 7.11(1), (3), and (6), and 3. an equitable claim, such as one for monetary damages, might be raised by the overpayment, even if in a different suit in a different court (Andrews, 2021).

According to a decision issued by the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal found that: • Pepper J's reading of the exemption to paragraph (h) in the definition of GFA was wrong, and that there was no miscalculation. However, the EPA Act's modification powers do not extend to changing the condition at issue, and modifying it would have served no purpose.

loading or unloading area for products (including access to it). The Court ruled that paragraph (h) of the definition of gross floor area necessitates an investigation into the access to transporting places. The only places where items could be loaded or unloaded were the authorized loading zones on floors 1 and 2, which were reserved for trucks and other large trucks. Only the entrances provided access to the specified loading places for trucks and cars.

Gross Floor Space Calculation

To get to authorized loading spaces, automobiles and trucks cannot utilize the building's internal staircases, lifts, or hallways, Preston CJ stated. It doesn't matter if a truck or vehicle is parked in a designated loading area or a self-storage unit is accessed via stairs, lifts, or hallways once the products have been unloaded from the truck or vehicle (Cavallaro, 2021). For the self-storage units, these means of transportation are useful, but they do not have any bearing on how the specified loading places are accessed.

What's more, in an unexpected turn of events, the Supreme Court rewrites the long-standing interpretation of the EPA Act's s.4.55(1A), (2), and 4.56(1) modification powers, stating that they can be used to change any feature of consent, even if it's just conditions. As a result of this decision, a hitherto unrecognized limitation on the modification authority was found to exist in the terms of the sections themselves, which the Court upheld (Clarke, 2021).

Accordingly, even though it is stated that these powers can be used to alter a 'development consent,' a judge ruled that in order for them to be put into practice, the "development to which [the consent] as changed refers" must be altered before the power can be used. Because of this, the ability to modify only applies to developments for which consent has already been granted. Therefore, the modifying power was not used because reducing contributions had little effect on how things were actually developing. After the payment had already been made, Preston CJ ruled that the development consent could not be modified to amend condition 30 (Cavallaro, 2021). To put it another way, a condition of permission requires the future performance or nonperformance of an action. Development consent conditions cannot be changed retroactively, hence this rule is true.

No one knows if it's conceivable to change a condition that doesn't change the development while still changing the development that the consent pertains to, but it's a possibility (Clarke, 2021). As a matter of law, the ruling appears to support the concept that any complaint to stipulations mandating taxes, fees, or bonds (or other factors that do not alter the development itself) must be challenged either in: (but only if severance of the condition is possible).

Since an appeal has the downside of permitting the opening up of other concerns and also stopping that consent from acting until the issue is addressed, developers have generally used the modification power rather than an appeal to handle contributions issues

The Court further concluded that the amendment had no purpose because the amount had already been paid. Since the overcharge was made as a condition of receiving connected component under this Act, a modification (which is merely prospective) could not preclude it from being a "consumers with respect as a prerequisite of grant of development consent under this Act" as referenced in s7.11(6)(a). Because of this, any subsequent development application would not be able to take into account the overypayment under s7.11(6)(a). A compensatory damages action too was rejected by the Court for the obvious reason that any action to recover a tax must be brought within a year of the payment date, as stipulated in section 2(1)(b) of the Recovery of Imposts Act 1963.  

References

Andrews, N. (2021). (21-050) Ku-ring-gai Council v Buyozo Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 177. Environmental Law Reporter, 40(21-050/21-059), 2.

Cavallaro, V. (2021). (21-027) Buyozo Pty Limited v Ku-ring-gai Council [2021] NSWLEC 2. Environmental Law Reporter, 40(21-022/21-032), 5-6.

Clarke, P. (2021). (21-051) Council of the City of Ryde v Azizi [2021] NSWCA 165. Environmental Law Reporter, 40(21-050/21-059), 2-3.